
STUDIES ON THE CĀRVĀKA/LOKĀYATA

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Professor Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya
a never-failing friend

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Preface

I started writing on the Cārvāka, the most uncompromising materialist school of philosophy in ancient India, from 1995 and have continued to work on its different aspects. My researches on this subject are now being offered in a revised and enlarged form, thanks to the interest shown by Dr Federico Squarcini, Florence University.

Each chapter is meant to be read separately, hence some repetitions have been retained. In some cases, references have been made to other chapters. This makes every chapter self-complete and, at the same time, helps readers follow my line of argument.

Admittedly, there is paucity of material relating to the Cārvāka. Still, as in the case of the Presocratic philosophers of Greece, it is possible to reconstruct the basic tenets of this system on the basis of whatever little is found in the works of its opponents and the extracts quoted by them. Notwithstanding distortions, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata has emerged as the lone contender against the pro-Vedic Brahminical schools on the one hand, and the non-Vedic Buddhist and Jain schools on the other. Besides the orthodoxy prevailing around the Vedas, belief in after-life and after-world has been the bone of contention. This will be evident from the way I have arranged the Cārvāka fragments in Chapter 6.

My endeavour has been to disprove certain notions about the Cārvāka/Lokāyata —two of which are generally admitted as being beyond doubt. They are as follows: (a) the Cārvāka-s did not approve of any other instrument of cognition except perception, and (b) they advocated unalloyed sensualism and hedonism. I have tried to show that both the charges are groundless calumnies. As to the first charge, there is enough evidence to show that the Cārvāka-s, in spite of their difference of opinion in other areas, did admit inference in so far as it was grounded on perception. As to the second charge, my contention is that no authentic Cārvāka aphorisms have been cited by the opponents of the Cārvāka to support their view, Moreover, the same charge was brought also against Epicurus, despite the fact that he disapproved of sensual gratification as the end of life. The common belief that all materialists are nothing but sensualists is a misconception.

It has also been my endeavour to establish the fact that there existed a pre-Cārvāka school of materialism in India, although there is no way to prove that the Cārvāka system grew out of it. On the other hand, if the evidence provided by the *Manimekalai* (and indirectly supported by the *Mahābhārata*) is admitted, the two schools seem to have continued to exist side by side. The chief difference between the two is that the earlier materialists took the number of elements to be five (earth, air, fire, water and space) while the Cārvāka-s admitted only the first four.

It is now for the readers to judge how far I have succeeded in my attempts.

Acknowledgements

Needless to say, I am indebted to all scholars who have written on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. However, special mention must be made of my friends, Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz. They have helped me in all possible ways and I do not know how to thank them enough. Even when I differ from their views (for example, whether Jayarāśi was a Cārvāka of some sort) my admiration for their scholarship is unbounded.

Professor Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya and Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan always stood by me and helped me unravel the intricacies of some passages. Dr Sadhukhan was also kind enough to translate some verses and sentences from Tibetan, a language I do not know. Prof. M.S. Khan and Dr M. Firoze helped me with the Arabic and Persian texts. I shall fail in my duty if I do not thank them too.

Without the assistance of my pupils and collaborators the task of editing, proof-reading and preparing the press copy could not have been possible. All of them did it as love's labour. I take this opportunity to thank Amitava Bhattacharya, Rinku Choudhuri, Prodyut Datta, Siddhartha Datta, Malayendu Dinda, Nabendu Roy and Subhendu Sarkar.

Thanks are also due to the editors of the journals and commemoration volumes in which my articles and papers first appeared.

Abbreviations

ABORI	*Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* (Poona)
ABS	Sadānanda Kāśmīraka. *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*
AC	Hemacandra. *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*
ĀḌ	Jayantabhaṭṭa. *Āgamaḍambara*
ĀLVṛ	Jñānaśrībhadra. *Āryālaṅkāvatāravṛtti*
AS	Vidyānandasvāmin. *Aṣṭasahasrī*
Aṣṭ	Pāṇini. *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. See Katre.
ĀSVṛ	Śīlāṅka. *Ācārāṅgasūtravṛtti*
AYVD	Hemacandra. *Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā*
AYVD (trans.)	Thomas 1968
BC	Aśvaghoṣa. *Buddhacarita*
BCA	Śāntideva. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*
Bhām	Vācaspatimiśra. *Bhāmatī*. See *BS*.
BhD	Nīlakaṇṭha. *Bhāratabhāvadīpa* (Comm. on the *Mahābhārata*). See *Mbh*.
BI	The Bibliotheca Indica (The Asiatic Society, Calcutta)
BORI	The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona)
BṛS	Varāhamihirācārya. *Bṛhat Saṃhitā*
Bṛ.Up.	*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* in *EPU*.
BS	*The Brahma Sūtra with Śaṅkara Bhāṣya and Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala.*

BSBh	Bhāskarācārya. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*
Ch. Up.	*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* in *EPU*
C/L	*Cārvāka/Lokāyata*
DA	*Divyāvadāna*
DN	*Dīghanikāya*
Dohā	Abhayadeva. Sanskrit comm. on Sarahapāda's *Dohākoṣa*
EPU	*Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads*
ERE	*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*
FLPH	Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow)
GBhB	Baladeva. *Gītābhāṣya. Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* 1845 Śaka.
GBhM	Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. *Gītābhāṣya.* 1978
GBhN	Nīlakaṇṭha. *Gītābhāṣya.* 1978.
GBhŚa	Śaṅkarācārya. *Gītābhāṣya Śrīmadbhagavadgītā.* 1978.
GBhŚr	Śrīdharsvāmī. *Gītābhāṣya Śrīmadbhagavad-gītā.* 1978.
GBhVi	Viśvanātha. *Gītābhāṣya. Śrīmadbhagavadgītā.* 1845 Śaka.
GrBh	Cakradhara. *Granthibhaṅga.* See *NM.*
GV	Jinabhadra. *Gaṇadharavāda*
HV	*Harivaṃśa*
IHR	*The Indian Historical Review* (New Delhi)
ISPP	Indian Studies Past and Present (Publications).
ISPP	*Indian Studies Past and Present* (Calcutta).
JAS(B)	*Journal of the Asiatic Society (of Bengal)* [Kolkata (formerly Calcutta)].
The Jātaka	Fausbøll 1891.
JJ	*Jain Journal* (Kolkata)
JM	Āryaśura. *Jātakamālā*
JñāNi	Jñānaśrīmitra. *Nibandhāvali*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (London)
KA	*Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*
Kāśikā	Vāmana-Jayāditya. See also Shastri, Shukla.
KB	Varadarājamiśra. *Kusumāñjali-bodhanī*
KM	Rājaśekhara. *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*
KS	Vātsyāyana. *Kāmasūtra*
KS (trans.)	*Kāma-Sūtra of Vatsayana* (sic), Mukherji 1945.
LS	*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Nanjio 1923).
LS (trans.)	Suzuki 1956.
LṢDSam	Anonymous. *Laghuṣaḍdarśana-samuccayasaṭīka*

LTN	Haribhadra. *Lokatattvanirṇaya*
MA	Candrakīrti. *Madhyamakāvatāra*
MadVṛ	Nāgārjuna. *Madhyamakavṛttiḥ*
Mahāp	*Mahāpurāṇa (Tisaṭṭhimahāpurisaguṇālaṃkāra)*
Mān.	*Mānasollāsa Saṃgraha*
Manu	*Manusmṛti*
MAP	Kamalaśīla. *Madhyamakālaṅkāra-pañjikā*
MB	*Mugdhabodhinī (Nītivākyāmṛtavyākhyā)*
Mbh	*The Mahābhārata*
MPu	*Matsya Purāṇa*
MŚ	Nāgārjuna. *Madhyamakaśāstra*
MVṛ	Māṭhara. *Māṭharavṛtti.* See *SK.*
NBh	Bhāsarvajña. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*
NC	Śrīharṣa. *Naiṣadhacarita*
NC (trans.)	Handiqui 1956. *Naiṣadhacarita of Śrīharṣa*
ND	Tarkavāgīśa. *Nyāya Darśana* (1981-89)
NCC	*New Catalogus Catalogorum*
NK	Udayana. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*
NKC	Parbhācandra. *Nyāyakumudacandra*
NM	Jayantabhaṭṭa. *Nyāyamañjari*
NP	Tarkavāgīśa. *Nyāya Paricaya*
NPr	Nārāyaṇa. *Naiṣadhaprakāśa* (Comm. on *NC*)
NS	*Nyāyasūtra's* (Ruben 1928)
NSBh	Vātsyāyana. *Bhāṣya* (Tarkavāgīśa 1981-89)
NSi	See *PrPañ.*
NTD	Jayasiṃhasūri. *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*
NVV	Vādirājasūri. *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*
OED	*Oxford English Dictionary*
OUP	Oxford University Press
Pandeya	See *MŚ.*
PaPan	Vāsudevasuri. *Padapañcikā*
Pari	Udayana. *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya pariśuddhiḥ*
PC	Kṛṣṇamiśra. *Prabodhacandrodaya*
PKM	Prabhācandra. *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*
PM	Hemacandra. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*
PPH	People's Publishing House (New Delhi)
PPu	*Padma Purāṇa.* Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa
PrPa	Candrakīrti. *Prasannapadā* (on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakaśāstra*). See *MŚ.*
PrPañ	Śālikanāthamiśra. *Prakaraṇapañcikā*
PrPr	Bhāvaviveka. *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti* (on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakaśāstra*). See *MŚ.*
Pr. Up.	*Praśna Upaniṣad* in *EPU*
PTS	Pali Text Society (London)
PV	Dharmakīrti. *Pramāṇavārttikam*

PVA	Prajñākaragupta. *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*
PVSVṬ	Karṇakagomin. *Pramāṇavārttikasvopajña-vṛttiṭīkā*
PVVṛ	Manorathnandin's *vṛtti* on *PV*
Rām.	*The Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*
RKD	Jagannāthamiśra (comp.). *Rasakalpadruma*
RNi	Ratnakīrti. *Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvaliḥ*
RVP	Śālikanātha. *Ṛjuvimalapañcikā* (on Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*)
Ṣaḍ-DS	Rājaśekharasūri. *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.* See *ṢDSam* (Varanasi ed.).
SBE	The Sacred Books of the East
ŚBh	*Śārīrakabhāṣya* by Śaṅkara on *BS*
ŚD	Pārthasārathimiśra. *Śāstradīpikā*
SDK	Mādhava Sarasvatī. *Sarvadarśanakaumudī*
SDKa	Damodara Mahapatrasastri. *Sarvadarśanakaumudī*
SDPS	*Saddharma-puṇḍarīka Sūtram*
SDS	Sāyaṇa-Mādhava. *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*
SDS (trans.)	Cowell, Gough, ed. Joshi 1981; *C/L*
ṢDSam	Haribhadra. *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*
SDŚi	Śrīkāṃcī Rāmānujācārya. *Sarvadarśanaśiromaṇiḥ*
ŚHŚA	Hemacandra. *Śrīsiddha-hemacandra-śabdānuśāsanam*
ŚHVP	Hemacandra. *Śrīsiddha-haimavṛhatprakriyā (Mahāvyākaraṇa)*
SK	Īśvarakṛṣṇa. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*
ŚKA	*Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna*
SKa	Haribhadra. *Samarāicca Kahā*
SKSVṛ	Śīlāṅka. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtravṛtti*
SMS	*Sarvamatasaṃgraha*
SPhS	*Sāmañña-phala-sutta* in *DN*, Pt.1.
SŚ	Sarvajñātman Muni. *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka*
SSaṃ	*Suśruta Saṃhitā* with *Nibandha-saṃgraha*
SSS	*Sarva[darśana]siddhāntasaṅgraha*
ST	Yāmuna. *Siddhitraya*
STP	Siddhasena. *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa.* See *TBV.*
Svi	Utpalabhaṭṭa (Bhaṭṭotpala). *Saṃhitā-vivṛti.* See *BṛS.*
SVM	Malliṣeṇa. *Syādvādamañjarī.* See *AYVD.*
SVR	Vādidevasūri. *Syādvādaratnākara*
ŚVS	Haribhadra. *Śāstravārtā-Samuccaya*
SVSS	*Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sārasaṃgraha*
SVṬ	Anantavīrya. *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*

Śv.Up.	*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* in *EPU*
TBV	Abhayadevasūri. *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*
Ten Suttas	*Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya*
TK	Vācaspatimiśra. *Tattvakaumudī* in *Sāṃkhyakārikā*
TRD	Guṇaratna. *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*
TS	Śāntarakṣita. *Tattvasaṅgraha*
TSP	Kamalaśīla. *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā.* See *TS.*
TSPC	Hemacandra. *Triṣaṣṭiśalākā-puruṣa-carita*
TSPC (trans.)	Johnson 1931
TSV	Vidyānandī. *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika*
Tt.Up	*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* in *EPU*
TUS	Jayarāśibhaṭṭa. *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*
TUS (Franco)	Franco 1987 [1994]
UBhPK	Siddharṣi. *Upamitibhavaprapañcākathā*
Up.Bhā.	*Upaniṣadbhāṣyam*
VāBh/SVṛ	Jinabhadra. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* and *Svopajñavṛtti*
Vasu.	Saṅghadāsagaṇivācaka, *Vasudevahiṃḍī*
VDMP	*Viṣṇudharmottara Mahāpurāṇa*
VK	Amalānanda. *Vedānta-Kalpataru.* See *BS.*
VMT	Cirañjīvaśarman (Bhaṭṭācāryya). *Vidvanmodataraṅgiṇī*
VP	Bhatṛhari. *Vākyapadīya*
VPS	Vidyāraṇya (Sāyaṇa-Mādhava). *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha*
VPu	*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*
VS	Sadānanda Yati (Yogīndra). *Vedānta-sāra*
Vyo	Vyomaśivācārya. *Vyomavatī*
YS	Hemacandra. *Yogaśāstram*
YTC	Somadevasūri. *Yaśastilakacampū*



Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

I
Origin of Materialism in India: Royal or Popular?

Erich Frauwallner, the celebrated historian of Indian philosophy, held that materialism in India was created for the circle of Realpolitikers, practical politicians like Cāṇakya. In it they found a doctrine which, by denying the existence of God, after-life, heaven and hell, etc., put out of their way all moral scruples that were hindrances to their actions. "It is, therefore, no accident," Frauwallner says, "that the first materialist whom tradition has handed down to us in living and vivid colours, is a King."[1] The king he mentions is a legendary one: Paesi (Pāyāsi), whose views are recorded in Prakrit (Jain) and Pali (Buddhist) works.[2]

A.K. Warder also proposes that "another materialist school, besides Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's, seems to have appeared among the kings themselves and especially their ministers including perhaps the celebrated Vessakara of Magadha, who in the *Anguttara Nikāya*, Vol. II, expresses a realist view in conformity with *Arthaśāstra Lokāyata.*"[3]

[1] Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216.

[2] See *Rāyapasenaijjam*, II = *Rāyapaseniyasutta (Paesikahanayam)* in Tripathi (ed.); *Pāyasi Suttanta* (*DN*, II: 23), trans. Rhys Davids (1910).

[3] Warder (1956), 55. He also says that the *KA* "certainly draws inspiration from the Lokāyata philosophy" (1971), 39.

Both Frauwallner and Warder arrived at the same conclusion on the basis of a supposed connection between materialism and Arthaśāstra, the science of polity. That the legendary founder of the Lokāyata/Cārvāka system and that of a school of Arthaśāstra bear the same name, viz. Bṛhaspati, seems to have contributed to this notion.

All this speculation, I contend, is wide of the mark. Let us take up the issues one by one.

I

First, king Paesi. In both Jain and Buddhist versions of the story, only one negative idea is stated: there is no soul. By various observations and experiments the king came to this conclusion. Much has been made of his "gruesome experiments".[4] The king is said to have thrown a thief alive in a brazen pot, with a brass lid strongly soldered laid over it, in order to see how the soul could escape after his death. He claims to have put another thief in a jar to check whether the weight of the man varied before and after his death, etc.

Frauwallner, it seems, took this story fabricated by the opponents of *dehātmavāda* (the view that there is no soul beyond the body) to be a record of real-life incidents. Hence, Paesi was held up by Frauwallner as "the first materialist". But we have another version of the same story in a later Jain source, *Samarāicca Kahā* (*Samarāditya Kathā*) by Haribhadra.[5] There is no mention of Paesi there, and though a king may be indirectly involved in this experiment, he is not the spokesman of *dehātmavāda*. Since this work has seldom been mentioned in connection with Lokāyata,[6] a summary of the debate between Piṅgakesa (Piṅgakeśa), a follower of a minister, and Vijayasiṃha, a Jain monk, may be given here.[7]

Piṅgakesa (hereafter abbreviated as P.) said that his grandfather had been a very wicked man, his soul ought to have been in hell, if the opponent's views were right; as he had loved him, his grandson, tenderly, he certainly would have warned him, but he did not do so. Therefore, P. concluded, his soul was no more in existence. Vijayasiṃha (V.) replied that a soul cannot get out of hell, just as a criminal shut up in a prison cannot get out of it and communicate even with his best friends.

P. then said that his father had been a very good man and had become a *śramaṇa*; accordingly he should be in heaven now; why did he not come to teach him as he might have done, being a god? V. replied that as a very poor man of low origin, who migrates to a distant country and acquires there riches and honours, forgets his former relations and friends, so a god, enjoying the delights of heaven, ceases to care for those with whom he lived on earth.

P. then related that a robber, who had been sentenced to death, was placed in an iron vessel hermetically sealed. The man died, but no soul was observed to issue from the vessel. V. replied that a famous conch-blower had similarly been put in an iron vessel; then he blew his conch, the sound was heard outside, though there was no opening at all.

P. said that a robber once was strangled, but his weight was found to be the same, before and after his death. V. replied that a bladder, filled with air and without it, was ascertained not to differ in weight.

At last P. said that a robber who had been sentenced to death, had been dissected into minute particles, but no soul could be detected. V. replied that a man had cut up a piece of *araṇi* wood into the smallest particles but among them no fire could be found which inheres the wood and comes forth by churning.

In all the versions of the story, the denier of soul is defeated by some Jain or Buddhist monk (there is no uniformity in this part) and is reduced to submission. The tale is thus tailor-made to denigrate a doctrine inimical to the Jain and Buddhist views (as well as the Brahminical). The Jains employed the story (based on examples and analogies, rather than arguments proper) to promote their doctrine, the Buddhists, theirs. There is no historical basis at all behind the story.

Another question may also be raised in this connection. If materialism originated in the royal circles, why do we not hear of any follower or ideological successor of Paesi? Epigraphic records reveal the religious affiliations of the kings. Many of them were adherents and/or patrons of the Brahminical sects (Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, etc.), some were Buddhists and Jains as well. But, barring one mention in a much later Tibetan work,

[4] Jayatilleke, 105.

[5] Haribhadra in Jacobi, III: 1, 63-81.

[6] Tucci refers to this work in passing (1925), reprinted in *C/L*, 389. He points out that "[t]he analogies which the Pāyasisuttanta shows to have with the Jaina Rāyapaseniya and some passages of Samarāiccakahā cannot be explained as mutual borrowings, but rather as various derivations from real doctrines followed in ancient times" (ibid.).

[7] I have reproduced (with some minor alterations) the summary given by Jacobi (ed.) in his introduction, li-liii.

History of Buddhism in India (1608) by Lama Tāranātha,[8] we do not find any king or prince professing Lokāyata. Surely we could legitimately expect at least a few more materialists in the rank of kings if the doctrine did originate among them.

The Dharmaśāstras uniformly condemn the *nāstika,* the reviler of the Vedās.[9] If there were Lokāyatikas among the kings, the Dharmaśāstras would have modified their attitude too. The kings and the law-givers used to live in symbiosis. There was no Church vs. State confrontation in the Brahminical tradition. So by applying both *ponendo ponens* (affirming the antecedent) and *tollendo tollens* (denying the consequent) we come to the same conclusion: there was no Lokāyatika king in India.

II

Second, the alleged connection between Lokāyata and Arthaśāstra.

As Kauṭilya (or Kauṭalya) tells us at the very beginning of his work, Arthaśāstra is meant "for the acquisition and protection of the world" (*pṛthivyā lābhe pālane ca*),[10] i.e., it teaches the king how to acquire and protect a kingdom. It is so named because it deals exclusively with only one of the three divisions (*varga*-s) of life, viz. material well-being (*artha*), the other two being spiritual good (*dharma*) and pleasure (*kāma*). All the three *varga*-s are to be attended to in equal measure, for all are mutually connected. Of these three, however, Kauṭilya considers *artha* to be the supreme one (*artha eva pradhāna iti kauṭilyaḥ*).[11]

The authors of all Arthaśāstra texts (there were many even before Kauṭilya, though we possess only his) would

[8] "The king's (Nemita's) first son followed the 'secret doctrine of the Lokāyata', the second worshipped Mahādeva, the third Viṣṇu, the fourth the secret [doctrine of the] Vedānta, the fifth the Digambara Kaṇaka and the sixth the *brahmacāri brāhmaṇa* Kuśa-putra [? Kauśika]. Each of them established his own centre." Tāranātha, 53.

What Tāranātha means by "the secret doctrine of the Lokāyata" is not clear. But the way he uses the word "secret" in relation to Vedānta seems to suggest that he was thinking of "philosophy" in general. He refers to Lokāyata in another passage (199), where it indubitably suggests *dehātmavāda.* (I would like to thank Dr Alaka Chattopadhyaya who explained the original Tibetan text to me, word for word.)

[9] *Manu,* 2.11, 4.30, 4.163, 8.22, etc. For a convenient compilation of the views of the Brahminical law-givers in regard to freethinking, see D. Chattopadhyaya (1976), 185-94.

[10] *KA*,1.1.1.

[11] Ibid.,1.7.4.

share this view. They would not deny either *artha* or *dharma* or *kāma.* But no materialist would accept *dharma* as a *varga* of life. Vātsyāyana in his *KS* quotes (rather paraphrases) a *sūtra* (aphorism) attributed to the Laukāyatika-s: "*dharma* is not to be performed."[12] Here lies the basic difference. The connection so naively made between Lokāyata and Arthaśāstra fails to take note of this. Just because both deal with the mundane world, it is not enough to link up the two; there is a gulf of difference between the views of a *trivargavādin* and a *lokāyatika.* Vātsyāyana too belonged to the former category. He rejects the Laukāyatika view as well as that of the *arthacintaka*-s, who also rejected *kāma.*[13]The concept of the three *varga*-s (later four, with liberation, *mokṣa,* added as a separate one) was the received view in the Brahminical tradition. Any school which preferred to serve only one or even two *varga*-s was not acceptable.[14]

But does Kauṭilya not mention the Bārhaspatya school of Arthaśāstra which believed that economics (*vārtā* = agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade) and the science of politics (*daṇḍanīti*) to be the only sciences?[15] They rejected the three Vedas as a subject of learning (*vidyā*) for the Vedic lore is only a cloak for one conversant with the ways of the world (*saṃvaraṇa-mātraṃ hi trayī lokāyātrāvida iti*).[16] Does it not prove that the followers of Bṛhaspati were covertly anti-religious?

Covertly, yes. Unlike the Lokāyatika-s, however, they did not declare their view openly. And to Vātsyāyana the *Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstra* (now lost) is the only Arthaśāstra, as the *Manu.* is the only Dharmaśāstra.[17] The *Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstra* then was as much orthodox as Kauṭilya's.

Let not the name of Bṛhaspati deceive us. From time to time, we hear of several Bṛhaspati-s.[18] The first is the preceptor of the gods (*suraguru*), second, the author of an Arthaśāstra, and third, that of a Dharmaśāstra. All of them

[12] *KS*,1.2.25 (Chowkhambha ed., 19). Jayantabhaṭṭa mentions the aphorism in the following form: *dharmo na kāryaḥ* (*NM*, Ch. 4, 1: 388). Peculiarly enough, this aphorism as found in Jayantabhaṭṭa has gone unnoticed in the collection of Bārhaspatya-sūtra-s compiled by D.R. Shastri and Namai.

[13] *KS,* 1.2.40. Kauṭilīya, however, accepts both *dharma* and *kāma* along with *artha* (1.7.3).

[14] *KS,* 1.2.51.

[15] *KA,* 1.2.4.

[16] *KA,* 1.2.5.

[17] *KS,* 1.1.6-7.

[18] For the Bṛhaspati-s, see Aiyangar, 79.

cannot be the same person. It was the *suraguru* who is credited with deceiving the demons (*asura*-s, *dānava*-s) by preaching anti-Vedic doctrines in disguise. The Purāṇa-s contain the story in slightly different versions.[19] It is due to him that the Lokāyata/Cārvāka system is called *Bārhaspatya-mata* as well. The *Bārhaspatya Dharmaśāstra,* like the Arthaśāstra bearing the name of Bṛhaspati, is unfortunately lost. But the fragments so far collected (as quoted or referred to in later works on Smṛti)[20] do not evince anything radically different from other existing Dharmaśāstra-s. There is no indication of anything anti-religious there (nor is it expected). The author of this work accepts Manu as the highest authority "because he has embodied the essence of the Veda in his work". This is surely a far cry from the Cārvāka which denounces the Vedas as hoax in no uncertain terms.[21]

Why does Kauṭilya then include Lokāyata as a branch of study fit for the kings?[22] Here too the identification of Lokāyata with Bārhaspatya-mata has led many scholars astray. Jacobi, for instance, approaches the question thus:

> Now it is difficult to believe that Kauṭilya, who acknowledges the entire social order founded on the Vedas, meant this grossly materialistic system by that *Lokāyata* which he puts on the same line together with *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* as a representative of *Ānvīkṣikī.* And still there is no doubt about it, because the Lokāyata doctrine is ascribed to Brihaspati, the teacher of the gods, and many of his verses handed down to us put in his mouth.[23]

The difficulty is created by taking all Bṛhaspati-s as one and the same person. Jacobi himself noticed, "*The Nīti*-teachings of Brihaspati, which Draupadi expounds in *Mahābhārata* III. 32, are at any rate as orthodox as one can wish!"[24] This itself is a conclusive evidence that there were many Bṛhaspati-s, not one.

[19] See *MPu*, Chs. 24, 47; *VPu*, III: 17-18; *PPu*, *Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa*, 13. The story is most probably derived from *Maitrī (Maitrāyaṇī) Upaniṣad*, 7.9.

[20] See Jolly (1977) and Aiyangar.

[21] *Bṛhaspatismṛti*, 27.3 (Jolly, 387); *SDS*, 12-13.

[22] *KA*, 1.2.10. A king is required to learn Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata, the three subjects which constitute Ānvīkṣikī.

[23] Jacobi (1911, 1970), 737; (1918), 104.

[24] Ibid. (1911), 737 nl and (1918), 104 n11, referring to the vulgate ed. of the *Mbh*. In the crit. ed. of the Āraṇyakparvan, it occurs in 33.57: *nītiṃ bṛhaspatiproktāṃ*). There are some other references to Bṛhaspati in the *Mbh*. See Aiyangar, 79ff.

Similarly, the word, *lokāyata,* in the *KA* does not stand for materialism.[25] If it were so, the Mānava school of Arthaśāstra would not consider Ānvīkṣikī (which comprises Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata) to be a part of the Vedic lore.[26] *Lokāyata* here stands for logic (as the Malayalam commentary clearly states),[27] or the science of disputation (as the Pali commentaries of the *Tipiṭaka* uniformly render the word, viz. *vitaṇḍasattham*).[28] So, Warder's reference to "Arthaśāstra Lokāyata" has no bearing on realism or materialism. Since his contention has been convincingly controverted by Jayatilleke,[29] we need not go into it any further.

III

Now I would like to demonstrate that materialism in India has a popular origin as opposed to the alleged royal one. It is rather strange that this origin has so far been entirely overlooked. I refer to Ajita Keśakambalin (Kesakambala), senior contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra.[30] Not that his name is never mentioned. It occurs in every book on Indian philosophy. He is accepted as "the forerunner of the later Cārvākas" on all hands.[31] But the most obvious conclusion has not yet been drawn.

As with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, the doctrine of Ajita is found exclusively in the works of his opponents, the Jains and Buddhists. They treated him as a rival, and so the accounts, as Goonasekere admits, cannot "be expected to be free from prejudice."[32] We are told that he was a renowned teacher who

[25] This issue has been elaborately discussed in Ch. 10 below.

[26] *KA*, 1.2.3: *trayīviśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikī.*

[27] See Ch. 10 below.

[28] See Rhys Davids and Stede, s.v. "Lokāyata". See also Moggallāna (1981), 19, v. 112 ab.

[29] Jayatilleke, 92-93.

[30] See the article, "Ajita Keśakambalī" by B. Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 325-27.

[31] See Barua, 288; Basham, 17. D. Chattopadhyaya, while not denying that Ajita was a materialist, chooses to emphasize the fact that he was "no less a philosopher of futility and moral collapse than the Buddha and Mahāvīra, Pūrana and Pakudha [...]". He also brands Ajita's teachings as "a philosophy of the graveyard" [(1959), 518]. He must have had in his mind the title of Roger Garaudy's book, *Literature of the Graveyard* (1948) in which Jean-Paul Sartre, François Mauriac, Andre Malraux, and Arthur Koestler had been adversely criticized.

[32] Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327.

lived the life of an ascetic, wearing a blanket made of hair (hence the appellation, "of the hair-blanket", *keśakambalin*) which made him feel hot in summer and cold in winter (did he take it off then?). This surely is quite unlikely for a king like Paesi. Ajita is said to have preached the following doctrine.

> There is no (consequence to) alms-giving, sacrifice or oblation. A good or bad action produces no result. This world does not exist, nor does the other world. There is no mother, no father (all good or evil done to them producing no result). There is no rebirth of beings after death. In this world, there are no *samanas* or *brāhmaṇas* established in the Noble Path and accomplished in good practice, who through direct knowledge (i.e., magga insight) acquired by their own efforts, can expound on this world and other worlds. This being is but a compound of the four great primary elements; after death, the earth-element (or element of extension) returns and goes back to the body of earth, the water-element (or element of cohesion) returns and goes back to the body of water, the fire-element (or element of thermal energy) returns and goes back to the body of air, and the air-element (or element of motion) returns and goes back to the body of air, while the mental faculties pass into space. The four pall-bearers and the bier (constituting the fifth) carry the corpse. The remains of the dead can be seen up to the cemetery where bare bones lie greying like the colour of the pigeons. All alms-giving ends in ashes. Fools prescribe alms-giving; and some assert that there is such a thing as merit in alms-giving but their words are empty, false and nonsensical. Both the fool and the wise are annihilated and destroyed after death and dissolution of their bodies. Nothing exists after death.[33]

It has been rightly pointed out that there is something wrong in the clause, "this world does not exist" (*natthi ayaṃ loko*). Jayatilleke thinks that the doctrines "attributed to [Ajita] seem to be of a composite character," i.e., many a different idea has been lumped up and foisted on him.[34]

[33] *Ten Suttas* (1984, 1987), 83. Translation modified.

[34] Jayatilleke, 95. He explains the anomaly in the following way: "... the Buddhists identified all the known materialist views with Ajita, who symbolizes the philosophy of Materialism, inconsistently putting together the tenets of mutually opposed schools since they both (or all) happened to be in some sense (metaphysical or pragmatic) materialists", 91.

Without going into the question whether Jayarāśibhaṭṭa can at all be taken as a materialist ("a pragmatic materialist" is what Jayatilleke calls him), it is obvious that the account in the *SPhS* is not fully reliable. Warder freely translates *natthi ayaṁ loko, natthi paro loko* as "There is no distinction of this and another world (or simply, there is no 'other world', as heaven or a future life)" (1971), 33.

Whatever be the right interpretation of this anomaly, it is to be noted that Ajita's doctrines do not consist solely of some negative propositions as Paesi's. Ajita had something positive to preach, viz. not only that there is no soul, but also that this being is a compound of four great primary elements (*mahābhūta*-s)—earth, air, fire, and water. This, as we know from later sources, was the basic plank of the Lokāyata philosophy. The *Bārhaspatya-sūtra*-s, quoted in the Brahminical and non-Brahminical works, uniformly speak of these four elements (not five) as *tattva*-s, basic things; everything else, including consciousness, comes out of them.[35] Ajita is the earliest source of these aphorisms. Thus, his claim to be the originator of materialism in India is incontestible. The later development shows a continuation of Ajita's ideas, not merely Paesi's.

IV

The popular origin of materialism in India also makes us review another myth: its alleged hedonistic character. Working under this prejudice, Goonasekere writes, "[Ajita's] choice of garments would indicate that he was a believer in austerity [...] *in spite of the fact that he was a materialist.*"[36]

Is there any necessary connection between materialism and hedonism? Very much like the alleged royal origin, the notion that a materialist must be a hedonist as well is wrongly conceived against even the evidence of Ajita's way of life. In Greece too, Epicurus (341-271 BCE) had been a victim of this libel.[37] Epicurus and the Epicureans had all along preached a doctrine of self-sufficiency and plain living. But their opponents persistently branded them as heedless hedonists.[38] It has been pointed out that the modern Eng-

[35] See D.R. Shastri (1982), 199, Aphorism Nos. 2-4; Namai (1976), 39, Aphorism Nos. A2-4.

[36] Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327. Emphasis added.

[37] Barua also refers to Epicurus in connection with Ajita and says that both of them were misunderstood (289-90). Lovejoy and Boas are of the opinion that the charges brought against the epicurean ethical system were libellous (152).

[38] Epicurus did speak of pleasure as the aim of life, but he meant intellectual pleasure, not sensual. As he said: "When we say that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasure of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and trouble in the soul.

lish sense of the word 'Epicurean', i.e., 'devoted to refined and tasteful sensuous enjoyment' (*OED*), misrepresents the teaching of Epicurus (as also does the *Epicuri de grege porcum* 'a swine from the sty of Epicurus' of Horace).[39]

Materialism as a philosophical doctrine definitely denies the concept of divine reward or retribution. It does not hesitate to declare that there is no pleasure obtainable beyond this world. But it is not synonymous with hedonism. The *OED* clearly distinguishes between the technical (philosophical) sense of 'materialism' and the transferred senses that follow. One of these means: "Devotion to material needs or desires, to the neglect of spiritual matters; a way of life, opinion, or tendency based entirely upon material interests" (2c). A semantic confusion around the word is still current in spite of Engels's clear explication more than a century ago. He said:

> By the word materialism the philstine understands gluttony, drunkenness, lust of the eye, lust of the flesh, arrogance, cupidity, avarice, covetousness, profit-hunting and stock exchange swindling —in short, all the filthy vices in which he himself indulges in private. By the word idealism he understands the belief in virtue, universal philanthropy and in a general way a "better world," of which he boasts before others but in which he himself at the utmost believes only so long as he is in the blues or is going through the bankruptcy consequent upon his customary "materialist" excesses.[40]

Ajita, it seems, had made a cult of asceticism, rather than of hedonism. It contradicts in no way his basic materialist position, because he was indifferent to both pleasure and pain.

How deep-rooted is the misconception regarding the identity of materialism and hedonism can be seen from

It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sensual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour and justice, and lead a life of prudence, honour and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them" ("Letter to Menoeceus" in Diogenes Laertius, 10.131-32).

[39] Harvey, 162. The phrase quoted from Horace occurs in his *Epistle*, 1.4.16.

[40] Engels (1886) in Marx-Engels, n.d., 237.

the example given below. Śāntarakṣita mentions one Kambalāsvatara whose opinion was apparently accepted by the Lokāyatika-s.[41] Benoytosh Bhattacharya proposes to identify him first with his namesake who is regarded as "one of the early authorities on the science of Music" along with such *ṛṣi*-s as Tumburu, Vāyu, Nārada etc. "This shows that Kambalāsvatara flourished at a very remote age."[42] But, other than the similarity of names, is there any justification for identifying the two? B. Bhattacharya writes, "It is not at all strange that a member of a materialist sect should devote himself to music; disbelieving in transmigration of soul or in a future life, the cultivation of pleasure in this life would seem logical and entirely proper."[43]

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya objected to this weird identification on two grounds: (a) It takes for granted that materialism equals hedonism, and (b) all *ācārya*-s of Music will then have to be considered hedonists, which surely could not be the case.[44] (Not satisfied with this identification, B. Bhattacharya was then "tempted to identify" Kambalāśvatara with Ajita Keśakambalin as well!).[45]

It was the Jains who made austerity (down to nakedness) a doctrine of their own[46] (quite different from the Middle Way, *majjhimā paṭipadā*, enunciated by the Buddha). Their opposition to materialism was as much on ontological grounds as on that of hedonism. Failing to find fault with Ajita, they charged his disciples: "Thus undertaking various works they engage in various pleasure and amusements for their own enjoyment."[47]

Even in the Common Era we find Jain scholars like Hemacandra and Guṇaratna attributing an eat-drink-and-be-merry philosophy of life to the Lokāyatika-s.[48] Not that they were alone in this. Brahminical writers like Kṛṣṇamiśra, Śrīharṣa

[41] *TS*, 22: v. 1863: "... consciousness proceeds from the body itself which is *equipped with the five life-breaths —Prāṇa, Apāna* and the rest— as has been declared by Kambalāsvatara" (*C/L*, 164; the verse No. there is 1864 as in Ganganath Jha's translation and the Baroda ed. of the text).

[42] B. Bhattacharya in Krishnamacharya (1926, 1984), xxxviii.

[43] Ibid.

[44] D. Chattopadhyaya (1969), 176 n258.

[45] B. Bhattacharya in Krishnamacharya (1926, 1984), xxxix.

[46] See the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, Lecture 16 in Jacobi, SBE 45: 73-77.

[47] *SKS*, 2.1.17 in Jacobi, SBE 45: 341-45 and Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 325-26.

[48] *TSPC*, 12, vv. 325-45 and in *TSPC* (trans.), 36-38; *TRD*, 300.

and others had done the same thing.[49] The Buddhists (e.g., Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla), however, never raised the issue of hedonism in their opposition to the Lokāyatika-s, nor did Śaṅkara or even the Jain scholar, Prabhācandra.[50]

Hedonism had no room in the doctrines of Ajita Keśakambalin, nor was it an invariable component of materialism, whether in Greece or in India. The popular origin seems to survive in the name *Lokāyata* (*lokeṣu āyatam*, widespread among the people) itself. Śaṅkara too hints at the same thing when he brackets the common people (*prākṛtāḥ janāḥ*) and the *lokāyatika*-s, for they thought that the soul was not different from the body.[51]

[49] *PC*, 2.22; *NC*, 17. 50, 68, 72, 83; *NC* (trans.), 250-54.

[50] *TS* and *TSP*, Ch. 22; Śaṅkarācārya on *BS*, 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53,54; *C/L*, 60-222, 234-40; Prabhācandra in *PKM*, 341-49 and *NKC*, 110-20. All are translated in *C/L*, 160-239, 298-342.

[51] Śaṅkara on *BS*, 1.1.1: "Unlearned people, and the Lokāyatikas, are of the opinion that the mere body, endowed with the quality of intelligence is the self", *C/L*, 234. Buddhaghosa also writes (whatever he might have meant by Lokāyata): "It is the ground of hoi polloi (*bālaputhujjanālokassa āyatam*)" in Woodward, 76.

II
Jain Sources for the Study of Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas in India

Jain canonical texts and their commentaries often shed welcome light on the philosophical systems prevalent in ancient and medieval India. For example, we come to know from the *SKS* that there were at least two materialist approaches in India before the seventh century CE.[1] This view is corroborated by some Buddhist and Brahminical sources as well. In what follows I propose to deal with some such evidence and then try to locate the points of difference between the two materialist theories mentioned by Jacobi.

The *SKS* begins with an attack on the opponents of Jainism:

> *eë gaṃthe viukkamma, ege samaṇamāhaṇā* |
> *ayāṇaṃtā viussittā, sattā kāmehi māṇavā* || [1.1.6]

> Some men, Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, who ignore and deny these true words [said in 1.1.2-5], adhere (to their own tenets), and are given to pleasures.[2]

[1] See Jacobi in SBE 45, II: xiii.

[2] I have used the text of the *SKS* and its commentary by Śīlāṅka as given in the MLBD ed. Jacobi's English translation has been cited with some minor changes, e.g. 'air' for *ākāśa* has been replaced by 'space', *vāyu* 'wind' has been replaced by 'air'.

Śīlāṅka in his commentary glosses on the word *samaṇa* as the Buddhists, etc. (*śākyādayo*) and the *māhaṇā* as those who follow the doctrines of Bṛhaspati (*bārhaspatya-matānusārinaśca brāhmaṇāḥ*).[3] He also mentions the followers of Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā and finally the Cārvāka-s and Lokāyatika-s who do not believe in the soul that goes to the other world, but think that the soul is nothing more than the five elements. The Cārvāka-s, he says, do not believe in virtue and vice (*puṇyapāpe*).

The next couple of verses in the *SKS* mention several other philosophical schools:

saṃti paṃca mahābbhūyā ihamegesimāhiyā |
puḍhvī āu teu vā, vāu āgāsapaṃcamā ||
ee paṃca mahabbhūyā tebbho egotti āhiyā |
aha tesiṃ viṇāseṇaṃ, viṇāso hoi dehiṇo || [1.1.7-8]

Some profess (the exclusive belief in) the five gross elements: earth, water, fire, air and space. These five gross elements (are the original causes of things), from them arises another thing (viz., *ātman*); for on the dissolution of the (five elements) living beings cease to exist.

Śīlāṅka explains the term *egesi* (*ekeṣām* in Sanskrit) as referring to the *bhūtavādin*-s (literally, elementalists) and identifies them as the followers of the doctrine of Bṛhaspati (*bhūtavādibhir bārhaspatyamatānusāribhirākhyātāni*). He takes this doctrine to be identical with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata and says that the Lokāyatika-s recognize these five elements as the basis of everything, even of the soul.

This identification of the *bhūtapañcakavādin*-s with the Lokāyata, however, is open to question. I shall come back to this issue soon. Let us now look at Śīlaṅka's commentary on *SKS*, 1.1.15, the first line of which is almost identical with that of 1.1.7 (quoted above). The verse explains the differences of these theories with regard to the number of elements:

saṃti paṃca mahabbhūyā ihamegesi āhiyā |
āyachaṭṭho puṇo āhu, āyā loge ya sāsae ||

Some say that there are five elements and that the soul is a sixth (substance), but they contend that the soul and the world (i.e., the five elements) are eternal.

[3] *SKSVṛ*, 9.

Instead of referring to the materialists Śīlaṅka glosses *egesi* in this verse as the Vedists, Sāṃkhyas and Śaivas.

The verse that follows continues to speak in the same vein:

duhao ṇa viṇassaṃti, no ya uppajjaye asaṃ |
savve 'vi savvahā bhāvā, niyattībhāvamāgayā || [1.1.16]

These (six substances) do not perish, neither (without nor with a cause); the non-existent does not come into existence, but all things are eternal by their very nature.[4]

The *SKS* then takes a fling at the Buddhists, who, as opposed to the eternalists, believe in the momentariness of everything, including the soul:

paṃca khaṃdhe vayaṃtege, vālā u khaṇajoiṇo |
aṇṇo aṇaṇṇo ṇevāhu, heuyaṃ ca aheuyaṃ || [1.1.17]

Some fools say that there are five skandhas of momentary existence. They do not admit that (the soul) is different from, not identical with (the elements).

In his interpretation of the term, *aṇaṇṇo* (Skt. *ananya*, identical), Śīlāṅka again refers to the *ātma-ṣaṣṭhavādin*-s, Sāṃkhya-s as well as the Cārvāka-s, who consider the soul to be a product of the elements.

The problem is that the elementalists mentioned in *SKS*, 1.1.7 and 1.1.16 cannot be equated with the Cārvāka/Lokāyatika-s. The reason is quite simple: the Cārvāka-s accept only four elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water, but not the fifth, ether or space (*ākāśa*). An oft-quoted Cārvāka aphorism states: "Earth, water, fire and air are the (only) principles," *pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni*.[5] This is why the Cārvāka-s are often referred to as *bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin*-s.

[4] The lines contain the seeds of materialism and atheism in particular. Lucretius (c. 99-55 BCE) takes this idea as his starting point: "*Nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing.* The reason why all mortals are so gripped by fear is that they see all sorts of things happening on the earth and in the sky with no discernible cause, and these they attribute to the will of a god. Accordingly, when we have seen that nothing can be created out of nothing, we shall then have a clearer picture of the path ahead, the problem of how things are created and occasioned with the aid of the gods." (Book 1, 31)

The proposition is said to have been advanced first by Melissus (fifth century BCE), a Greek philosopher. See Rosenthal and Yudin, 492.

[5] Cārvāka Fragments, I.2. For sources etc. see Ch. 6 below.

SKS, 1.1.18 mentions them to be so:

puḍhavā āu teu ya, tahā vāu ya egao |
cattāri dhāuṇo rūvaṃ evamāhaṃsu āvare ||
(for *āvare* some MSS have *jāṇagā* or *jāṇayā*)

The Jāṇayas say that there are four elements: earth, water, fire and air which combined form the body (or soul?).[6]

Are the *SKS* and *SKSVṛ* all wrong then? Not quite. Here is the first hint of a materialist theory which admitted four elements, rather than five, as the basis of its system. We hear more of them in *SKS,* 2.1.15-17. It is necessary to quote the whole passage:

Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is (what is called) soul, or what is the same, the Ātman. The whole soul lives; when this (body) is dead, it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction (of the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men carry it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore there is and exists no (soul different from the body). Those who believe that there is and exists no (such soul), speak the truth.
This murderer says: "Kill, dig, slay, burn, cook, cut or break to pieces, destroy: Life ends here; there is no world beyond."
These (Nāstikas) cannot inform you on the following points: whether an action is good or bad, meritorious or not, well done or not well done, whether one reaches perfection or not, whether one goes to hell or not. Thus undertaking various works they engage in various pleasures and amusements for their own enjoyment.

The first part is strikingly akin to what Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of Mahāvīra and the Buddha, taught. The *SPhS* records his teachings as follows:

[6] The word, *jāṇayā,* has been explained by the *Dīpikā* as *jñānaka* = *paṇḍitammanya,* one who considers himself to be a scholar (but is not). There is a variant reading: *āvare* for *jāṇayā/jāṇagā.* Commentators take this to mean another sect of Buddhists, but the doctrine is more akin to materialism than Buddhism. Śīlāṅka glosses on *āvare,* but refers also to the reading *jāṇagā* and explains it as follows: *tatrāpyayam artho 'jānakā' jñānino vayaṃ kiletyabhimānāgnidagdhāḥ santa evam āhuriti saṃvandhanīyam* (18).

This being is but a compound of the four great primary elements: after that, the earth-element (or element of extension) returns and goes back to the body of the earth, the water-element (or element of cohesion) returns and goes back to the body of water, the fire-element (or element of thermal energy) returns and goes back to the fire, and the air-element (or element of motion) returns and goes back to the body of air, while the mental faculties pass on into space.[7]

The number of elements ("great primary elements", *mahābhūta*-s) is mentioned as four, but space too is admitted in relation to the mental faculties, as opposed to the merely physical. The rest of the passage speaks of a materialist doctrine that denies the concepts of religious merits, need for offerings (*dāna*), etc.:

[...] The four pall-bearers and the bier (constituting the fifth) carry the corpse. The remains of the dead can be seen up to the cemetery, where bare bones lie greying like the colour of the pigeons. All alms-giving ends in ashes. Fools prescribe alms-giving; and some assert that there is such a thing as merit in alms-giving; but their words are empty, false and nonsensical. Both the fool and wise are annihilated and destroyed after death and dissolution of their bodies. Nothing exists after death.

SKS, 1.1.11-12 seem to echo Ajita's words:

patteaṃ kasiṇe āyā, je bālā je a paṃdiā |
saṃti piccā na te saṃti, natthi sattovavāiyā ||
natthi puṇṇe va pāve va, natthi loe ito vare |
sarīrassa vīṇāseṇaṃ iṇāso hoi dehiṇo ||

Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual soul. These souls exist (as long as the body), but after death they are no more: there are no souls which are born again.
There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.

Śīlāṅka does not identify this doctrine with the Cārvāka/ Lokāyata. He uses a very different term for it, namely, *tajjīvataccharīravāda,* i.e., the body and the soul are not two different entities, but one.[8] It is to be noted that the doc-

[7] *DN,* I: 48, trans. *Ten Suttas,* 83.
[8] *SKSVṛ,* 13-14. Śīlāṅka also refers to a passage from *Bṛ.Up.* (2.4.12): *vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthyāya tānyevānu vinaśyati, na pretyasaṃjñāstī,* "The pure Intellingence comes out of these elements and

trine of Ajita is called *ucchedavāda*, 'annihilationism' in the Pali, Buddhist literature.[9] Apparently Ajita's denial of almost everything under the sun, particularly of the concept of the other-world and the transmigration of the soul, is responsible for the name given to this doctrine by the Buddhists. Śīlāṅka, on the other hand, picks up another aspect of the doctrine, namely, the denial of an immortal soul, which, he believes, can and does exist without the mortal body.

Not satisfied with mentioning two different materialist thoughts, the *bhūtavādin*-s and the *tajjīvataccharīravādin*-s, Śīlāṅka resorts to the doctrine of *svabhāva* (lit. own being, meaning 'inherent nature') and associates the doctrine enunciated in *SKS*, 1.1.11-12 with *svabhāva*.[10] Utpalabhaṭṭa, too, preferred to identify the doctrine of *svabhāva* with that of the Lokāyatika-s (whom Śīlāṅka calls *bhūtavādin*-s).[11] By whatever name one may prefer to call them —Bārhaspatya, *bhūtavādin*, Cārvāka or Lokāyatika— all the names refer to the followers of the same materialist doctrine.

In *SKS*, 2.2 we hear again of the materialist and three more persons who hold heretical views. "The second man" is a *bhūtapañcakavādin*, for he mentions five elements instead of four (2.1.20). Śīlāṅka evidently does not know who this "second man" is. He offers two alternatives: the Lokāyatika or the Sāṃkhya. In *SKS*, 2.2.22 we again hear of some men who say: "There is a self besides the five elements. What is, does not perish; from nothing nothing comes." Thus we have here a rehash of *SKS*, 1.2.7-8 and 16.[12]

The mention of more than one materialist school in the *SKS* was noted long ago. Jacobi in the introduction to his

is destroyed with them, there is no awareness after death." The same passage has been quoted in *NM*, Ch. 3, I: 387-88 and in *SDS*, Ch.1, 4. See *C/L*, 157, 248.

[9] The *Mahābodhi Jātaka* (*Jātaka* 528), V: 228,239, 246.

[10] *SKSVṛ*, 14. Śīlāṅka also quotes a verse attributed to the *svabhāvavādin*-s: *kaṇṭakasya ca tīkṣṇatvaṃ, mayūrasya vicitratā* | *varṇāśca tāmracūḍānāṃ, svabhāvena bhavanti hi* ||. "The sharpness of the thorn, the variety of the peacock and the colour of the cocks are (due to) natural development."

For various readings of this verse and their sources see R. Bhattacharya (2002), 77-78.

[11] See *Svi* on *BṛS*, 1. 7. For further details see R. Bhattacharya (2002), 84. Śīlāṅka defines the *bhūtavādin*-s as follows (on *SKS*, 1.1.1.11): *bhūtavādino bhūtānyeva kāyākārapariṇatāni dhāvanavalaganādikāṃ kriyāṃ kurvanti, asya tu kāyākārapariṇatebhyo bhūtebhyaścaitanyākhya ātmotpadyate 'bhivyajyate vā, tebhyaścābhinna ityayaṃ viśeṣaḥ* (14).

[12] See n4 above.

English translation of the *SKS*, alludes to "two materialist theories" in *SKS*, 2.2.15 and 21f. respectively. He notes that both "have much in common" and compares the first with the views of Pūraṇa Kassapa and Ajita Kesakambala as found in the *SPhS*. He further notices the image of the corpse being carried away by four bearers for burning and the dove-coloured bones that remain. These are also mentioned in Ajita's exposition of this doctrine in the *SPhS*.

The *SPhS* represents Ajita as a *bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin* whereas in the *SKS* the first school of materialists is said to be *bhūtapañcakavādin*. Jacobi points out that *ākāśa* "is not reckoned as a fifth element in the Buddhist literature but it is so in that of the Jainas [...]".[13] He, however, summarily dismisses this discrepancy as "a verbal, rather than a material difference".

The difference, I would humbly submit, *is* material, not merely verbal. There are reasons to believe that before the seventh century CE there did exist two distinct materialist schools in India. We may cite a few instances from both Buddhist and Brahminical sources in support of this view.

Manimekalai, the only extant Tamil Buddhist poem (written between the third and seventh centuries CE), mentions *bhūtavāda* as a philosophical system distinct from the Lokāyata. It says:

> Passing on to the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika pandits, at last she (*sc.* Manimekalai) came to a *Bhūta-Vādi*. The *Bhūta-Vādis* hold that the world is formed out of the five elements alone, without any divine intervention. We agree with the Lokāyata, the sage said, and believe that when the elements combine together, a material body and a spirit come into existence. That is all. We believe that perception alone is our means of knowledge and nothing else. We recognise only one birth, and we know that our joys and pains end on earth with this one life.[14]

The basic philosophical position of the *bhūtavādin*-s and the Lokāyatika-s indeed does not seem to differ in any major respect. Echoes are heard of some well-known Cārvāka aphorisms, e.g., consciousness arises out of matter as does the intoxicating power of wine from non-toxic objects; it is all a matter of combination of a particular kind; perception is the instrument of knowledge; and, there is no rebirth.[15]

[13] See Jacobi (n1 above), xxiv and nn1-2.

[14] Adapted by Laksmi Holmstörm, Ch. 20, 170.

[15] See Ch. 6 below, aphorisms I.3-5 and III.I.

That there was a school of materialist thinkers called *bhūtacintaka* (he who thinks in terms of the elements), who recognized five elements instead of four, is attested, however obliquely, by the *Mbh.* The following verse (Śāntiparvan, 267.4) may be cited as a case in point:

yebhyaḥ sṛjati bhūtāni kāle bhāvapracoditaḥ |
mahābhūtāni pañceti tānyāhur bhūtacintakāḥ ||

These (elements) from which Time, moved by the desire of bringing forth physical forms, creates all beings, are called "the five great elements" by those who think (in terms) of the elements.[16]

In another passage in the *Mbh* we read an account of cosmogony, beginning and ending with five elements.[17] The word *bhūtacintā* also occurs in the *SSaṃ.*[18]

Guṇaratna most probably has this school of *bhūtapañcakavādin*-s in mind when he speaks of "some sections of the Cārvāka-s who consider space as the fifth element."[19] The *nāstika*-s in general are said to have believed in the existence of four elements only. However, every other Jain writer, right from Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Prabhācandra, down to Vidyānandin and Vādidevasūri mention the Lokāyatika-s as *bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin*-s.[20] But none of them refers to any other

[16] The same verse occurs in the vulgate edition, 274.4. The verse may be related to the doctrine of time (*kālavāda*) which is first mentioned in the *Śv.Up.*, 1.2: *kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā* | *bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam* [...] ||. "Whether time, or inherent nature, or destiny, or accident, or the elements, or the soul is the (first) cause is to be considered." The distinction between *kālavāda* and *svabhāvavāda*, as mentioned in several chapters of the *Mbh*, Śāntiparvan, Mokṣadharmaparvādhyāya, is merely that Time is considered to be the Creator of all things instead of *svabhāva*. Both are atheistic and accidentalist (non-causationist, casualist). See Bedekar for further details.

[17] *Mbh,* Āśvamedhikaparvan, crit. ed., 50.10 (vulgate 51.10). The *bhūtacintaka*-s are mentioned in Śānti., 224.50 (vul. 231.51) and Āśva., 48.24 (vul. 49.12).

[18] Sūtrasthāna, 3.15; Śārīrasthāna, 1.1. For further details see R. Bhattacharya (2007), 275-281.

[19] *TRD*, 300: *kecit tu cārvākaikadeśīyā ākāśaṃ pañcamaṃ bhūtamabhimanyamānāḥ pañcabhūtātmakaṃ jagaditi nigadanti.*

[20] Sometimes the position of some Jain authors is not clear. Jinabhadragaṇi, speaking of *tajjīva-taccharīra-vāda*, merely mentions the production of consciousness "from the collection of elements like the earth, etc." (*vasuhaha bhūyasamudaya saṃbhūya ceyaṇa tti te saṃkā. GV*, 3.102 (1650), 143), without specifying how many elements he has in mind, four or five.

school as "another section of the Cārvāka-s" as Guṇaratna does. In this respect he stands alone among the Jains. The fact is that the *bhūtapañcakavādin*-s belong to another materialist school. They are not just *cārvākaikadeśīya*-s.

The difference between the two schools of materialists is not confined to the difference in their views on the number of elements (four of five?) admitted by them. There was another difference in their attitudes towards *puruṣakāra* (lit. manliness), human endeavour vis-à-vis *daiva* or *niyati*, destiny or fate, *yadṛcchā* (chance, accident), etc.

The elementalists in the *Mbh* are shown to be accidentalists (non-believers in causality) and hence inactivists, since human efforts are futile:

devā manuṣyā gandharavāḥ piśācāsurarākṣasāḥ |
sarve svabhāvataḥ sṛṣṭā na kriyābhyo na kāraṇāt ||[21]

Elsewhere in the *Mbh* the word, *svabhāva,* is used to suggest denial of causality, *animittatā.*[22] It is in this sense that *svabhāva* recurs in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, right from Aśvaghoṣa's *BC* (first century CE).[23] In the Nyāya tradition, too, the pet example of the sharpness of the thorn used by the *svabhāvavādin*-s is cited to suggest *nirnimittatā* (the absence of any efficient cause), or even *ahetu* (absence of any cause, efficient or material whatsoever).[24]

Did the Cārvāka-s adhere to this view? Somadevasūri suggests just the opposite. A Cārvāka minister in the *YTC* upholds human endeavour over fate.[25]

In S-M's representation of the Cārvāka, too, the Lokāyatika positively refuses to accept the concept of a lawless world. He recognizes *svabhāva* as the cause behind all phenomena:

nanvadṛṣṭāniṣṭau jagad-vaicitryam ākasmikaṃ syāditi cet na tad bhadraṃ, svabhāvādeva tadutpatteḥ |

[21] *Mbh*, Āśva., 50.11 (vul. 49.11).

[22] *Mbh*, Śānti., 172.10 ab (vul. 179.10).

[23] *BC*, 9.57-62; Śāntideva, *BCA*, 9. 117; *TS*, 4.110-12; Dharmakīrti, too, mentions this doctrine without using the word *svabhāva* in *PV*, 162 cd-163 ab. Manorathanandin explains *kecit as svabhāvavādinaḥ* (ibid., 64).

[24] *NS*, 4.1. 22-24 and Tarkavāgīśa, IV: 183 -91. The position of the commentators is not uniform. For details see Tarkavāgīśa, IV: 179.

[25] *YTC*, 3.60-61, I: 382: *daivaṃ ca mānuṣaṃ karma lokasyāsya phalāptiṣu* | *kuto 'anyathā vicitrāṇi phalāni samaceṣṭiṣu* || *apekṣāpūrvikā yatra kāryasiddhiḥ prajāyate* | *tatra daivaṃ nṛpānyatra pradhanaṃ pauruṣaṃ bhavet* ||. See also Handiqui, 145-46.

But an opponent [of the Cārvāka] will say, if you do not thus allow *adṛṣṭa,* the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we (*sc.* the Cārvāka-s) cannot accept this objection as valid, since phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.[26]

Thus, in both the domains, cosmogony as well as attainment in human life, the Cārvāka is represented as non-accidentalist and activist —quite different from the elementalist mentioned in the *Mbh.*

The existence of an elementalist-cum-inactivist/accidentalist school prior to the Cārvāka may also account for the identification of the Cārvāka and *svabhāvavāda* by quite a number of Vedāntins, Naiyāyikas and others.[27] Such an identification may be traced back to the anonymous commentary on *SK,* v. 27 (available in a Chinese translation by Paramārtha) in the sixth century and more explicitly in Utpalabhaṭṭa's commentary on *Bṛ.S,* 1.7.[28] Other writers, such as Haribhadra and Śāntarakṣita, however, treat the Cārvāka and *svabhāvavāda* as two independent doctrines, having no connection with each other.[29]

The confusion of terms, e.g., *svabhāva* as distinct from *yadṛcchā* (as in *Śv.Up.* 1.2 and as lucidly explained by Amalānanda in the thirteenth century)[30] and *svabhāva* as a synonym for *yadṛcchā* (as in the *BC* etc.) is a stumbling block in the way of determining the significance of the word, *svabhāva,* in various contexts. But here we are concerned with the indirect evidence of the existence of two schools of materialists in India: one was the proto-materialist trend which seems to have been *bhūtapañcakavādin* as well as *akriyāvādin;* the other was the deutro-materialist trend, which was both *bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin* and *kriyāvādin.* Both trends appear to have co-existed (if the evidence of *Manimekalai* is accepted). The proto-materialist trend presumably withered away. It is also probable that it never developed into a full-fledged philosophical system with its own *sūtra*-work, commentaries, etc. The deutro-materialist trend, on the other hand, evolved from the doctrine of *bhūta* mentioned in *Śv.Up.* 1.2., was preached by Ajita Kesakambala and finally took the shape of the Cārvāka system. The earliest Jain reference to the doctrine of five elements is found in the *Vasudevahiṃḍī;*[31] the *Mbh* and the *SKS,* too, record the view of these proto-materialists.

[26] *SDS,* Ch. 1, 12-13. Trans. E.B. Cowell in *C/L,* 253.

[27] Ānandagiri on Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛ.Up.,* 4.3.6., 554; Vidyāraṇya, *VPS,* 201-11; Agnicit Puruṣottama, Rāmatīrtha and Nṛsiṃha Āśrama on *SŚ,* 1.528; *KB* on *NK,* 1.5.

[28] *SKSVṛ,* 36; *SVi,* 9.

[29] See Ch. 11 below and R. Bhattacharya (2001), 46-52.

[30] Amalānanda on Śaṅkara's commentary on *BS,* 2.1.33: *niyatinimittamanapekṣa yadā kadācitpravṛttyudayo yadṛcchā, svabhāvastu sa eva yāvadvastubhāvī, yathā śvāsādau,* "*Yadṛcchā* means random occurrence without regard for the law of fixed causation; by contrast *svabhāva* is that which exists as long as the thing exists, for example, respiration, etc. (in the case of living beings)." Cf. *TRD,* 13-15.

[31] *Vasu.,* 169, 275. See also Jamkhedkar, 184. The theory is called *ṇāhiyavāda* (*natthiyavāda* or *nāstikavāda*) (*Vasu.,* ibid.). It is both *bhūtapañcakavādin* and accidentalist (*jahicchā* = *yadṛcchā*). Haribhadra also calls the materialist Piṅgakesa a *nāhiyavādin* (*SKa,* III: 164). Piṅgakesa, too, is a *bhūtapañcakavādin* (ibid.).

III
Ajita Kesakambala: Nihilist or Materialist?

Ajita Kesakambala (Keśakambalin in Sanskrit), a senior contemporary of the Buddha, is generally recognised as an early (if not the earliest) materialist in India.[1] As with the later Cārvāka/Lokāyata-s, no authentic report of his teachings —not to speak of any work composed by him or his disciple— has come down to us. Whatever little we know of him is derived from Buddhist (Pali) and Jain (Prakrit) sources. Both the sects regarded him as a rival, so their accounts may not be accurate or without prejudice (as Goonasekere admits).[2]

One full statement of Ajita's views is found in the *SPhS.* He tells king Ajātasattu (Ajātaśatru) of Magadha:

> *natthi, mahārāja, dinnaṃ, natthi yiṭṭham, natthi hutaṃ, natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko, natthi ayam loko, natthi paro loko* [...] |
>
> Great king! There is no (consequence to) almsgiving, sacrifice or oblation. A good or bad action produces no result. This world does not exist, nor does the other world [...].[3]

[1] See B. Barua, 289-90; H. Shastri, *Lokāyata* (1925) in *C/L*, 378; Basham, 17; Frauwallner (trans.), II: 219-20; Kosambi, 104.

[2] Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327.

[3] *DN*, I: 48. The translation is taken from *Ten Suttas*, 83. I have modified the rendering where necessary (for *natthi paro loko*, it has 'nor do other

Jayatilleke points out that the view expressed in the last part of the passage does not square with the materialist position:

> This has always presented a problem for while it is well known that the lokāyata-materialists denied the existence of the next world, it appears strange that they should be spoken of as denying the existence of this world as well, particularly when they were elsewhere supposed to affirm positively the existence of this world.[4]

The same view, however, is ascribed to a *nāstika* in the *Mbh* Bhīṣma tells Yudhiṣṭhira:

nāyaṃ loko 'sti na para iti vyavasito janaḥ |
nālaṃ gantuṃ ca viśvāsaṃ nāstike bhayaśaṅkini ||
5

There are men who have decided that this world does not exist, nor does the next. Such a terror-striken *nāstika* is not to be trusted.

Leaving aside the question why a *nāstika* is considered to be terror-stricken,[6] we may note another passage in the same text. Indrota warns Janamejaya:

yad idaṃ manyase rājan nāyam asti paraḥ kutaḥ |
pratismārayistaras tvāṃ yamadutā yamakṣaye || [7]

If you think, O king, since this (world) does not exist, where can be the next, the devils (*lit.* the messengers of Yama, the Indian counterpart of Hades/Pluto) will convince you (*lit.* make you remember) in the infernal region (*lit.* the abode of Yama).

In another verse in the *Mbh* we are told:

worlds', making the singular *loko* appear as plural, which is unwarranted). T.W. Rhys Davids's translation of this passage ('there is no such thing as this world or the next') too is not literal enough. See Jayatilleke, 91.

[4] Jayatilleke, 95.

[5] *Mbh*, Śāntiparvan, crit. ed., 131.13 (133.14 in the vulgate edition).

[6] There was every reason for a *nāstika* to be terror-stricken for, if detected, he could be banished with his arms bound, to the inaccessible regions, full of carnivorous beasts and elephants, and full of fear due to snakes and thieves: *vyālakuñjaradurgeṣu sarpacorabhayeṣu ca | hastāvāpanena gacchanti nāstikāḥ kim ataḥ param ||* said Bhīṣma to Yudhiṣṭhira, Śāntiparvan, crit. ed., 174.5 (181.5 vulgate).

[7] Śāntiparvan, crit. ed., 146.18 (150.13 vulgate).

mūḍhasya darpaḥ sa punar moha eva
mūḍhasya nāyaṃ ca paro 'sti lokaḥ |
na hyeva duḥkhāni sadā bhavanti
sukhasya vā nityaśo lābha eva || [8]

The pride of a stupid fellow is but delusion: he has neither this world nor the next. Nobody is ever in grief; nor can pleasure be had always.

In the *Gītā*, the same doctrine is ascribed to a sceptic:

ajñāś ca śraddadhānaś ca saṃśayātmā vinaśyati |
nāyaṃ loko 'sti na paro na sukhaṃ saṃśayātmanaḥ || [9]

The ignorant and unbelieving man who has a soul of doubt is destroyed; neither this world nor the next exists, nor happiness for him who has a soul of doubt.

In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, however, the phrasing is different. Yama advises Naciketas:

ayaṃ loko nāsti para iti mānī
punaḥ punar vaśam āpadyate me | [10]

Believing, this world exists and not the other, he (= the stupid one deluded by wealth) is again and again subject to my sway.

Instead of the denial of both this world and the next, here we have a more meaningful formula:'this world exists, there is no other' (to quote Radhakrishnan's translation).[11] It should be remembered that Naciketas had a doubt (*vicikitsā*) whether the soul existed after the death of man and that is what he wished to learn from Yama.[12]

But the basic textual crux cannot be resolved by adopting the reading that occurs in the *Kaṭha* as the right one. Where did the other version —which denies both this world and the next— come from? There is no room for emendation of the passages (Pali and Sanskrit) in which it occurs. All MSS give the same reading without any variants. There is also the question of metre. We just cannot alter *nāyam* to *ayam*

[8] Ibid., crit. ed., 275.12 (287.13 vulgate).

[9] *Gītā*, 4.40. The translation is by Hopkins, 86.

[10] *Kaṭha Up.*, 1.2.6. The translation is by E. Rõer, I: 64.

[11] Radhakrishnan (1953), 610.

[12] *Kaṭha Up.*, 1.1.20-21.

or *ayam* to *nāyam*. And, in any case, as text-critics warn us, explanation is preferable to emendation.

Let us look at the explanations offered so far.

1. Buddhaghosa explains the Pali passage as follows: "This world is not there, if one is residing in the other world; the other world is not there, if one is residing in this world."[13] (According to Basham, "Buddhaghosa seems to imply the existence of a world beyond, but one which it was impossible for mortals to enter; certainly he did not deny the existence of the material world.")[14]

2. Hopkins refers to the Brahminical sources only but pays no attention to the clear difference between *ayam* and *nāyam*. He takes both to be the doctrine of the *nāstika*.[15]

3. Basham paraphrases the line thus: "there is no passing from this world to the next."[16]

4. Jayatilleke, taking the *SPhS* and *Kaṭha* in conjunction with Medhātithi's Commentary on *Manu*, 4.30, first suggests that "there was a lokāyata-materialist school which denied the existence of this world as well" represented in the work of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa and asks, "Was Ajita also a pragmatic materialist like Jayarāśi?".[17] Not being convinced of this dubious identification, he writes:

> The more probable explanation seems to be that the Buddhists identified all the known materialist views with Ajita, who symbolizes the philosophy of Materialism, inconsistently putting the tenets together of mutually opposed schools since they both (or all) happened to be in some sense (metaphysical or pragmatic) materialists.[18]

[13] *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, ed. Mahesh Tiwary, I: 156.

[14] Basham, 15 nl.

[15] Hopkins, 86. "According to epic interpretation," Hopkins points out, "one saying nāsti, in refusing a gift to a priest, is a "negator" no less than he who refuses assent to the orthodox belief. But ordinarily Nāstika is used in the latter sense and connotes a dissenter from received opinion in regard either to the existence of transcendental things or to the authority of hallowed tradition [such as the infallibility of the Vedas]... Any number of these unbelievers is known who deny everything there is to deny" (ibid.). The two meanings of the word, *nāstika*, are significant, for they may account for the juxtaposition of the denial of both *dakṣiṇā* and oblation along with the disbelief in the world beyond. See also Medhātithi on *Manu*, 4.30 (discussed below).

[16] Basham, 15.

[17] Jayatilleke, 91.

[18] Ibid.

5. Warder, taking the words of Ajita alone, cuts the Gordian knot in the following way: "There is no distinction of this and another world (or simply, there is no 'other world', as heaven or a future life)".[19]

Instead of adopting any of these explanations (but not rejecting any in toto), I would like to view the issue from a different angle. Even though in fragments, we possess a number of aphorisms attributed to Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata school.[20] Taken together, they contain a more or less coherent doctrine, both epistemological and ontological. Let us see if they can be harnessed to the solution of this textual problem.

There is no next world (or, after-life), is a well-known Lokāyatika position.[21] The hedonistic pursuit ascribed to the Cārvāka-s (wrongly, in our opinion) follows from this very tenet. Similarly, "Religious duties are not to be performed", *dharmo na kāryaḥ*, is another basic position held by them.[22] This too follows from the first. Combining these two, we may try to explain the formula containing two negatives as: No religious duties (such as sacrifices (*yajña*-s), alms-giving, etc.) are to be performed either for the sake of this world (since no earthly benefits can accrue from them) or for the next (such as, salvation, release from rebirth, etc. which do not exist). Or, using the technical terms, one may say: sacrifices guarantee neither *abhyudaya* (worldly pleasure) nor *niḥśreyasa* (*summum bonum*), as mentioned in *Manu*, 12.88.

If this explanation seems too fanciful or far-fetched, let us look at *Gītā*, 4.40 again. It does not say that the man who has a soul of doubt declares, "This world does not exist, nor the other"; it only tells us that such a person enjoys no happiness either in this world or in the next. The verse is cryptic enough, but that is how it is to be understood.[23] In Bengali,

[19] Warder (1971), 33.

[20] See Ch. 6 below.

[21] See Aphorism Nos. IV. 1-2 in Ch.6 below.

[22] Aphorism No. V.I.

[23] Mohini M. Chatterji translated this verse as follows: "The ignorant man, the man devoid of faith, the doubt-souled, are destroyed. For the doubt-souled man there is happiness neither in this world, nor the next, nor in any other." 91. Cf. also Gītā, 6.40: *pārtha naiveha nāmutra vināśastasya vidyate | na hi kalyāṇakṛt kaścid durgatiṃ tāta gacchati ||*. O son of Prithā, neither here nor hereafter is there destruction for him; never, my son, does a worker of righteousness come to an evil end. M.M. Chatterji's trans. (115). Cf. also Ch. Up., 8.8.4: *ātmānam eveha mahayannātmānaṃ paricarannubhau lokāvavāpnotīmaṃ cāmuṃ ceti*, "It is here that the Self is

the common proverb, *ihakāl-parakāl khoỳāno* or *yāoỳā* (losing both this world (*lit.* time) and the next) means the same: enjoying no benefit in this world or in the next.[24]

This interpretation is further corroborated by the way Medhātithi explains the word *haitukāḥ* (rationalists or sophists, not just 'logicians', as Bühler renders it)[25] in *Manu*, 4.30. Medhātithi glosses the word as *nāstikāḥ* and adds: "Those who are firm in the knowledge that 'there is no next world, no (virtue in) alms-giving (or paying sacrificial fees, *dakṣiṇā* to the priests) and oblations', *nāsti paralokaḥ, nāsti dattaṃ nāsti hutam ity evaṃ sthitaprajñāḥ*".[26] It is worth noting that Ajita too denied the efficacy of the last two items along with the existence of the next world.[27]

Where did Medhātithi find this passage? So far the source has remained unidentified. It actually occurs in the *VDMP*:

mugdhā evaṃ pratāryante dhūrtair dhana-jihīrṣayā |
yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaram ||
bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ ||
nāsti dattaṃ hutaṃ ceṣṭaṃ na devā ṛṣayo na ca || [28]

The cunning ones thus cheat the deluded men, prompted by the desire to take away their riches. As long as life remains, live happily; nothing is beyond death. From where can be any return for that which has been reduced to ashes and ceased to exist? There are no such things as gifts (in sacrifices), oblations, rites, nor gods nor sages.

King Vena is represented as a *lokāyatika* king here and he is made to say this. Since this is the ultimate source of Medhātithi and a host of writers who have quoted parts of this passage, mostly with some alterations here and there,[29] we may safely conclude that the formula found in the *Kaṭha Up.* (which, of course, comes earlier) is a variant of the same idea. But we need not reject or emend the latter formula containing two negatives. Whether applied to a sceptic or to a denier of the world beyond (*nāstika*), it contains the grains of the same contention in a more cryptic and somewhat puzzling form.

The second passage quoted from the *Mbh* (Śānti., 131.13) however, represents an extremely nihilist position. It certainly goes well with the kind of the doctrine that some ultra-Śaṅkarite Vedāntins (Berkley-like solipsists called *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivādin*-s) and perhaps Jayarāśibhaṭṭa may have held. But it has no claim to be regarded as 'materialist'. If someone denies sense-perception as a valid means of knowledge, he can also deny the existence of this world, not to speak of the next. This may very well be one among the many points of view, but it cannot be called 'materialist' by any stretch of imagination. It is not on the basis of his views but on the strength of his references to Suraguru (i.e., Bṛhaspati) that Jayarāśi has been branded as a Lokāyatika.[30] However, nobody has denied that his approach cannot be identified with, or even assimilated in, the doctrine of Cārvāka, which is uncompromisingly realist and *pratyakṣa-prāmāṇyavādin.* Jayarāśi has been taken as a representative of a supposedly second school of the Lokāyatika-s.[31] But, by claiming so, his fundamental idealist (solipsist) position has been conveniently overlooked.[32] A denier of *pratyakṣa* may be called anything but a materialist.

This interpretation does not contradict Jayatilleke's. The Buddhists might have lumped up many heretical (both non-Vedic and non-Buddhistic) views and foisted them on Ajita.

to be adored, the Self is to be served, By doing so, one attains both the worlds, this one and the other." It is rather odd that Virocana the Asura should speak of the world beyond. This turn of the phrase, it seems, has already become proverbial.

[24] E.g. Rabindranath Tagore, *Red Oleanders*, 32: "Are you bent on spoiling your chances both in this world and the next, you wretched one?" Similarly cf. the opening lines of Subhāsh Mukhopādhyāỳa's poem, "Lokṭā jānlai nā" (The man didn't even know): *bā̃ diker buk-pakeṭṭā sāmlāte sāmlāte |hāỳhāỳ | lokṭār ihakāl parakāl gela (Yata dūrei yāi)*, 15: "Alas! Pennywise, the man forfeited (the bliss of) this world and of the world beyond" (The credit for translating these highly idiomatic lines goes to my friend, Prabhas Kumar Sinha).

[25] George Bühler, 133.

[26] Medhātithi in *Manu*, II: 315.

[27] *SPhS*, 48.

[28] I. 108. 18-19, 70a.

[29] See Ch. 20 below.

[30] Sukhlalaji Sanghavi and Rasiklal Parikh, "Introduction", *TUS*, xi-xii. Franco endorses their view but brands Jayarāśi as both a Lokāyata and a sceptic. (1987), 4-8. But see K.K. Dixit's refutation of this view in *ISPP*, IV.1 (1962), reprinted in *C/L*, 520-30.

[31] Jayatilleke speaks of no fewer than seven materialist schools in ancient India, Jayarāśi belonging to one of them. But he also admits that some of these may be hypothetical, concocted by the author of the *Brahmajāla-sutta* (*DN*), I: 106-07. In another place, Jayatilleke, however, declares that Jayarāśi "is not a materialist", but "shows a certain partiality for materialism [...]." (82).

[32] Ruben (1958), K.K. Dixit (1962) and D. Chattopadhyaya (1964) have tried to point out precisely this very aspect. See *C/L*, 505-30 and D. Chattopadhyaya (1964), 221-22.

It is, however, to be noted that his basic doctrine regarding religious duties (*dharma*) is faithfully reflected in the passage from the *VDMP* excepting the *natthi ayaṃ loko* part. Both represent the same doctrine, viz. uncompromising materialism, not just scepticism.

We may also note the views of king Pāyāsi (Paesi in Prakrit) who is held by some to be "the first materialist" in India.[33] He is said to have declared: "Neither is there another world, nor are there beings reborn not of parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done."[34] There is no denial of this world, only of the *paro loko.*

The *SKS,* a Jain canonical work, also refers to many heretical views, some of which are quite akin to Ajita's. One of them runs as follows:

> Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is (what is called) Soul (*jīva*), or what is the same, the Ātman. The whole soul lives; when this (body) is dead, it (the soul) does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction (of the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men carry it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore there is and exists no (soul different from the body).[35]

The similarity of the images —the pall-bearers and the dove-coloured bone— is unmistakable. Ajita is made to employ the same image in the *SPhS.*[36] Here too there is no denial of the mortal world, only of the next. (Cf. the Lokāyata-*sūtra*: "Since there is no dweller of the other world, the other world does not exist," *paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ*).[37]

Earlier in the same Jain work, we are told:

> [Some fools say]: Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual soul. These souls exist (as long as the body), but after death they are no more; there are no souls which are born again. There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.[38]

[33] Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216.

[34] *Pāyāsirājaññasuttam* (*DN*), II: 236.

[35] *SKS*, 2.1.15. The translation is by Hermann Jacobi in SBE 45, II: 339-40.

[36] *āsandipaññamā purisā mataṃ ādāya gacchanti. yāvālahanā padāni paññayanti, kāpotakāni aṭṭhīni bhavanti. SPhS*, 48.

[37] See Ch. 6 below, Aphorism No. IV.2.

[38] *SKS*, 1.1.11-12: Jacobi, SBE 45, II: 237.

Here too we have an echo of Ajita's view (specially the last part of his exposition)[39] but the statement stops at the denial of the world beyond, there is no denial of this world.

Thus, the declaration *natthi ayaṃ loko* is not to be taken literally, but as a shorthand for "There is no happiness in this world" as in the *Gītā* passage and the verse in Śāntiparvan (275.12) quoted above.

At the same time, there is no denying the fact that there were arch-nihilists as well as all-out sceptics and agnostics in India from the days of the *Ṛgveda.*[40] The *LS* records no fewer than thirty one points of dispute (called *lokāyata*-s) regarding soul, after-life, creation, etc.[41] Ajita was inclined to deny all that idealism and theism stood for. He too must have meant, like the later Lokāyatika-s, *atthi ayaṃ loko, natthi paro loko,* but in the series of negations, the one affirmatory statement has become a part of universal denial.[42] However, the subsequent statement attributed to Ajita, which speaks of the four great elements (*mahābhūta*-s)[43] makes it abundantly clear that he believed only in their existence, not in *atthikavāda* (the doctrine that affirms the existence of the immutable soul). In this sense alone, he was a *nātthikavādin* (though he is generally called *ucchedavādin,* for he believed in the dissolution of the soul with the death of the body).[44] A *nāstika* does deny the efficacy of religious rituals and codes of conduct, but not the existence of this world. Ajita, too, was a proto-materialist in his views, not a nihilist like Jayarāśi.

[39] *cāturmahābhūtiko ayaṃ puriso... bhassantā āhutiyo. dattupaññattaṃ yadidaṃ dānaṃ tesaṃ tucchaṃ musā vilāpo ye keci atthikavādaṃ vadanti. vāle ca paṇḍite ca kāyassa bhedā ucchijjnati vinassanti, na honti paraṃ maraṇāti. SPhS*, 48.

[40] See D.R. Shastri (1982), 82-93; Hemanta Gangopadhyaya, 69-86.

[41] *LS*, 176-79. D.T. Suzuki in his translation of this passage (152-55) "consistently mistranslated the term [*lokāyata*] as 'materialism' though it is obvious from the context that it could not mean this." Jayatilleke, 52.

[42] Cf. *sarvatra paryanuyogaparāṇy eva sūtrāṇi bṛhaspateḥ*, "The aphorisms of Bṛhaspati are everywhere prone to refuting only." *TBV*, 69. The author says that the Cārvāka-s themselves declared so (*cārvākair abhihitam*), but it is more probable that this comes from the opponents of the Cārvāka, complaining against the long series of denials —of God, after-life, the authenticity of the Vedas, the efficacy of religious rites, of rebirth, heaven and hell, etc. Anantavīrya calls this so-called aphorism a *sūktam* in *SVṬ*, 277. 23. See Ch.7 below.

[43] See n39 above.

[44] In the *Mahābodhi Jātaka* (*Jātaka* 528) king Brahmadatta of Kāśī (Kāsiraṭṭha) is said to have five heretical councillors, one of whom is called an *ucchedavādin*, who ultimately turns out to be a later incarnation of Ajita Kesakambala! *The Jātaka*. V: 228, 239, 246.

IV
Perception and Inference in the Cārvāka Philosophy

Materialism, it has been said, is as old as philosophy.[1] India too had her share of heretics, sceptics and proto-materialists right from the Vedic times.[2] We read of them in the Upaniṣads and the epics. "Any number of these unbelievers is known, who deny everything there is to deny," said Hopkins.[3] "Materialists and other heretics without special designation appear to fill the whole land." As the culmination to all these developments we have the Cārvāka/Lokāyata system of philosophy.

How and from when did materialism face a challenge? According to Frauwallner,

> Its situation becomes more difficult at the end of the classical period of Indian philosophy, when logical and epistemological questions moved to the forefront of interest and when every system was compelled to take them into consideration, on which their systems were founded. The adherents of the Lokāyata also could not escape this demand.[4] Originally they made light of the fact. In the *sūtras* of Bṛhaspati it is said: "The

[1] Both Radhakrishnan and Frauwallner have quoted this saying. See Radhakrishnan (1980) I: 277; Frauwallner, II: 296 (trans.: II: 216) respectively.

[2] For a selection of such specimens, see Radhakrishnan-Moore (ed.), 34-36.

[3] Hopkins, 86. The next sentence is quoted from ibid., 86-87.

[4] Franco takes the appearance of Dharmakīrti to be the turning point. (1991), 154.

only means of right knowledge is sense perception," "The inference is not the means of right knowledge." [5] One, therefore, appealed only to sense-experience and simply dismissed the further assertions of the opponent. One could do it so long as inferences which were arrived at by the antagonistic schools were simple inferences by analogy. It was enough to show the fault of every conclusion, in order to decline every inference as unreliable. Things, however, were different, as the opponent developed the firmly grounded scientific doctrines forming conclusions. One had to discuss these, nay, one was compelled to establish one's own doctrine differently as from what one had done hitherto and to defend it.[6]

This is, of course, all conjecture, but this is how Frauwallner wished to reconstruct the course of development of the Cārvāka.

As to the materialists, he said:

> Partly one tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for instance, when one explained: "The aphorisms of Bṛhaspati have only this aim, viz. to refute the opponent".[7] But in the majority of the cases one decided to discuss the doctrine of inference and to take it over at least in parts.

Thus, according to Frauwallner, the later Cārvāka-s deviated from their 'orthodoxy' regarding the inadmissibility of inference, etc. as a means of right knowledge. Paradoxically, however,

> This desertion of the original attitude led, in no way, to the consequence of the decline of the system. The taking up of foreign thoughts and occupation with them led, on the contrary, to a regular activity and to a blossoming up of a literature richer than hitherto.

Frauwallner did not elaborate on the blossoming of the later period but it may be presumed that he had Purandara,

[5] Bedekar in his translation (225) omits the first aphorism (or it may be a printing mistake). See the German text, S. 302.

[6] Frauwallner, S. 307-08 (German text) and 225 (translation amended). The extracts that follow are from the same source. Franco-Preisendanz have followed Frauwallner in *REP*, VI: 180. In an earlier article (1991) Franco conjectured that the devastating arguments put forward by Dharmakīrti against the Cārvāka "had to be urgently answered, or the Cārvāka would have been kicked out of the philosophical scene" (159).

[7] Though this sentence has generally been accepted as an authentic Cārvāka aphorism, I have attempted to show that it really represents the view of the Cārvāka's opponents. See Ch. 7 below.

Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāvivikta, and Udbhaṭa in mind.[8] Whatever little we know of them (and that is meagre indeed) from the works of Karṇakagomin, Kamalaśīla, Cakradhara, Anantavīrya, Vādidevasūri and Vādirājasūri is adequate to make us concur with Frauwallner's opinion that the philosophical literature of the materialists did become richer in their hands. It is, however, difficult to agree with his assertions that the later Cārvāka-s deserted the original position vis-à-vis the inadmissibility of inference as a means of right knowledge and that they took up 'foreign thoughts'. In what follows I propose to examine the issue in some detail.

What induced Frauwallner to believe that the later Cārvāka-s had deserted the original position of their school? He must have had in his mind the following sentence written by Purandara: "The Cārvāka-s, too, admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]."[9] Franco says, "This is probably the most significant contribution of Purandara to the Lokāyata school (at least it is the one for which he is remembered) [...]".[10]

Thus it is assumed that Purandara, by admitting at least one kind of inference, viz., "inference as is well-known in the world," deviated from the original, uncompromising position of the Cārvāka-s who allegedly refused to admit any other means of right knowledge except sense-perception. This is how their position has been represented in almost all philosophical digests and the works of its opponents in which the Cārvāka appears as the *pūrvapakṣin,* one whose view is to be refuted. However, I would like to submit that, first, Purandara, instead of being a 'revisionist', was only expatiating on the original Cārvāka view regarding the means of right knowledge, and, second, the Cārvāka-s after Purandara, too, held the same view, viz., barring one kind of inference mentioned above (i.e. *laukika,* belonging to this world, and hence verifiable by the senses), no other kind of inference is valid, and sense-perception alone is the means of right knowledge, nothing else.

Aviddhakarṇa (to be distinguished from his namesake who was a Naiyāyika, a Nyāya philosopher)[11] holds the same

[8] For the few known Cārvāka philosophers from Kambalāśvatara to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, see Ch. 6, Bhā. 1-30.

[9] Qtd. in *TSP* on *TS*, vv. 1481-82, 528.

[10] Franco (1991), 159. See also Franco and Preisendanz (1998) where Purandara is treated as a revisionist, a view which I do not share.

[11] See *NCC*, I: 426-27.

view. Inference, he says, might be accepted from the empirical point of view but adds: since the definition of *probans* (*liṅga*) is not possible, inference *per se* cannot be a means of right knowledge.[12]

Thus the limited validity of inference is not doubted; what is denied is the claim that any kind of inference is as acceptable as sense-perception. Aviddhakarṇa further points out that any means of right knowledge consists in cognizing an object which has not been cognized before; hence, inference cannot be regarded as a means of right knowledge, lacking as it is in this respect.[13]

Aviddhakarṇa thus admits the validity of inference "as is well known in the world", and, at the same time, denies the validity of inference as such by pointing out its disqualification.

That the Cārvāka-s always admitted what Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa spelt out in so many words is also borne out by the anonymous author of a philosophical digest, *SMS:*

> This rice, because of its riceness, satisfies hunger as it did yesterday —such an inference as this is included there (*sc.* in the Lokāyata-śāstra) due to its being rooted in perception. The fruits of worldly goods and *summum bonum,* the matter of religion and *brahman* as well as the Veda, are devoted to the pretersensual, hence these are not (to be admitted as) means of light knowledge —this is the conclusion.[14]

While explaining the word, *hi* (indeed) in a verse representing the Cārvāka view,[15] Guṇaratna, too, said:

> The word 'indeed' (*hi*) has been used here to indicate a speciality. The speciality, again, is that the Cārvākas admit the validity of inferences which tend to facilitate the daily activities of ordinary people; such as the inference of fire from smoke, etc., but they never admit the validity of extraordinary inferences which seek to establish the heaven, merit and demerit, etc.[16]

This, we should not fail to note, is spoken of the Cārvāka-s in general, not of a particular sect (*cārvākaikadeśīya*-s) whom Guṇaratna refers to elsewhere in the same work.[17]

[12] Qtd. in *PVSVT,* 19.
[13] Qtd. in ibid., 25.
[14] *SMS,* 15.
[15] *ṢDSam,* v. 83, 306.
[16] *TRD* on *ṢDSam,* v. 83, 306. Trans. *C/L,* 273.
[17] *TRD,* 300; *C/L,* 266.

It is also interesting to observe that Udayanācārya, intending to prove that every person worships God in one form or the other, says that the Cārvāka-s worship him as "what is proved by everyday practice".[18] S-M also writes, "The only supreme being is the king, well established in the world".[19] Being materialists, the Cārvāka-s could not but accept "the worldly way", i.e., what was open to all for verification. Excepting the extreme idealists (the Śaṅkaraite Vedāntins, for example, who came in the wake of the nihilist Buddhists and the other Buddhist school called Madhyamaka), all systems of philosophy in India accept the validity of the worldly way.[20] That is why Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, the denier of all means of knowledge (and therefore of knowledge itself), says,

> And even those who know the supreme reality say:
> "The worldly path should be followed...
> In respect to everyday practice the fool and the wise are similar."[21]

Hence it is idle to believe that the earlier Cārvāka-s did not have any faith even in the truth inferred and inferable from daily life and experience.[22]

[18] *lokavyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ, NK,* 5 (the prose portion following *kārikā* 1.2).
[19] *lokasiddho rājā parameśvaraḥ, SDS,* 6.
[20] Śaṅkarācārya himself is said to have admitted that even a hundred Vedas cannot be authoritative against the evidence of sense-perception, *na śrutiśatam api śīto 'gniraprakāśo veti bruvan prāmāṇyam upaiti* (quoted by P.K. Gode (1939), 95.
[21] Franco (1994), 69 and 279 n4. He offers an alternative translation of *paramārthavid*-s (299 n3), "those who know the supreme or ultimate aim in life" (taking the word, artha to mean aim or purpose, as in *puruṣārtha*). The context, however, does not seem to warrant such an interpretation. On the other hand, the two conjunctions, *ca* and *api,* indicate that Jayarāśi had the transcendentalists in mind who were more interested in *paraloka* than *ihaloka.* Nor do I think that Franco's interpretation of the view of the Lokāyatika-s is correct. He thinks that the Lokāyatika-s "rejected *dharma* and *mokṣa,* and maintained that *kāma* and *artha* are the only aims in life" (299 n3), quoting *SDS* in support (*arthakāmau puruṣārthau*). There is every reason to doubt if the Lokāyatika-s at all used to think in terms of the so-called four aims in life. Second, in some other sources (equally antagonistic to the Lokāyata), they are said to have only aim; viz., *kāma,* pleasure (see *ABS,* 99; Nīlakaṇṭha on *Gītā,* 16.11). Apparently nobody knew what the Cārvāka-s really thought in this regard. It was simply in order to stigmatize them that their opponents called them *ekavargavādin*-s; some others, *dvivargavādin*-s.
[22] One verse attributed to the Vedāntins (the Śaṅkaraites in particular) runs as follows: *dehātmapratyayo yadvat pramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ | laukikaṃ*

What then about the aphorisms that have been attributed to the Cārvāka-s, quoted presumably from the now lost *sūtra*-work or its commentaries? It is to be noted that the reading of the aphorisms differs from text to text, and there is every possibility that most of the quotations are not *verbatim*. Thus I have the unenviable task of ascertaining the reading of the relevant aphorisms and then interpreting them.[23]

Although we do not possess the original *sūtra*-work of the Cārvāka-s, we may try to form an idea of their original epistemological position from the following aphorisms found quoted in the works of their opponents. They are as follows:

a) "Sense-perception indeed is the means of right knowledge," because

b) "The means of right knowledge is non-secondary/primary," and

c) "Inference is secondary/non-primary," therefore

d) "Inference is not the means of right knowledge."

If we take the reading adopted by Śīlāṅka,[24] we may rewrite (d) as:

tadvad evedaṃ pramāṇaṃ tvātmaniścayāt. || "As the faith in the (identity of the) body and the soul is assumed to be the truth, similarly the mundane things are to be admitted only so long as (the true nature of) the soul is not known" (qtd. by Bhūtanātha Saptatīrtha, I:[8]).

[23] Let us note a few variants of the three basic aphorisms referred to in the various works (the list is not exhaustive):

a. 1. *pratyakṣam ekaṃ pramāṇam* (*SVR*, 265)
2. *pratyakṣam ekaṃ ghaṭate pramāṇam* (*SVR*, 261)
3. *pratyakṣam ekaṃ (prāmāṇam) nāparam* (*SVR*, 277)
4. *pratyakṣam ekam eva hi pramāṇam agauṇatvāt pramāṇasya* (*PKM*, 177).
5. *pratyakṣam evaikaṃ pramāṇam* (*VPS*, 211; *AYVD*, v. 32, 130)
5A. (Jinabhadra quotes it as '*indriyapratyakṣam evaikam pramāṇam*' (*VĀBh/SVṛ*, II: 439)
6. *pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam* (*PC*, Act II, 40)
7. *pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam agauṇatvāt* (*PKM*, 178)
8. *pratyakṣam pramāṇam nānumānam* (*TSP*, 945)

b. 1. *anumānam apramāṇam* (*STP/TBV*, 70)
2. *anumānaṃ na pramāṇam* (*NM*, Ch. 7, II: 201)
3. *na khalu apratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam asti* (*Bhām*, 851)
4. *nānumānaṃ pramāṇam* (*TSP*, 520; *TK* on *kārikā* 5, 32).
5. *nānumānādikaṃ pramāṇam gauṇatvāt* (*SKSVṛ*, 10, 12) (see also a. 8)

c. 1. *nānumānaṃ tāvat pramāṇam gauṇatvāt* (*SVR*, 261, 265)
2. *pramāṇasya gauṇatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ* (*NM*, Ch. 2, I: 183; *Vyo*, II: 161).
3. *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād anumānārathadurlabhaḥ* (*NBh*, 210).
4. *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ* (*NM*, Ch. 2, I: 177; *STP/TBV*, 70, 72, 354; *PVSVṬ*, 25; *PKM*, 180).

[24] See n23 b 5.

Inference and others (i.e. all non-primary/secondary means of knowledge such as analogy, verbal testimony, negation (*abhāva*), etc. —all the seven else mentioned in *NS*, 2.2.1) are not the means of right knowledge.

The four *sūtra*-s (or three, if we treat (c) and (d) together as one, as they are sometimes found quoted (e.g., "Since inference is secondary/non-primary, ascertaining the object through inference is rarely possible") may very well have formed a *prakaraṇa* (sequence) in the original *sūtra*-work. In his commentary on the concluding aphorism, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa defends the original position of the Cārvāka-s. The passage runs as follows:

> In the grasping of the invariable relation of the *hetu* (probans) with its *sādhya* (probandum), three modes are recognised; (i) by two unqualified perceptions, (ii) by perception along with a qualified non-perception, and (iii) by the process of repeated perception as found in worldly behaviour (*bhūyodarśanapravṛttyā ca lokavyavahārapatitayā*). This *sūtra* is aimed at those who recognise the *hetu* as *gamaka* (capable of yielding knowledge) according to the first mode of grasping. Failure of concomitance (*vyabhicāra*) is not seen even in the case of *hetus* popularly known as such (*lokaprasiddhahetus*) (e.g. smoke, etc.); so also it is not noticed in the case of *hetus* adopted in the special tantras or śāstras (*tantrasiddha hetu*—Śāstric *hetus*); so on the basis of the quality characterised by 'non-perception of failure of concomitance' being common to them, the *tantrasiddha hetus* are established as being *gamaka;* it is because of this that *anumāna* is *gauṇa*. Now, the knowledge of non-failure of concomitance (*avyabhicārāvagama*) in respect of *laukika* (popular) *hetus* (like smoke, etc.) is instrumental in bringing about the knowledge of the probandum; but that is not there in the case of the *tantra-siddha hetus* (śāstric *hetus*), so it is not proper that non-perceptible things should be known with the help of these. Hence it is said that the ascertainment of things is difficult to attain on the strength of *anumāna.*[25]

Vādidevasūri admits that the purpose of denying the validity of inference was not to deny inference as such, but only such inferences as the śāstric ones that purported to establish heaven, etc. Udbhaṭa was in favour of worldly practice, and kept such well-established inference as fire from smoke, etc. in view.[26] Thus Udbhaṭa was only adding some

[25] Trans. Solomon (1977-78), 986-87. For the text, see *SVR*, 256-66.

[26] Jayantabhaṭṭa, while elucidating the views of "the better learned

new logical arguments against the extramundane use of inference to prove the existence of imperceptible objects, such as heaven and hell, etc. He was not against inference as applied in everyday life, very much in the same spirit as Purandara had explained. Similarly, Ubdhaṭa is at one with Aviddhakarṇa in repudiating the claim of inference to be as primary as perception (as most of the other schools of philosophy claimed). There is thus no departure from the original position as Frauwallner believed. The distinction made between the *lokaprasiddha* and *tantrasiddha hetu*-s is fundamental to the Cārvāka logic.

It will be rewarding to study the aphorism, "Inference is not the means of right knowledge" in the context it occurs. Here, too, we have to resort to conjecture since the order in which the aphorisms were originally arranged is not known to us. However, a look at the *STP* and *TBV* suggests that the aphorism came in the wake of the following one, viz. "There is no other-world, because of the absence of any other-worldly being."[27] The major opponents of the Cārvāka —the Naiyāyikas, Buddhists and Jains— in spite of their difference of opinion among themselves, were all unanimous at one point: the existence of the other-world was an article of faith with them. The existence of God or gods might be denied, not that of the other-world. This was their trump-card. As Jayantabhaṭṭa said, "Once the other-world is established their (*sc.* the Cārvākas') objections are automatically refuted."[28]

The crux lies in the fact that the other-world cannot be visited by a man so long as he is alive; its existence has to be proved either by inference or by verbal testimony. In order to prove the existence of the other-world, the validity of inference and/or verbal testimony has to be established first. Hence the demand for the acceptance of inference, verbal testimony, and/or analogy (*upamāna*), etc. as valid means of right knowledge, on a par with sense-perception.

This is where the Cārvāka-s put their foot down. They denied the validity of any kind of inference whatsoever unless and until it was preceded first by perception. The famous parable of the wolf's footprints was meant to drive this lesson

ones" also refers to the instance of smoke and fire (*NM*. Ch. 2, I: 184) as does *SMS*, 15.

[27] See Ch.6, IV. 2 below.

[28] *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 275; *C/L*, 156.

home, viz., an inference based not on actual perception but on an unverified major premise may very well be fallacious.[29]

Thus the later Cārvāka-s, in spite of other differences in their interpretation of some aphorisms,[30] stuck to their original position regarding the primacy of perception and non-primacy of all other alleged means of right knowledge. If a Paurandara aphorism denied the validity of inference (as *SVR* says), it was Purandara himself who admitted the validity of inference in mundane matters. There is no contradiction between the two positions. Whenever the Cārvāka aphorisms speak of 'perception', "inference preceded by perception" inheres in it, and 'inference' stands for "such inference as transgresses the worldly way in order to prove the existence of the imperishable soul, its transmigration after the death of a person, God, heaven and hell, the omniscient being, etc."[31] In this respect there is perfect continuity between the *sūtra*-work and its commentaries.

[29] This is one of the earliest stories in support of the primacy and indispensability of perception. It is found in a number of Buddhist, Brahminical and Jain sources. See Ch. 15 below.

[30] Both Kamalaśīla and Prabhācandra mention two different *adhyāhāra*-s proposed by the commentators in connection with the aphorism, "From that, consciousness," *tebhyaś caitanyam*. See *TSP*, 633-34; *PKM*, 116-17 and *NKC*, 342. Udbhaṭa interpreted the same sūtra in yet another manner (*GrBh*, II: 257).

[31] "However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after-world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things." (*NM*, Ch. 2, I: 184, *C/L*, 140).

Apparently the Cārvāka-s had to contend against both the Brahminical *āstika* and the Buddhist-Jain *nāstika* schools, hence the reference to 'an omniscient being'.

V
Commentators of the Cārvākasūtra

In the history of classical Indian philosophy the Cārvāka school is the lone representative of the materialist system. Materialism in India, as we have shown before, had an earlier tradition. But the question is: Does the Cārvāka system represent a continuation of the materialism of the pre-Christian era? In other words, is it just a change of name from Bārhaspatya (the doctrine of Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of materialism in India)? At the present state of our knowledge, no definite answer is possible. However, one thing can be said: the philosophical system known at present as the Cārvāka, attained its final form before the eighth century CE and some continuity in its tradition can be observed at least upto the twelfth century. It can be safely asserted that there were a collection of Cārvāka aphorisms and more than one commentary on it. None of these works has been found to date. But a few extracts from the commentaries are scattered in various works and a few verses containing the basic doctrines of the Cārvāka have been quoted in other works.

The names of five commentators of the *Cārvākasūtra* are known. All of them seem to have flourished before the eighth century or thereabouts. In what follows we propose to give an account of their works. The names are arranged alphabetically, not chronologically.

1. Aviddhakarṇa. He wrote a commentary on the *Paurandarasūtra* (which may be a namesake of the *Cārvākasūtra* or a new arrangement of the Cārvāka aphorisms). Vādirājasūri distinctly refers to him as "a Cārvāka".[1] Karṇakagomin too mentions his name.[2] In the *TSP* two Aviddhakarṇas are mentioned: one, a Naiyāyika, and the other, a follower of Cārvāka. The name of the commentary by the second one is *Tattvāṭīkā*.[3] In Anantavīrya's work, the extracts from Aviddhakarṇa are most probably taken from this commentary. Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya assumes this Aviddhakarṇa to be the author of the *Paurandarasūtra* itself.[4] This is not acceptable, for Vādirājasūri refers to Aviddhakarṇa and Purandara separately and quotes from their works.[5]

2. Bhāvivikta. Cakradhara mentions him as a "traditional Cārvāka master" (*cirantana cārvākācārya*), i.e., one who belonged to the old Cārvāka school (as opposed to the new one represented by Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa).[6] Bhāvivikta may have written a commentary on the *Cārvākasūtra*. It also may be assumed that he is one of the commentators whom Kamalaśīla and Prabhācandra had in mind. A Naiyāyika bearing the same name (Bhāvivikta) is also encountered.[7] Like the first Aviddhakarṇa no work of this Bhāvivikta has survived, Not a single line or even a phrase from his commentary has been quoted anywhere.

3. Kambalāśvatara. His name occurs in the *TS* and *TSP*. Only a part of a sentence from his commentary is quoted: "From the body (comes consciousness)."[8] This extract seems to have been taken from a passage explicating the Cārvāka view on the primacy of the body over consciousness. Wild conjectures have been made about Kambalāśvatara's identity. He has been equated with a veteran preceptor of musicology as well as with Ajita Kesakambala, senior contemporary of the Buddha.[9] Kambala and Aśvatara are said to have composed *Saṅgītaratnākara* and similar works on music.[10]

[1] *NVV*, II: 101.
[2] *PVSVṬ*, 19, 25.
[3] See *NCC*, I: 426-27.
[4] See Intro. to *SVṬ*, 77.
[5] *NVV*, 101.
[6] *GrBh* on *NM*, Ch. 7, II: 257.
[7] See Franco (1997), 99, 142.
[8] *TS*, I: 225, v. 1863.
[9] B. Bhattacharya, Foreword to *TS* (1926), xxxviii-xxxix.
[10] *NCC*, I: 169.

So there is little possibility of Kambalāśvatara to be identical with them. Similarly another Kambalāsvatara is mentioned along with such legendary sages as Tumburu, Vāyu, Nārada and others.[11] Prajñārakṣita, a Buddhist philosopher, is called a follower of Kambalāmbara.[12] Cordier also refers to one Kambalakambalāmbara.[13] There is nothing common to all those names excepting the word, *kambala*. B. Bhattacharya's ambivalance —first identifying Kambalāśvatara with a musicologist and then with Ajita Keśakambalī— is prompted by a strange argument: "It is not at all strange that a member of a materialist sect should devote himself to music; disbelieving in transmigration of Soul or in a future life the cultivation of pleasure in this life would seem logical and entirely proper."[14] As Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has rightly pointed out, all the *ācārya*-s of musicology could then be dubbed as materialists.[15]

4. Purandara. His name is first found in the *TSP*.[16] Vādidevasūri quotes a '*paurandaraṃ sūtraṃ*' that is cited in the name of Cārvāka in the *PKM*. The same *sūtra* (with minor variations) is found in three other works.[17] Another Paurandara aphorism has been quoted in the *SVṬ*.[18]

While speaking of the Cārvāka system, Puṣpadanta mentions a '*paurandariya vitti*' (*paurandarīya vṛtti*).[19] It would appear that a philosopher called Purandara compiled the aphorisms of the Cārvāka and himself wrote a commentary on them. Kamalaśīla cites a sentence most probably from this commentary. Vādirājasūri also mentions Purandara.[20]

It is not possible to say whether Purandara compiled the aphorisms already known, or also added some of his own. But one point is clear: he tried to refute the common misconceptions around the number of *pramāṇa*-s. He did not deny the validity of inference as such.

5. Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa (or Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa). His name is found more than once in the works of Cakradhara and

[11] B. Bhattacharya, xxviii, referring to Bhuvanānanda Kavikaṇṭhāvaraṇa as his source.
[12] *NCC*, I: 169.
[13] Ibid.
[14] B. Bhattacharya, xxxviii.
[15] Chattopadhyaya (1969), 176 n258.
[16] *TSP*, 528, on *TS*, vv. 1481-82.
[17] *SVR*, 256; *NM*, *NBh* and *PKM*. See Franco (1991), 161 n1. See also Ch. 8 below.
[18] *SVṬ*, 306.
[19] *Mahāp*, I: 328.
[20] *NVV*, II: 101.

Vādidevasūri.[21] His commentary was entitled *Tattvavṛtti*.[22] He was a very atypical commentator of the Cārvāka aphorisms; it may not be wrong to call him a 'revisionist'. There were already two distinct interpretations of the aphorism, *tebhyaścaitanyam*, "consciousness out of these". Some believed that the missing verb should be 'arises', some others, 'is manifested'.[23] Udbhaṭa, however, says that "consciousness is for (the sake of) the elements; consciousness is independent and aids the physical elements which constitute the body."[24] Udbhaṭa also gives a novel explanation of the aphorism attributed to Purandara. According to Cakradhara, by 'the cunning Cārvāka' as well as 'the well-versed Cārvāka' Jayantabhaṭṭa means Udbhaṭa.[25]

Vādidevasūri, on the other hand, refers to Udbhaṭa reverentially as "this respectable veteran twice-born".[26]

Both Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa appear to blend the finesse of the Nyāya system with materialism. The available fragments show a typically scholastic way of refuting the opponents' views and profusion of technical terms.

Udbhaṭa the philosopher has been identified with the rhetorician who was also the minister of Kashmir during Jayapīḍa's reign (779-813 CE). Two other Udbhaṭa-s are known to have existed.[27]

The upshot of this survey is that, like all other philosophical systems in India, the Cārvāka too had its own development. The commentators were not always unanimous in their views but continued their polemic against the Buddhist, Jain and Naiyāyikas. It is a mystery why, along with the *sūtra* text, all the commentaries too are lost and nothing except a few stray fragments survive. Frauwallner notices that in the writings of the later commentators, the Cārvāka system became more enriched than before.[28] It is a matter of regret that modern students and scholars of Indian philosophy do not seem to be well-informed about the Cārvāka commentary tradition.

[21] *GrBh* on *NM*, Ch. 1, I: 52-100; Ch. 7, II: 257, 263; *SVR*, 265, 269-70, 764-65, 1087.
[22] *SVR*, 265.
[23] *TSP*, I: 633-34 on *TS*, vv. 1857-58; *NKC*, 352.
[24] *GrBh*, II: 257-58 on *NM*, Ch. 7.
[25] *GrBh*, I: 52-100.
[26] *SVR*, 764.
[27] *NCC*, II: 341.
[28] Frauwallner (trans.), II: 225.

VI
Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection

Introduction

A collection of all available Cārvāka fragments has been a desideratum since Henry Thomas Colebrooke first wrote on the materialist tradition in India in 1827.[1] For a pretty long time scholars relied almost exclusively on S-M's exposition in the *SDS*, Chapter 1.[2] Slow but steady discovery of many a Cārvāka fragment, specially in the Buddhist and Jain works and other compendia of philosophical systems, made it clear that there was more than meets the eye. Formerly only two legendary names were associated with the materialist system: Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka. Śāntarakṣita's *TS* and Kamalaśīla's *TSP* provide three historical names of Cārvāka authors: Aviddhakarṇa, Kambalāśvatara and Purandara. Cakradhara mentions two more: Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa and Bhāvivikta.[3] Several aphorisms and extracts from the works of these com-

[1] H.T. Colebrooke (1837), 402-405. The essay was first read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society on 3 February 1827.
[2] The *editio princeps* of the *SDS* was first published by Ishwarachandra Vidyasagara in BI, 1853 (first fascicule) and completed in 1858.
[3] *TSP* on *TS*, v. 1484; *TS*, v. 1863; *TSP* on *TS*, v. 1481; *GrBh/NM*, Ch. 1, I: 100; Ch. 7, 257; *SVR*, 265, 270, etc. also mention Udbhaṭa.

mentators were welcome additions to the meagre number of Cārvāka fragments known before the 1920s.

D.R. Shastri (1894-1961) first attempted to compile the Cārvāka fragments in his English-Sanskrit work, *Chārvāka Shashṭi* (1928).[4] Not satisfied with those attributed to Bṛhaspati or the Cārvāka-s in general, he sought to find materialist traits in other systems of philosophy. Thus he compiled one hundred aphorisms from various sources, some of which, however, are not of Cārvāka origin (he quoted from the *Mīmāṃsā-*, *Nyāya-* and *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*-s as well).[5] He also reproduced sixty verses (hence the title of the work, *Cārvāka-ṣaṣṭi*). They are taken from the *NC* by Śrīharṣa (verses 1-47), *SDS* by Mādhavācārya (48-55, 57-59), *VMT* by Cirañjīva Bhaṭṭācārya (56) and *ṢDSam* by Haribhadra (60). He then published another collection of fifty fragments entitled "Cārvvāka-pañcāśikā" (in Bengali) in 1944.[6] Later, in an appendix to his Bengali book, *Cārvāka Darśana* (1959) he selected fifty-four aphorisms and verses out of all these and printed them under the title, "Bārhaspatyasūtram".[7] He was of the opinion that many more such sayings could be collected and an authoritative work on the Bārhaspatya system might be had if pains were taken to do so.[8]

Sarvananda Pathak reproduced these fifty-four aphorisms and verses verbatim (with Hindi translation) in his work on the Cārvāka philosophy in 1965.[9]

Namai has compiled and analysed the Bārhaspatya aphorisms and verses in a long article (in English and Japanese) in 1976.[10] Of the fifty-four aphorisms and verses reproduced in Pathak's work he omitted nineteen and added nine new ones from different sources, including Tibetan. There are thus forty-five aphorisms and verses arranged under six heads (A-F) with the sources given in more detail.

[4] D.R. Shastri (1928), Sanskrit Section, 1-53. An unauthorized reprint has been published by one Gagan Deo Giri, Ph.D., Ranchi University (Patna, Ranchi, Varanasi: Jyoti, 1980) with Hindi translation of certain parts.

[5] Ibid., Appendix A, 1-8. Acarya Ananda Jha and Kewal Krishan Mittal similarly utilized all orthodox and heterodox philosophical texts in their studies of materialism in India, as did Riepe in his work on naturalism.

[6] See D.R. Shastri (1944).

[7] Shastri (1959), 173-176.

[8] Ibid. (1982), 203.

[9] Pathak (1990), 136-146.

[10] Namai (1976), 29-44. Halbfass, 330 n13 refers to another article by Namai (published in 1981) which is not available to me.

It is known that Frauwallner also collected the Cārvāka fragments for his own use but, to the best of my knowledge, they have never been published.[11]

In spite of the pioneering works of D.R. Shastri and Namai, there is still scope for yet another attempt to (a) reconstruct the lost *Cārvākasūtra* and (b) compile the extracts from its commentaries, followed by (c) some verses (called *ābhāṇaka*-s and *lokagāthā*-s in the *SDS*) attributed to the Cārvāka-s, and (d) other miscellaneous fragments mostly found in non-philosophical works. In what follows I propose to offer such a collection of the first three. Most of the fragments already printed by D.R. Shastri and Namai will be found here, but unlike D.R. Shastri, all fragments will not be treated as *sūtra*-s (aphorisms). I am unable to admit some fragments considered genuine by D.R. Shastri and Namai as emanating from authentic Cārvāka sources.[12] Therefore it will be necessary to explain why I have found it advisable to omit some fragments that were admitted by them. At the same time, I propose to add a few more aphorisms, verses and other fragments. The justification for both exclusion and inclusion of some fragments is duly furnished.

The fundamental problem of collecting Cārvāka fragments is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Although very few fragments are available, each one has to be critically tested before it may be accepted. Ancient authors, whether in India or in Greece, were not very particular about quoting verbatim. The practice of modern editors of putting some phrases and sentences within inverted commas or printing them in bold or italic types often facilitates locating the quotations. But sometimes, I feel, such quotation marks or special types are unwarranted.[13]

[11] Namai (1989, 1991), 229 n52 and Halbfass, ibid.

[12] The basic reason is that such fragments are found only once in much later works or have been copied from the same source without any evidence to support their authenticity. See e.g., Shastri (1959, 1982) Nos. 9-14 = Namai (1976) A16-21 (taken from the *KS*) and Shastri, Nos. 26-34 (all taken from the *PC*) but not admitted by Namai. The question will be discussed below in more details.

[13] A good example has been provided by L.V. Joshi: "[...] Bhāsarvajña explains the application of *anekānta* following almost verbatim the text of Akalaṇka's *Tattvārthavārtika*. The editor, Svami Yogindrananda seems to believe that Bhāsarvajña has verbatim quoted the passage from *Tattvārthavārtika* and hence he puts the passage into inverted commas which (marks) are not found in the Photostat of *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*. As a matter of fact, Bhāsarvajña has paraphrased the *TAV* text in his own way." 97.

The second problem lies in deciding whether the alleged quotation comes from the original source, or is merely re-quoted.

Last but not least, we have to reckon with some spurious statements attributed to the Cārvāka-s. This is most apparent in the case of poems and plays containing Cārvāka or Kali or a follower of his doctrines as a character.[14] A look at the Cārvāka fragments collected to date reveals the fact that most of them are found in works written between the eighth and twelfth centuries CE. Although Cārvāka studies really began after the publication of the *editio princeps* of the *SDS*, it should be noted that this digest rarely *quotes* any Cārvāka aphorism that can be taken as genuine. It only purports to give, both in prose and verse, the essence of the Cārvāka philosophy, not in the words of any Cārvāka author, but as the learned fourteenth-century Vedāntin understood it. Nor does he mention the name of a single Cārvāka work, text or commentary (which he does profusely while dealing with other philosophical systems in the same work). So it may be admitted that all Cārvāka works had disappeared from India even before S-M's time. Hence, it may also be assumed that any author born after the twelfth century had no access to the authentic Cārvāka works. Any reference to the "aphorisms of Bṛhaspati" or any statement ending with "Thus said the Lokāyatikas" should not be accepted at its face-value. Paradoxically enough, we have to adopt a very conservative attitude in dealing with the most radical philosophical system in ancient India.

At the same time, we cannot afford to throw away any scrap of a fragment because of its dubious authenticity. Pending the discovery of the lost *Cārvākasūtra* along with its commentaries (yes, I am an invetarate optimist in this matter —as in all other matters, too!), all we can do is to assiduously collect *all* statements which refer to the Cārvāka directly (i.e., mentioning the authority or authorities by name) or indirectly (attributing some idea to them rather vaguely).

After all such direct or indirect references have been collected, we may start threshing.

Such a collection, however, will pose further problems. The Cārvāka-s were criticized by the proponents of almost all philosophical systems, but mostly by the Naiyāyika-s, Vedāntins, Jains and Buddhists. True to the Indian tradition of polemics, they first propounded the exponent's

[14] See e.g., *PC, NC* and *VMT.*

view (*pūrvapakṣa*). In order to do justice to the exponent, the opponent would not only reproduce what the former had actually said, but would liberally add what he might or should have said to strengthen his position further. Having apparently made the exponent appear with the array of the best possible arguments, the opponent would then set out to refute the former's views one by one.

However admirable the practice may be in other respects, it is more a hindrance than an aid to the reconstruction of the actual views of the exponent.

Another problem lies in choosing the right reading from the number of variants available. In connection with the stray verses attributed to Bṛhaspati in the *SDS,* I have chosen the reading that comes chronologically first. The second *pāda* in the well-known verse, *yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven,* etc. was originally *nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ* as is found in the earliest source.[15] The other reading, *ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet* (found in the *SDS* alone) is spurious. It occurs only once in the fourteen instances in which the verse is wholly or partly quoted or adapted.[16]

Similarly, in the case of another verse, *agnihotram,* etc., the fourth *pāda* as given in the *SDS* (*jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā*) is spurious. Everywhere else, in ten out of eleven instances, it reads: *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ.*[17]

But what to do when we are confronted with such a slight variation as *pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam* and *pratyakṣam evaikaṃ pramāṇam*? The former reading occurs first in *TSP* (eighth century) and is so quoted by Abhayadevasūri, Kṛṣṇamiśra (both eleventh century) and others. The latter reading, however, is first found in *VāBh/SVṛ* (sixth/seventh century) which is followed by Anantavīrya (tenth century), Vādidevasūri (eleventh century) and many others. Prabhācandra first chooses the former reading and a few lines after quotes the latter one.[18]

If we follow the same principle as adopted in the case of the verses, the former reading, viz., "perception is the one and only means of valid knowledge", has to be accepted. But that would go flatly against what Purandara, himself a

[15] The earliest source is presumably the *VDMP* followed by the *TSP* and *NM.*

[16] See *Śl.*7 below. The issue has been elaborately dealt with in Chs. 19, 20 below.

[17] See Ch. 20 below.

[18] For details, see Ch. 4 above. See also *Śl.*2 below.

Cārvāka, says: "The Cārvākas, too, admit of such an inference as is well known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]".[19] The same idea is found in the *SMS*, too.[20] Therefore to brand the Cārvāka-s as refusing to accept any other means of valid knowledge excepting perception (as Sureśvara (eighth century) does in his *Mān.*)[21] or, in other words, rejecting the validity of inference as such (as Jayantabhaṭṭa and Vācaspatimiśra (both ninth century) represent them to be)[22] will amount to a distortion of the true Cārvāka position.

And the acceptance of the true position would also entail the rejection of another so-called Cārvāka aphorism: *nānumānaṃ pramāṇam* (or its variants).[23] Kamalaśīla ascribes this view to the grammarians as well as to the Cārvāka-s on two different occasions.[24] In fact, while attributing this view to the Cārvāka-s, the opponents invariably quote a verse (or verses) from Bhartṛhari (fifth century),[25] not any aphorism from the *sūtra*-work. The Cārvāka-s were quite prepared to accept inference as a means of valid knowledge in so far as it was preceded or verifiable by perception. They, however, made a clear distinction between the *lokasiddha* (commonly accepted) and *tantrasiddha* (following from scripture) *hetu*-s.[26] Jayantabhaṭṭa used another set of terms to designate the same distinction: *utpanna-* and *utpādya-pratīti*-s.[27]

Therefore, chronological priority cannot be the only criterion in selecting the right reading of the so-called Cārvāka aphorisms. The first one that reaches us may not be the original reading. A late source, on the contrary, may retain it. We have to take all the basic tenets of the doctrine into consideration and see whether a fragment conforms to them or not.

[19] Quoted in the *TSP*, 528. See *Bhā.* 17 below.

[20] *SMS*, 15. It is also echoed in the *TRD*, 306 and the anonymous Avacūrṇi on *ṢDSam*, 508.

[21] *Mān.*, 2.17, 5.1; 20, 59. Varadarāja/Varadācārya quotes 2.17-18 in his *Tārkikarakṣā*, as does the *SMS* on p. 14 (attributing the verses to the "logicians", *nyāyavidāṃ*).

[22] *NM*, Ch. 1, I: 43 (but see ibid., 52 where the well-educated Cārvāka-s (presumably Udbhaṭa and others) are made to say that the number of *pramāṇa*-s cannot be determined); *Bhām.* on *BS*, 3.3.54, 851-852.

[23] See Ch. 4 above.

[24] See Chs. 8, 11 below.

[25] *VP*, 1.52-54. See also n24 above.

[26] Udbhaṭa quoted in the *SVR*, 265-266. See *Bhā.* 12.

[27] *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 184. Jayanta seems to have taken it from some commentary, most probably by Udhhaṭa, on the *Cārvākasūtra*.

Another difficulty is to distinguish between a verbatim quotation from a Cārvāka work (the collection of aphorisms and its commentary) and a paraphrase. The *SDS* first summarizes the Cārvāka philosophy in prose and repeats the same in verse —both in the same chapter.[28] This has led Dasgupta to declare: "There was at least one metrical version of the main contents of this system from which extracts are found quoted in Mādhava's *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* and in other places".[29]

This is a mere conjecture that may not prove true in all cases. Versified versions of a philosophical system made by an opponent are not altogether unknown.[30] Verbatim quotations, we may safely hypothesize, will be few and far between, and even those which appear to be so, should be weighed more than once before accepting them as genuine.

The last problem: from where to begin? Should we start from the hints and suggestions pointing to the existence of heretics, sceptics and free-thinkers in India as may be culled from the Vedic literature?[31] Uddālaka (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* 6.1 ff) has been claimed to be the first materialist-scientist in India.[32] There are references to Asuramata in the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā.*[33] There is every reason to believe that Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, preached a proto-materialist doctrine.[34] While referring to the Lokāyatika-s, both Bhāvaviveka (sixth century) and Candrakīrti (sixth/seventh century) quote a passage which resembles the words of Ajita as reproduced in *SPhS.*[35] The *SKS* also refers to some such proto-materialist doctrine which Śīlāṅka could not identify. He referred to

[28] *SDS*, 6-7.

[29] Dasgupta, III: 532.

[30] Siddhasena Divākara presents in verse form the basic tenets of Vaiśeṣika and some other philosophical systems in his *Dvātriṃśad Dvātriṃśikā*. But they are all composed by him, not taken from any other source.

[31] See Radhakrishnan-Moore, 34-36.

[32] See D. Chattopadhyaya (1991), Ch. 7, 89-148. He first staked this claim in an earlier paper, later reprinted as "Materialism in Indian Philosophy" which forms Ch. 7 of his *Knowledge and Intervention* (1985), 196 ff. He elaborated the theme in the Zakir Husain Memorial Lecture (New Delhi, 1988), which was afterwards printed in *IHR*, XIII: 37-57.

[33] See *Ch. Up.*, 8.7-9; *Gītā*, 16.7, 9. See also Dasgupta, III: 529 and D. Chattopadhyaya (1959, 1973), Ch. 1, "Asura View", 1 ff. K.C. Chattopadhyaya has strongly objected to this (153-154 n42).

[34] See Chs. 1, 3 above.

[35] See *MŚ*, II: 60, 63-64 and 66 (on *MS* 18, 5-7) Cf. *DN*, I: 48.

both Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata.[36] The *Mbh,* Śāntiparvan, Ch. 211 contains a clear reference to materialism.[37]

I would, however, like to start from the time when the name, Cārvāka, is unequivocally mentioned in connection with the materialist philosophy. The word, *lokāyata,* can be traced back to the *KA*;[38] its Pali and Prakrit variants are also found in Buddhist and Jain canonical works. But as I have tried to show elsewhere, *lokāyata* originally meant *disputatio,* the science of disputation, both in Pali and Sanskrit.[39] Only from the sixth century CE do we find a verse attributed to the Lokāyatika-s.[40] The verse in question presents the lesson of a parable designed to establish the superiority of perception to mere inference that is not preceded or supported by perception.[41] The word, *bārhaspatya,* although favoured by D.R. Shastri, Namai and some others, should, in my opinion, better be avoided. It encourages the identification of the author of the *Cārvākasūtra* with the preceptor of the gods (*suraguru*). Why and how an uncompromisingly materialist doctrine originated with a mythical sage associated with the gods is told in the Purāṇa-s.[42] Jayarāśibhaṭṭa names Bhagavān Bṛhaspati and Suraguru when he refers to the eponymous founder of materialism in India.[43] As there was a lawbook (*smṛti*) purportedly composed by a Bṛhaspati, some scholars have tended to take the founder of a philosophical system and

[36] *SKSVṛ,* 10 (on *SKS,* 1.1.7).

[37] *Mbh,* 12.211. 26-27 (218.27-28 in vul.). See Ch. 8 below.

[38] *KA,* 1.2.10. See Ch. 10 below. A more elaborate Bengali version was published in 1996.

[39] See Chs. 16, 17. Eli Franco (2000) recently mentions that the Spitzwer MS fragment 143b (SHT – 810 of the Turfan MSS) contains references to *laukāyatā* (sic) besides Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika (p. 548 [63] n23). He, too, notes that the word is not used "in the sense of a materialistic philosophical school, but as a science whose nature is to criticize with reasons".

[40] The anonymous commentary on the *SK,* v. 27 (translated into Chinese by Paramārtha) refers to a verse, *yena śuklīkṛtā haṃsāḥ,* etc. and identifies it as a Lokāyatika saying. See Bedekar, 10 n45 and S.S.S. Shastri, 36. For the *etāvān eva* verse, see *Śl.* 13 below and Ch. 15 below.

[41] See Ch. 15 below.

[42] *VPu,* 3.18.1-29; *PPu,* Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, 13.291-371. See also Hazra (1940, 1987), p. 25 and his Introduction to *VPu* (1972), k-l.

[43] *TUS,* 45.11 and 125.13. See also 88.9. The very mention of Bṛhaspati as the preceptor of the gods and addressing him as *bhagavān,* I believe, are further evidence to prove that Jayarāśi was not a Cārvāka/Lokāyata, for no Cārvāka would deign to admit the existence of the gods and their guru and refer to him as a god or demi-god.

the law-maker to be the same person.[44] To make the confusion worse confounded, a collection of rather odd aphorisms called the *Bārhaspatyasūtram arthāt Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstram,* a piece of transparent forgery (as F.W. Thomas, the editor, himself indirectly acknowledged) still haunts the scene.[45]

Rejecting both the names, Lokāyata and Bārhaspatya, I, therefore, prefer to call it Cārvāka, which is at least not as dubious as the other two.[46] And there is a special reason to do so. The first philosopher known to have used the name is Purandara, himself a materialist. He refers to his fellow-philosophers as "the Cārvāka-s".[47] Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra (both eighth century) employ this name in their works,[48] and they are followed by a host of writers. (Interestingly enough, Śaṅkara always uses the term, "Lokāyatika", never "Cārvāka", when he refers to the materialists).[49]

Materialism may very well be as old as philosophy (as both Radhakrishnan and Frauwallner assert),[50] but a methodical presentation of any system in the ancient Indian context requires, first, a book of aphorisms which would generate a commentary to be followed by a series of sub-commentaries. I would, therefore, for the present purpose, leave behind all references to *asuramata, ucchedavāda, tajjīvataccharīravāda, dehātmavāda,* etc.[51] and start from such works as refer directly or indirectly to the *sūtra*-work or its commentaries.

First, the aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms (i.e., those which look like aphorisms but may not be so —not merely on stylistic grounds but because each of them is found in only one source). IV.1, IV.3-5 and V.1-2 (see below) may be

[44] For the many Bṛhaspati-s, see, Aiyangar, 79. MŚ. Saraswati Bali's *Bṛihaspati in the Vedas and the Purāṇas* (1978) is not available to me.

[45] Thomas, 17; Kangle, II: 6 n4 and III: 43. The Bṛhaspati-nīti teachings that a learned Brahmin taught Draupadī's brother (*Mbh,* Āraṇyakaparvan, 33.57), "are at any rate as orthodox as one can wish" (Jacobi (1911), S. 737 = (1918), 104) See also Bhagavad Datta in Thomas 1916, 9.

[46] The name, Cārvāka is first found in the *Mbh,* Ādiparvan, 2.63 (Vul., 2.74); Śānti., 39.23-47 (vul., Chs. 38-39). He is, however, a demon who got a boon from Brahmā by satisfying Him in penance. To identify this Cārvāka with the founder of a philosophical school is downright absurd, although some people tend to do so. As to the Bṛhaspati-s, see n44 above.

[47] See n19 above.

[48] See *TSP,* 639, 649, 657, 663, 665 and *ṢDSam,* 85d.

[49] See *ŚBh* on *BS,* 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53; on *Gītā,* 16.8, etc.

[50] Radhakrishnan (1980), 277; Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216 (= S.296).

[51] Some other doctrines called *prāṇātmavāda,* etc. found in the Upaniṣads and in the works of later Vedāntins are also left out because they are older than the Cārvāka doctrine. See n72 below.

taken as examples of pseudo-aphorisms. Variant readings are mostly of a negligible nature, excepting in the case of III. 1.[52] The sources in each case are arranged chronologically as far as practicable (undated works like the *SMS* and the Purāṇa-s have been placed at the end).

The Aphorisms and Pseudo-aphorisms section (marked A) is followed by the extracts from commentaries (B) and finally the verses attributed to the Cārvāka-s (C). Miscellaneous fragments mostly found in non-philosophical works will have to wait for some time to be collected and presented.

The fragments are then rendered into English. Wherever translations are extant, I have reproduced them with minor amendments (when absolutely necessary).

My views on the fragments are then given separately. Those fragments which have not been included by Shastri and/or Namai are marked with + before the number of the fragment. Additional sources too have been marked with +.

Following abbreviations have been used (General: Bhā/s = Bhāṣya/s, Comm/s = Commentary/ries, N = Namai, Ś = D.R. Shastri and Śl/s = Śloka/s). For others, see Abbreviations at the beginning of the book.

Text

A. *Aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms*

I. *bhūtavāda*

I.1. *athātastattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ* (Ś 1, N A1)
TUS, p. 1 (Franco, 68); *NM*, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 100.8; *GrBh* (on *NM*, Ch. 1), p. 100.20.

I.2. *pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni* (Ś 2, N A2)
TSP, p. 633; *MAP*, p. 99b (see N, p. 38 n11 on A2-3); *LTN* (on 2.3), f. 24a; +*UBhPK*, p. 668; +*TSV* (on 1.98 and 1.104), pp. 27-28; *ŚBh* (with some variants) (on 3.3.54), p. 854; +*Bhām* (on *BS* 3.3.53.54), p. 854; *BSBh* (on *BS* 3.3.53-54), p. 196; *TUS*, p. 1 (Franco, 68); +*NKC*, p. 341; +*PKM*, p. 116; +*PVA*, 54; +*GrBh* (on *NM*, Ch. 1), Part 1, 100.20; *PC*, Act 2, p. 40; *ST*, p. 13, 17; *ĀLVṛ* (see, N, 38 n11 on A2-8); +*SVR*, pp. 1075, 1086; *VPS*, p. 211; *TRD*, p. 307 (This and the following four aphorisms are also found in other philosophical digests such as *SDS*, p. 2).

[52] See Ch. 4 above.

I.3. *tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñāḥ* (Ś 2, N A3)
TSP, p. 634; *LTN*, f.24a; *UBhPK*, p. 668; *TUS*, p. 1 (Franco, p. 68); *TSV* (on 1.104), p. 28; *BSBh* (on *BS* 3.3.53), p. 196; *ĀLVṛ* (see, N, p. 38 n11 on A2-8); *NKC*, p. 341; *PKM*, p. 116; +*PVA*, p. 54; *NVV*, p. 93; *TRD*, p. 307.

I.4. *tebhyaścaitanyam* (Ś 3, N A4)
TSP, p. 633; +*UBhPK*, p. 668; +*TSV* (on 1.104), p. 28; *ŚBh* (on *BS* 3.3.53), p. 851; *BSBh* (on *BS*, 3.3.53), p. 196; *ĀLVṛ* (see, N, p. 38 n11 on A2-8); +*GrBh* (on *NM*, Ch. 7), Part 2, pp. 257-258; *NKC*, p. 342; +*PKM*, p. 116; +*PVA*, p. 54; +*NVV*, pp. 93,106; +*ST*, p. 13, 17; +*SVR*, pp. 1073, 1081; +*TRD*, p. 307.

I.5. *kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat* (Ś 4, N A5)
+*LTN* (on 2.31), f.24a; +*UBhPK*, p. 668; *ŚBh* (on *BS*, 3.3.53), p. 851 (with variants); +*SKSVṛ*, p. 11 (with variants); +*PrPañ*, p. 326; +*NM*, Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 217.23 (cf. p. 201.26); *BSBh* (on *BS* 3.3.53), p. 196; *SVṬ*, Part 1, pp. 283, 291; (cf. +*YTC*, pp. 252-253); *ĀLVṛ* (see, N, p. 38 n11 on A2-8); *NKC*, p. 342; *PKM*, p. 115; +*PVA*, p. 54; *ST*, p. 13; +*NVV*, pp. 93, 107; *SVR*, pp. 1073, 1086; *KB* p. 44; +*VK*, p. 854 (cf. *PrPa*, on *MŚ*, 18.6; p. 64; *ṢDSam*, v. 84, p. 306; *TRD*, p. 307).

I.6. *caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ* (Ś 7, N A10)
+*LTN*, f.24a; *ŚBh* (on *BS* 3.3.53), p. 851; (cf. on 1.1.1, pp. 81-82); +*PrPañ*, Ch. 8, p. 320; [*NM*, Ch 7, Part 2, p. 201.21]; +*Vyo*, Part 1, p. 137; +*NVV*, p. 93; *TRD*, p. 300; *GBhŚr* (on *Gītā* 16.11), p. 643; *GBhM* (on *Gītā* 16.11), p. 642 (cf. *dehamātraṃ caitanyaviśiṣṭaṃ ātmā*, *GBhM* (on *Gītā* 2.13), p. 48); *ABS*, Ch. 2, p. 99; *GBhN* (on *Gītā* 16.11-12), p. 642.

I.7. *śarīrād eva* (Ś 22, N A9)
TUS, p. 88 [cf. *TS*, p. 635: *kāyād eva*, which Ś quotes].

+I.8. *śarīre bhāvāt*
+*ŚBh* (on *BS* 3.3.53), p. 851 (cf. Śaṅkara on *Pr. Up.* 6.2. *Up. Bhā.*, p. 195).

I.9. *jalabudbudavajjīvāḥ* (N A6)
+*LTN*, f.24a; [*UBhPK*, p. 668]; [*SKSVṛ*, p. 11], [*YTC*, p. 253]; *SVṬ*, pp. 283, 291; *NKC*, p. 342; *SVR*, p. 1074; *TRD*, p. 300.

II. *svabhāvavāda*

II.1. *janmavaicitryabhedājjagadapi vicitram* (N A7)
ĀLVṛ (see, N, p. 38, n11 on A2-8).

II.2. *mayūracandrakavat* (N A8)
ĀLVṛ (see, N, p. 38, n11 on A2-8) (cf. *NVV*, Part 2, p. 106: *svabhāvādeva mayūracitrādivat...*).

III. *pratyakṣaprādhānyavāda*

III.1. *pratyakṣam (ekam) eva pramāṇam* (Ś 20,25; N A13)
GrBh, Part 1, p. 43; +*VABh*, Part 2, p. 439; +*TSP*, p. 945; *UBhPK*, p. 668; *SKSVr*, pp. 10, 12; +*AS*, p. 36; +*SVṬ*, pp. 277, 293; *TBV*, Part 1, p. 73; *NKC*, p. 343; +*PKM*, pp. 177-178; *PC*, Act 2, p. 40; +*SVR*, pp. 261, 265; +*NSi* (on *Pr.Pañ.*, Ch. 6, v.l), p. 112; +*VPS*, p. 211 (also found in *Mān.*, Ch. 5, v.l, p. 59; +*AYVD*, on v. 20, p. 130; +*NTD*, p. 88; *SDS*, Ch. 1, p. 3; *SDK*, pp. 4, 108; *SMS*, p. 15; *SDŚi*, p. 1).

III.2. *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ* (Ś 21, N Dl)
NM, Ch. 1, pp. 177, 183; *AS*, p. 36; *NBh*, p. 210; *Vyo.*, Part 2, p. 161; *TBV*, pp. 70, 72, 354; *PVSVṬ*, p. 25; *PKM*, p. 178; *SVR*, pp. 261, 265.

IV. *punarjanma-paraloka-vilopavāda*

+IV.1. *paralokāsiddhau pramāṇābhāvāt*
SVR, p. 1109 (cf. *UBhPK*, p. 668; *PC*, Act 2, p.40; *SDK*, p. 4).

IV.2. *paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ* (Ś 17, N A ll)
TSP, p. 633; *TUS*, p. 45 (Franco, p. 228); +*ĀḌ*, Act 3, p. 65; *YTC*, p. 269; *TBV*, pp. 71, 91, 731; *NKC*, pp. 343, 345; +*PKM*, p. 116; *SVR*, p. 1109.

+IV.3. *paralokicaitanyaṃ niravayavatvāt*
SVR, p. 1109.

V. *vedaprāmāṇya-niṣedhavāda*

+V.1. *dharmo na kāryaḥ*
NM, Ch. 4, Part 1, p. 388 (cf. *KS*, 1.2.25: Ś 9, N A16).

+V.2. *tad upadeśeṣu na pratyetavyam*
NM, Ch. 4, Part 1, p. 388.

B. *Extracts from commentaries*

+Bhā.1. *evamādis Tattvaṭīkāyām udāharaṇaprapañco draṣṭavyaḥ*
TSP, p. 521 (on *TS*, Ch. 18, v. 1458).

+Bhā.2. *Aviddhakarṇas Tattvaṭīkāyāmāha – "nanu vā pramāṇena kim iti paraḥ pratipādyate, ubhayasiddhaṃ hi pratipādakaṃ bhavatīti? tad etad ayuktam; yasmād vacanātmakam anumānam, na ca vaktuḥ pramāṇam, atha ca vaktā tena param pratipādayati, parapratipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya, nāvaśyam ubhayasiddhena prayojanam" iti.*
TSP, p. 529 (on *TS*, Ch. 18, v. 1484).

+Bhā.3. *tena yad ucyate 'viddhakarṇṇena –"satyam anumānam iṣyata evāsmābhiḥ pramāṇam lokapratītatvāt kevalaṃ liṃgalakṣṇamayuktam".*
PVSVṬ, p. 19.

+Bhā.4. *tena yad ucyate 'viddhakarṇṇena – "anadhigatārthaparicchittiḥ pramāṇam ato nānumānaṃ pramāṇam arthaparicche dakatvābhāvād" iti.*
PVSVṬ, p. 25.

+Bhā.5. *itarasya acetanasya vā bhūmyādeḥ mūrtasya. anena Aviddhakarṇasya samayo darśitaḥ.*
SVṬ, p. 306.

+Bhā.6. *kaścana cārvākaviśeṣo 'viddhakarṇaḥ.*
NVV, Part 2, p. 101.

+Bhā.7. *suśikṣitacārvākāḥ Udbhaṭādayaḥ.*
GrBh, p. 52.26 (on *NM*, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 52.18-19). See also Bhā.29.

+Bhā.8. *cārvākadhūrtastviti. Udbhaṭaḥ. sa hi lokāyatasūtreṣu vivṛtiṃ kurvan "athātastattvaṃvyākhyāsyāmaḥ" "pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti" sūtradvayaṃ yathāśrutārthatyāgenānyathā varṇayāmāsa prathamasūtre tattvapadena pramāṇaprameya-saṅkhyālakṣaṇaniyamāśakyakaraṇīyatām āha, dvitīyasūtram api prameyāniyamapratipādakaṃ tena vyākhyātam. tatra hi "pṛthivyāpastejovāyur iti" ya "iti" śabdaḥ sa evaṃ prāyaprameyāntaropalakṣaṇatvena tasyābhimataḥ.*
GrBh, p. 100.19-24 (on *NM*, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 100), Shah, p. 43.

+Bhā.9. *"cirantanacārvākair hi Bhāviviktaprabhṛtibhiḥ bhūtebhyaścaitanyam" iti sūtraṃ bhūtebhya iti pañcamyantapadayojanayā vyākhyātam, bhūtebhya utpadyate caitanyamiti. Udbhaṭenatu "bhūtebhyaḥ" itipadaṃcaturthyantatayā vyākhyātam, bhūtebhyaścaitanyaṃ bhūtārthaṃ caitanyaṃ svatantram eva śarīrārambhakabhūtopakārakam ityarthaḥ.*
GrBh, p. 257.24-26-258.21 (on *NM*, Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 257); Shah, p.197.

+Bhā.10. *yathā Udbhaṭena uktam –"śarīrārambhakakāraṇānām eva bhūtānaṃ sa kaścit tādṛśo vicitrasukhaduḥkhopabhogado dharmaḥ svabhāvaviśeṣa ityarthaḥ".*
GrBh, p. 262.25-27 (on *NM*, Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 262); Shah, p. 198.

+Bhā.11. *Tattvavṛttāvudbhaṭena –"lakṣaṇakāriṇa lāghvikatvenaiva śabdaviracanavyavasthā, na caitāvatā 'numānasya gauṇatā, yadi ca sādhyaikadeśadharmidharmatvaṃ heto rūpaṃ brūyuste, tadā na kācillakṣaṇe 'pi gauṇīvṛttiḥ".*
SVR, p. 265.16-19.

+Bhā.12. *"hetoḥ svasādhyaniyamagrahaṇe prakāratrayamiṣṭaṃ darśanābhyām aviśiṣṭābhyāṃdarśanena viśiṣṭānupalabdhisahitena*

bhūyodarśanapravṛttyā ca lokavyavahārapatitayā, tatrādyena grahaṇopāyena yehetor gamakatvam icchanti tān pratīdaṃ sūtram. lokaprasiddheṣvapi hetuṣu vyabhicārādarśanam asti tantrasiddheṣvapi tena vyabhicārādarśana-lakṣaṇaguṇasādharmyataḥ tantrasiddhahetūnāṃ tathābhāvo vyavasthāpyata iti gauṇatvam anumānasya avyabhicārāvagamo hi laukikahetūnām anumeyāvagame nimittaṃ sa nāsti tantrasiddheṣviti na tebhyaḥ parokṣārthāvagamo nyāyyota idam uktam anumānād arthaniścayo durlabha iti".
SVR, p. 265. 23-24, p. 266. 1-8.

+Bhā.13. *uktam ca Tantravṛttau Bhaṭṭodbhaṭena –"sarvaśca dūṣaṇopanipāto-'prayojakahetum ākrāmatītyaprayojakaviṣayā viruddhānumānavirodhaviruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ".*
SVR, p. 270. 3-5.
Tantravṛtti may be misprint for *Tattvavṛtti* (as noted by Solomon, p. 990 n14).

+Bhā.14. *yatratu Bhaṭṭodbhaṭaḥ prācīkaṭat –"nahyatrakāraṇameva kāryātmatāmupaiti yata ekasyākāraṇātmana ekakāryarūpatopagame tadanyarūpābhāvāt tadanyakāryātmanopagatir na syāt. kiṃ tvapūrvameva kasyacidbhāve prāgavidyamānaṃ bhavat tat kāryam. tatra viṣayendriyamanaskārāṇām itaretaropādānahitarūpabhedānāṃ sannidhau viśiṣṭasvetarakṣaṇabhāve pratyekaṃ tadbhāvābhavānuvidhānād anekakriyopayogo na virudhyate. yata ekakriyāyām api tasya tadbhāvābhāvitaiva nibandhanaṃ sā cānekakriyāyām api samānā" iti.*
SVR, p. 764. 6-13.

+Bhā. 15. *tatrāyaṃ jaraddvijanmā mahānubhāvo 'bhinavam etam uttaramārgam asmān prati prakāśayati.*
SVR, p. 764, 24-25.

+Bhā.16. *yadācaṣṭa Bhaṭṭodbhaṭaḥ – "itiśabdaḥ pradarśanaparo na punaḥ samāptivacanaś caitanyaśabdasukha-duḥkhecchādveṣa – prayatnasaṃskārāṇām tattvāntaratvāt pṛthivyādiprākpradhavṃsāpekṣānyonyābhāvānāṃ cātyantaprakaṭatvād uktatvavilakṣaṇatvācceti".*
SVR, p. 1087, 1-4.

+Bhā.17. *Kambalāśvataroditam*
TS, Ch. 22, v. 1863, p. 635; *TSP* on *TS* (as above). See also "Aphorisms and Pseudo-aphorisms", I.7

Bhā.18. *Purandaras tvāha – "lokaprasiddham anumānaṃ cārvākair apīṣyata eva, yattu kaiścil laukikaṃ mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate tanniṣidhyate"* (Ś 35, N D2).
TSP, p. 528 (on *TS*, Ch. 18, v. 1481).

+Bhā.19. *emeya karivi appaṇiya utti |*
kiṃ jaṃpasi paüraṃdariya vitti ||
Mahāp, 20.18.9, p. 328.

+Bhā.20. *[caitanyasya] mūrtasya pṛthivyādi-catuṣṭayasya jñānam anena pauraṃ [paurandaraṃ] mataṃ darśitam.*
SVṬ, p. 306.
Mahendrakumāra Nyāyācārya offers an emendation of the first word: *caitanyaviśiṣṭasya* (p. 306 n16).

+Bhā.21...*na kevalam Purandarādeḥ...*
NVV, Part 2, p. 101.

+Bhā.22. [Purandara] *cārvākamate granthakartā.*
A marginal note on a passage found in a MS of Puṣpadanta's *Mahāpurāṇa* (most probably the passage cited above as Bhā.19), quoted in P.D. Gune's introduction to the edition of Dhanapāla's *Bhavisayatthakahā*, p. 42.

+Bhā.23. *Bhāvivikta*
GrBh, p. 257.24 (on *NM*, Ch. 7 Part 2, p. 257); Shah, p. 197. See, Bhā.14 above.

+Bhā.24. *ya garbhasthātītaloko 'stīti tadarthasiddhyarthaṃ garbhasthātītabuddhiḥ samanantaraniruddhabuddhipūrvik, buddhitvāt, tadanantarabuddhivad iti sādhanaṃ vadanti, teṣāṃ dṛṣṭānto nāsti. evaṃ maraṇaṃ yāvat sthitānāṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ buddhyekamātratvaniṣpannatvāt, tatastāvan na pūrvaloka iti* (N F2).
PrPr, 204, a, 2-4 (on *MŚ*, 16.1) (For another restoration, see Pandeya, Part 2, p. 3). Cf. *TUS*, p. 57.

+Bhā.25. *na hi devadattasya maraṇacittaṃ cittāntareṇa pratisandhīyate, maraṇacittatvāt, arhato maraṇacittavat* (N F3).
PrPr, 204, a, 4-5 (on *MŚ*, 16.1) (For two other restorations see, Pandeya, Part 2, p. 3 and Franco, 1997, p. 116). Cf. *TSP*, p. 635 (on *TS*, vv. 1862-1863).

+Bhā.26. *deśāntaraṃ kālāntaramavasthāntaraṃ vā paralokaḥ.*
TSP, p. 637 (on *TS*, Ch. 22, vv. 1871-1876).

+Bhā.27. *ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayorapi cittayornaikaḥ santānaḥ* (Ś 18, N F4).
TSP, p. 663 (on *TS*, vv. 1938-1940). Cf. *PVA*, p. 105.21.

+Bhā.28. *jātismaraṇamasiddhamekagrāmāgatānāṃ sarveṣāṃ smaraṇāt.*
TSP, p. 665 (on *TS*, Ch. 22, v. 1945).

+Bhā.29. *aśakya eva pramāṇasaṅkhyāniyama iti suśikṣitacārvākāḥ.*
NM, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 52. 18-19 (see, Bhās. 8 and 16).

+Bhā.30. *suśikṣitatarāḥ prāhuḥ – dvividham anumānam, kiñcid utpannapratīti, kiñcid utpādyapratīti, īśvarādyanumānantu utpādyapratīti.*
NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184.6-7. See also Śls. 18-20 below.

C. *Verses attributed to the Cārvāka-s*

Ś1.1. *na svargo nāpavargo vā naivātmā pāralaukikaḥ |*
naiva varṇāśramādīnāṃ kriyāśca phaladāyikāḥ ||
(Ś 39, N B4).
PPu, Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa 13.323; *SDS,* p. 13, v. 1, lines 110-111; *VMT,* 3.2.

Ś1.2. *agnihotraṃ trayo vedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam |*
buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ ||
(Ś 40, N B7).
RVP, p. 285; *PC,* 2.26, p. 44; *GrBh,* Part 2, p. 228 (on *NM,* Ch. 7); *NC,* 17.39; *NPr,* p. 365 (on *NC,* 17.39); *SDS,* pp. 5.50-51,13.112-113; *BhD* on the *Mbh,* Śāntiparvan, 218.25 (vulgate ed.), 211.24 (critical ed.); *ABS,* Ch. 2, p. 100; *SMS,* p. 15; *SSS,* p.6.

Ś1.3. *paśuścen nihataḥ svargaṃ jyotiṣṭome gamiṣyati |*
svapitā yajamānena tatra kasmān na hiṃsyate ||
(Ś 41, N B8).
VPu. 3.18.26; *PC,* 2.20, p. 40; *SDS,* p. 13.14-15; *ABS,* p. 101 (quoting from *VP*).
Cf. *ŚKA,* p. 19 (*DA,* p. 321, vv. 23-24).

Ś1.4. *mṛtānām api jantūnāṃ śrāddhaṃ cet tṛptikāraṇam |*
nirvāṇasya pradīpasya snehaḥ saṃvardhayec chikhām ||
(Ś 42, N B9).
PC, 2.21, p. 40; *SDS,* p. 13. 116-117; *YS* auto-commentary, 2.47, f. 98b; *SVM,* 69.

Ś1.5. *gacchatām iha jantūnāṃ vyarthaṃ pātheyakalpanam |*
gehasthakṛtaśrāddhena pathi tṛptir avāritā ||
(Ś 43, N B10).
SDS, p. 14. 118-119.
Cf. *VPu.* 3.18.29, also quoted *in ABS,* Ch. 2, p. 101; *Rām.,* Ayodhyā. 109.15 (vulgate).

Ś1.6. *svargasthitā yadā tṛptiṃ gaccheyus tatra dānataḥ |*
prāsādasyoparisthānām atra kasmān na dīyate ||
(Ś 44, N Bll).
SDS, p. 14. 120-121.

Ś1.7. *yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ |*
bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ ||
(Ś 45, N B3).
+*VDMP,* 108. 18-19; +*TSP,* p. 17; +*NM,* Ch. 4, Part 1, p. 388; Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 257; +*TBV,* p. 505 n6; +*YTC,* Part 2, p. 253; *MB,* p. 14; +*Pari.,* p. 113 (on *NS,* 1.1.2); *TSPC,* 1.345, p. 12; *Doha.,* p. 86; *NC,* 17.69; *SDS,* p. 2. 17-18; p. 14. 125-126; *TRD,* p. 202; *SDK,* 108.

Ś1.8. *yadi gacchet paraṃ lokaṃ dehād eṣa vinirgataḥ |*
kasmād bhūyo na cāyāti bandhusnehasamākulaḥ ||
(Ś 46, N B12).
SDS, p. 14. 124-125.

Ś1.9. *tataś ca jīvanopāyo brāhmaṇair vihitas tviha |*
mṛtānāṃ pretakāryāṇi na tvanyad vidyate kvacit ||
(Ś 47, N B13).
SDS, p. 14. 126-127.

Ś1.10. *trayo vedasya kartāro bhaṇḍadhūrtaniśācarāḥ |*
jarbharīturpharītyādi paṇḍitānāṃ vacaḥ smṛtam ||
(Ś 48, N B14).
SDS, p. 14. 128-129; +*GBhŚr* (on *Gītā,* 16.8); *GBhVi* (on *Gītā,* 16.8); *SMS,* p. 15 (first line only—with variants).

Ś1.11. *aśvasyātra hi śiśnaṃ tu patnīgrāhyaṃ prakīrtitam |*
bhaṇḍais tadvat paraṃ caiva grāhyajātaṃ prakīrtitam ||
māṃsānāṃ khādanaṃ tadvan niśācarasamīritam ||
(Ś 49, N B15-16).
SDS, p. 15. 130-132.

Ś1.12. *nagna śramaṇaka durbuddhe kāyakleśaparāyaṇa |*
jīvikārthe 'pi cārambhe kena tvam asi śikṣitaḥ ||
(Ś 51, N B6).
TUS, p. 79. 17-18.

Ś1.13. *etāvān eva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocaraḥ |*
bhadre vṛkapadaṃ hy etad yad vadanti bahuśrutāḥ ||
(Ś 19, N B2).
+*PrPa,* Vol. 2, p. 65 (on *MŚ,* 18.6); *MA,* p. 209; *PrPr,* Vol.2, p. 3 (on *MŚ,* 16.1), 64 (on *MŚ,* 18.6); *VāBh/SVṛ,* Part 1, p. 186; Part 2, pp. 344,439; *TSP,* p. 637. 19-20; (*ṢDSam.,* p. 301. 14-15; v. 81; *LTN,* v. 33, f. 24b; *MVṛ,* p. 129 (on *SK,* 17); *SKSVṛ,* p. 10 (on *SKS,* 1.1.6); (*Ṣaḍ – DS,* p. 81, v. 160.; Hemacandra Sūri on *GV,* 1.5(1553), p. 10; *LṢDSam.,* p. 256.
Cf. *Mbh,* Śānti., vulgate, 134.2; crit. ed. 132.1ef-2ab.

+Ś1.14. *piba khāda ca cārulocane yadatītaṃ varagātri tanna te |*
na hi bhīru gataṃ nivartate samudayamātram idaṃ kalevaram ||
PrPr, Vol. 2, pp. 3 (on *MŚ,* 16.1), 64 (on *MŚ,* 18.6); *ṢDSam,* p. 304. 14-17, v. 82; *SKSVṛ,* p. 10 (on *SKS,* 1.1.6), p. 49 (on *SKS,* 2.3.11); p. 186.29-30; *ĀSVṛ,* p. 123 (on *AS,* 1.4.2); *Ṣaḍ-DS,* p. 81, v. 161 (verbatim reproduction of *ṢDSam.,* v. 82).

Ś1.15. *tapāṃsi yātanāś citrāḥ saṃyamo bhogavañcanā |*
agnihotrādikaṃ karma bālakrīḍeva lakṣyate ||
(N B5)

+*VDMP,* 1.108.14cd-15ab; +*LTN,* v. 34, f. 25a; *ĀḌ,* 3.9; *TRD,* p. 302. 18-19.

+Śl.16. *viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvāt sāmānye siddhasādhanāt |*
tadvato 'nupapannatvād anumānakathā kutaḥ ||
NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 177. 12-13; *PrPañ,* p. 206 (first line only: *viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvaḥ sāmānya siddhasādhyatā); AS,* Ch. 1, p. 36 (first line only: *sāmānye siddhasādhanād viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvāt); PVSVṬ,* p. 26 (first line only: *viśeṣenugamābhāvaḥ sāmānye siddhasādhanam); Vyo.,* Part 2, p. 161 (first line only: *sāmānye siddhasādhanaṃ viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvaḥ); JñaNi,* No.7, p. 268 (first line only, as in *PrPañ);* ibid., No.7, p. 274 (first hemistich only, as in above); ibid., No. 11, p. 379 (first line only, as in above excepting *b: siddhasādhanam); ŚD,* p. 63 *(ab* as in *PrPañ, cd: anumābhaṅgapaṅke 'smin nimagna vādidantinaḥ);* ibid., p. 71 (first line only, as in *PrPañ); PKM,* p. 177.16 (first line only, as in *PVSVṬ); RNi,* No.2, p. 54 (as in *ŚD* but line 1 becomes line 2 and line 2 = line 1 with variants in 2d); *SVR,* p. 263. 12-13 (as in *NM); PrPañ,* p. 24 (the second line reads: *tadvato 'nupapannatvādi anumānakathā kutaḥ*).

+Śl.17. *anumānavirodho vā yadi ceṣṭavighātakṛt |*
viruddhāvyabhicāro vā sarvatra sulabhodayaḥ ||
NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 179. 1-2; *SVR,* p. 263.14-15 (v. 2) (*c. viruddhāvyabhicārastu*).

+Śl.18. *tatra dhūmānumānādeḥ prāmāṇyaṃ kena neṣyate |*
ato hi sādhyaṃ budhyante tārkikairakṣatā api ||
NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184. 8-9.

+Śl.19. *yattvātmeśvara-sarvajña-paralokādigocaram |*
anumānaṃ na tasyeṣṭaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ tattvadarśibhiḥ ||
NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184. 10-11.

+Śl.20. *ṛjūnāṃ jāyate tasmānna tāvad anumeyadhīḥ |*
yāvat kuṭilitaṃ ceto na teṣāṃ viṭatārkikaiḥ ||
NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184. 12-13.

TRANSLATION

A. *Translation of the aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms*

I. *Materialism*

I.1 We shall now explain the principle.
I.2 Earth, water, fire and air are the principles, nothing else.
I.3 Their combination is called the "body", "sense" and "object".

I.4 Consciousness (arises or is manifested) out of these.
I.5 As the power of intoxication (arises or is manifested from the constituent parts of the wine (such as flour, water and molasses).
I.6 The self is (nothing but) the body endowed with consciousness.
I.7 From the body itself.
+I.8 Because of the existence (of consciousness) where there is a body.
I.9 Souls are like water bubbles.

II. *The doctrine of inherent nature (lit. own being)*

II.1 The world is varied due to the variation of origin.
II.2 As the eye in the peacock's tail.

III. *The doctrine of the primacy of perception*

III.1 Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge.
III.2 Since the means of right knowledge is to be non-secondary, it is difficult to ascertain an object by means of inference.

IV. *The doctrine of the denial of rebirth and the other-world*

IV.1 There is no means of knowledge for determining (the existence of) the other-world.
IV.2 There is no other-world because of the absence of any other-worldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self).
IV.3 Due to the insubstantiality of consciousness (residing in the other-world.

V. *The doctrine of the uselessness of performing religious acts*

V.1 Religious act is not to be performed.
V.2 Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon (All trans. are mine).

B. *Translation of the extracts from commentaries*

Comm.1. See a number of such examples in *Tattvaṭīkā* [the commentary on the *Cārvākasūtra* by Aviddhakarṇa].
Comm.2. Aviddhakarṇa had said in *Tattvaṭīkā*: "By this means of knowledge *(sc.* inference) what is conveyed to the

other? What is conveyed has to be admitted by both (the speaker and the addressee). That is not right. As inference is in the form of a verbal statement, not a means of knowledge for the speaker, so he conveys (what he has to say) to the other. His effort is to convey, hence admitting (inference) by both is not necessary".

Comm.3. Therefore, as has been said by Aviddhakarṇa: "It is true that inference is admitted by us as a source of knowledge, because it is found to be so in general practice; (what we only point out is that) the definition of an inferential mark is illogical".

Comm.4. Therefore, as has been said by Aviddhakarṇa: "A source of knowledge means (an instrument) which produces an awareness of an object not (already) cognized and therefore, inference is not a source of knowledge, because it is not an instrument for producing a definite awareness of an object".

Comm.5. *Of something else,* i.e., of the unconscious elements such as earth, etc. which have corporeal forms. By this is shown the conclusion of Aviddhakarṇa.

Comm.6. Thus (said) a certain Cārvāka (called) Aviddhakarṇa.

Comm.7. The well learned ones are Udbhaṭa and others.

Comm.8. The cunning Cārvāka [is] Udbhaṭa. While explicating the two aphorisms in the *Lokāyatasūtra-s,* "We shall now explain the principle" and "Earth, water, fire and air (are the principles)" [see aphorisms I.1 and 2], he described it in another way, forsaking the conventional interpretation. In the first aphorism, the term, *tattva,* tells the impossibility of laying down any fixed number and essential characteristics of the sources of knowledge and objects of knowledge. The second aphorism, too, is explained by him as referring to the objects of knowledge. The word, *iti* (in the aphorism), "the earth, water, fire and air *iti*" indicates also the possibility of similar objects of knowledge other than the earth, etc. Such is his view.

Comm.9. The ancient Cārvāka-s like Bhāvivikta and others explained (the aphorism) "Consciousness (is produced) from the elements", as in the word, *bhūtevyaḥ,* the fifth declension (in the ablative case) has been employed. But Udbhaṭa explains the word, *bhūtevyaḥ* as having the fourth declension, meaning "consciousness is for (the sake of) the elements; consciousness is independent and aids the physical elements which constitute the body". Such is the meaning.

Comm.10. As has been said by Udbhaṭa, "It means that there is an unseen property of the elements, the particular nature of the elements that constitute the body, which brings about the experience of diverse pleasures and miseries".

Comm.11. Udbhaṭa has said in *Tattvavṛtti*: "The one who framed the definition aimed at brevity of expression, but not only because of this does inference become secondary. And if they were to define the characteristics of probans as attributes of the thing which is a part of the probandum, there would be no secondary significance even in the definition".

Comm.12. In the grasping of the invariable relation of the probans with the probandum, three modes are recognized: [1] by two unqualified perceptions, [2] by perception along with a qualified non-perception, and [3] by the process of repeated perception as found in worldly behaviour. This aphorism is aimed at those who recognize the probans as *gamaka* (capable of yielding knowledge) according to the first mode of grasping. Failure of concomitance is not seen even in the case of probanses well-established in the world; so also it is not noticed in the case of the probanses established in the scriptures; so, on the basis of the quality characterized by "non-perception of failure of concomitance" being common to them, the probanses established in the scriptures are admitted as being *gamaka.* It is because of this that inference is secondary. Now the knowledge of non-failure of concomitance in respect of worldly probanses is instrumental in bringing about the knowledge of the probandum. But that is not there in the concept of probanses established by the scriptures. So it is not proper that non-perceptible things should be known with the help of these. Hence it is said that the ascertainment of things is difficult to attain by dint of inference.

Comm.13. Udbhaṭa, too, has said in *Tantravṛtti* [sic]: All the objections (viz, *Viruddha, Virodha-viruddha-vyabhicārin,* etc.) you raise against inference apply to the incapable reasons *(hetu-*s*),* they do not affect capable reasons.

Comm.14. [Literal translation of this passage is beyond my power. I give below only a summary of what Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa is alleged to have said]: It cannot be said that the cause attains the nature of the effect, but the effect is something new which appears in the presence of the cause.

Comm.15. This respectable veteran twice-born is revealing to us a novel way of answering criticism.

Comm.16. As said Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, "The word, *iti,* does not denote the end, (but) it is illustrative. There are other principles such as consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression and others. There are also

prior non-existence of the earth, etc., posterior non-existence, the mutual difference which are quite apparent and distinct (from the principles, viz., earth, etc.)".

Comm.17. (As) said by Kambalāśvatara.

Comm.18. But Purandara said: "The Cārvākas, too, admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]".

Comm.19. "Arranging your arguments in this way, why do you blurt out the commentary of Purandara"?

Comm.20. *Cognition* belongs to the group of the four elements, such as the earth, etc. *which have assumed a corporeal form* —by this is shown the conclusion of Pauram [Paurandaram].

Comm.21. Not only of Purandara and others.

Comm.22. [Purandara] author of a work on the Cārvāka doctrine.

Comm.23. Bhāvivikta [The name of an ancient Cārvāka philosopher].

Comm.24. Those who want to prove that there is a previous world of the embryonic state with the help of the argument that "the previous intelligence in the embryonic stage is always preceded by the cessation of an immediately preceding intelligence", since it is intelligence, like the intelligence coming after the embryonic state, cannot stand, as because the instance given by them is not proper. Man, till he is dead, has only one stream of intelligence, therefore there is no previous world.

Comm.25. The dying consciousness of Devadatta is not recognized by another consciousness because the consciousness is about to die, as the dying consciousness of the *arhat*.

Comm.26. The other-world consists in another place, another time, or another state.

Comm.27. The body in this world and the body in the other-world being entirely different, the chain of cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and the same.

Comm.28. Remembrance of previous birth cannot be admitted, because there is remembrance of all men coming from the same village.

Comm.29. The Cārvāka-s, the well-versed ones, say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of the sources of cognition.

Comm.30. Now those who (think themselves to be) more well-versed, say that (in fact) there are two kinds of inference, "some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself" *(utpanna-pratīti)*, and "some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on somebody else's advice)" *(utpādya-pratīti)* [The former kind is valid, but the latter kind is not].

[Translations of Bhās. 1,2,17,18,26,27 and 28 are quoted (emended) from Ganganatha Jha's English rendering of the *TS* and *TSP;* of Bhās. 8,9 and 15 from E.O. Solomon's article; 19 was translated by C.R. Deshpande (see Bhattacharya Ch. 8 n11 below). Bhās. 29, 30 and 31, as translated by Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya, are taken from *C/L,* pp. 154, 140 and 320 respectively. Bhās. 24 and 25 were restored to Sanskrit from the Tibetan version by Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan. The rest are translated by me with the help of Gangopadhyaya and Sadhukhan.]

C. *Translation of the verses attributed to the Cārvāka*-s

1. There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world.
Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect.

2. Bṛhaspati says —The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,— (all these) are the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.

3. If a beast slain in the Jyotiṣṭoma rite will itself go to heaven.
Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?

4. If Śrāddha (*offering of rice balls to a dead person*) produces gratification to beings who are dead, then oil may rear the flame of an extinguished light.

5. (If the Śrāddha produces gratification to beings who are dead), then here, too, in the case of the travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.

6. If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering (the Śrāddha) here, then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?

7. While life remains let a man live happily; nothing is beyond death.
When once the body becomes ashes, how can it even return again?

8. If he who departs from the body goes to another world, how is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred?

9. Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established (it) here.

All these ceremonies for the dead, —there is no other fruit anywhere.

10. The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.

All the well-known formulae of the pandits, *jarpharī turpharī*, &c.

11. And all the rites for the queen (e.g., holding the penis of the horse) commanded in the Aśvamedha (the Horsesacrifice).

These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests.

While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.

12. O, the naked one (Jain), ascetic (Buddhist), dimwit, given to practising physical hardship! Who has taught you this way of leading life?

13. Man consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) is but similar to (the statement) "Oh! Dear! Look at the footprint of the wolf!"

14. O! The one with beautiful eyes! Drink and eat (as you like). O! The one with a charming body! That which is past does not belong to you. O! The timid one! The past never comes back. This body is nothing but a collectivity.

15. Penances are only various forms of torments, and abstinence is only depriving oneself of consuming (the pleasures of life). The rituals of Agnihotra, etc., appear only to be child's play.

16. No concomitance being possible in the case of the particular and there being the charge of "proving the proved" in the case of the universal, the subject cannot be justified as a locus of the probandum. How can, therefore, one talk about inference (as a source of valid knowledge)?

17. It is easily possible to find, in all cases, that one's inference is contradicted either by probans "which nullifies one's own thesis", or by a probans "which is an invariable opposite".

18. Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they may not be pestered by the logicians.

19. However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the other-world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things.

20. Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians.

(The translations of Śls. 1-11 are taken from Cowell's trans. of *SDS* (with some modification, particularly in case of Śls. 2 and 7); those of Śls. 13-20 from Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya's trans. in *C/L*, pp. 258, 271, 269, 130, 132, 140 respectively (with some modification, particularly in the cases of Śls. 13-14). Śl. 12 has been translated by me. As for the reasons for choosing the readings I have adopted, see Chs. 20-22 below.)

Comments

A. *Comments on the aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms*

D.R. Shastri and Namai include all kinds of fragments —complete aphorisms and verses as well as extracts from the works of critics of the Cārvāka (Shastri even accepts passages from poems and plays in which Cārvāka is ridiculed)— purporting to represent the Cārvāka doctrine. I omit some of them as doubtful. Hence some explanation of why certain fragments are not admitted is only to be expected. In what follows I append the reasons.

Both Shastri and Namai adopt the following fragments: *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ*, "pleasure is the only aim of life" (Ś5, N A 15). It is found in a seventeenth-century work, *ABS* by Sadānanda Kāśmīraka. Other writers such as Śrīdhara (before the fifteenth century), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (sixteenth century) and Nīlakaṇṭha (seventeenth century) in their respective commentaries on the *Gītā*, 13.11, mention it. However, Shastri himself includes another fragment, *arthakāmau puruṣārthau*, "Wealth and pleasure are the two aims of life" (Ś 27) which is found in two earlier sources, viz. the *PC* and *SDS*.[53]

What are we to believe, then? Did the Cārvāka-s admit of only one aim of life or two? The question itself needs to be questioned. It is extremely doubtful whether the Cārvāka-s at all used to speak or write in terms of *puruṣārtha*, a typically Brahminical concept. It seems the detractors of the Cārvāka did not know what the Cārvāka view was in this regard. So they elected to foist on the Cārvāka what they considered to be improper and/or despicable. Some chose 'pleasure' only, some others decided to add 'wealth' as well. Both are mere conjectures, not based on any statement found in any authentic Cārvāka source. So I reject Ś5 and Ś27.

[53] *PC*, Act 2, 40; *SDS*, Ch. 1, 2.19-20.

For similar reasons I have desisted from accepting N A12: *maraṇam evāpavargaḥ*, "death indeed is emancipation" (also taken from *ABS*). *Apavarga*, like *puruṣārtha*, is a concept relevant to the believer in rebirth, from the cycle of which a pious man seeks to be released. But the Cārvāka-s denied and ridiculed the very idea of rebirth and emancipation. So the use of such a term is not to be expected of them. Some Cārvāka might have once said something to this effect: "What do you people mean by emancipation? Death is the end of life. The cycle of birth, death and rebirth, and the possibility of final emancipation are mere figments of the imagination". Hence some opponents of the Cārvāka might have framed this "aphorism". A variant of this *(mṛtyurevāpavargaḥ)* is found in the *PC*.[54] Shastri includes it as a separate fragment (Ś 30). That, too, is therefore dispensed with.

Now to a cluster of fragments from Vātsyāyana's *KS*. Almost all scholars before and after Shastri and Namai have accepted them as authentic Cārvāka aphorisms. Let us look at them one by one.

Speaking of the three aims of life, viz., virtue, pleasure and wealth, Vātsyāyana mentions three groups of people: The Lokāyatika-s who say *na dharmāṃścaret*, "religious acts are not to be practised" (Ś 9, N A16), the followers of the doctrine of wealth who prohibit pleasure, and those of the doctrine of pleasure who say that searching for wealth is useless.[55] Thus each group upholds only two aims of life, wealth and pleasure, virtue and wealth, and virtue and pleasure respectively. Vātsyāyana himself prefers to follow all the three aims of life as does Kauṭilya.[56] The only difference between them is that Kauṭilya considers wealth to be the foremost of the three aims,[57] whereas Vātsyāyana apparently thinks pleasure to be so. However, as I have argued above, the Cārvāka-s presumably did not think in terms of the so-called aims of life at all. Vātsyāyana simply conjures up three schools of thinkers who were not *trivargavādin*-s, but *dvivargavādin*-s.

Vātsyāyana then makes all the three groups spell out their doctrines. The Lokāyatika-s are made to say as follows: *eṣyat phalatvāt, sāṃśayikatvācca*, "for they do not bear any fruit in this world and (at the same time) it is also doubtful whether

[54] *PC*, Act 2, 40.
[55] *KS*, 1.2.32-47.
[56] *KS*, 1.2.51; *KA*, 1.7.3-7.
[57] *KA*, 1.7.6-7.

they will bear any fruit at all" *(KS*, 1.2.26-27; Ś 10-11, N A17-18). Vātsyāyana then "cites" a few quotable quotes which have been accepted by almost all modern scholars as genuine Cārvāka aphorisms, viz.,

> *ko hy abāliśo hastagataṃ paragataṃ kuryāt*, "who but a fool would, give away that which is in his own hands into the hands of another?" (*KS*, 1.2,28, Ś 12, N A19).

> *varamadyakapotaḥ śvo mayūrāt*, "it is much better to have a pigeon in hand today than a peacock tomorrow." *(KS*, 1.2.29; Ś 13, N A20).

> *varaṃ sāṃśayikānniṣkādasāṃśayikaḥ kārṣāpaṇaḥ*, "a genuine copper coin is better than a dubious gold coin" *(KS*, 1.2.30; Ś 14, N A21).

The commentator of the *KS* has shown that 1.2.29 is related to 1.2.26. The Mīmāṃsakas, too, admitted that the fruit of religion is not always available immediately, it is to be expected in the future. *KS*, 1.2.26 seems to be an echo of this declaration. Similarly *KS*, 1.2.30 is related to 1.2.27. And *KS* 1.2.29 and 1.2.30 are merely popular maxims, *laukika nyāya*-s.[58] They cannot be regarded as aphorisms of any philosophical school. *KS*, 1.2.28, too, is a mere rhetorical question. Vātsyāyana also represents the views of the *artha*- and *kāla-cintaka*-s in the form of aphorisms. But there is no evidence that these two groups had any set of aphorisms of their own.

Then where does Vātsyāyana get those so-called aphorisms? The only plausible answer is that he authored them himself. The same is true of the alleged aphorisms attributed to the Lokāyatika-s. Even if the ideas contained in them tally with those of the Cārvāka, they cannot have been composed by any Cārvāka philosopher. If the word *dharma* is taken to mean *yajña*, "ritual sacrifice", *KS*, 1.2.26-27 might have also originated from the Jain and Buddhist circles, for they, too, were opposed to the Vedic sacrificial cult.

Now to Ś 53-54. Namai takes them to be one (N Bl). The fragment/-s runs/run as follows:

> *laukiko mārgo 'nusartavyaḥ. lokavyavahāraṃ prati sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau.*

[58] See Jacob, I: 44.

The worldly way should be followed. In respect to worldly practice the child (i.e., the unwise) and the learned one are similar.

Both are taken from the *TUS*. But, as Eli Franco has shown, both belong to the category of popular maxims and on the two occasions the second sentence occurs in the *Vyo*, "the context of the discussion has nothing to do with Lokāyata".[59]

Ś 15 runs as follows: *śarīrendriyasaṅghāta eva cetanaḥ kṣetrajñaḥ*, "the union of the body and senses is consciousness". Madhusūdana Sarasvatī quotes it in his commentary on the *Gītā*, 13.6. In the same passage, while expounding the Nyāya view on consciousness, he refers to *NS*, 1.1.10. side by side with the Lokāyatika view. But the term, *kṣetrajña* is found exclusively in Sāṃkhya; to be more exact, in the epic Sāṃkhya.[60] It is highly improbable that a Cārvāka aphorism would contain such a term.

kāma eva prāṇināṃ kāraṇam, "pleasure is the cause of (the birth of) animals" (Ś 16), is taken from Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Gītā*, 16.8. Śaṅkara refers to it as "the view of the Lokāyatikas". The view, however, is essentially Vedic. As the famous Nāsadīya hymn (*Ṛgveda*, 10.129.4) says:

Desire in the beginning came upon that, (desire) that was the first seed of mind. Sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom found out the bond of the existent in the non-existent.[61]

So there is no reason why the sentence found in Śaṅkara should be taken as a Cārvāka aphorism.

etāvāneva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocaraḥ, "man is as much as is admissible to the senses" (Ś 19), is the first line of a verse (Śl. 13 of ours). Namai has taken the whole verse (N B2). Shastri was apparently led by the *TSP* to adopt the first line only.

Similarly, *kāyādevatatojñānaṃprāṇāpanādyadhisthitādyuktaṃ jāyate*, "consciousness proceeds from the body equipped with (the life breaths), Prāṇa, Apāna and the rest" (Ś 22), is taken from Kambalāśvatara's exposition of the *Cārvākasūtra* (Bhā. 7 of ours), and is not an aphorism by itself.

sarvatra paryanuyogaparānyeva sūtrāṇi bṛhaspateḥ, "the aphorisms of Bṛhaspati are everywhere merely for the sake

[59] Franco (1987, 1994), Introduction, 43-44 and 299 n4. See also *Vyo*, II: 108, 172.

[60] Cf. *Mbh*, Śāntiparvan, crit. ed., 204.8, 211.12, 228.10, 308.105, etc.

[61] Trans. A.A. Macdonell, 209.

of objections" (Ś 23), is taken from the *TBV*. But in an earlier source, this sentence is called a *sūkta*, not a *sūtra*, as the *TBV* calls it.[62] So it need not be accepted as a genuine Cārvāka saying. On the other hand, it apparently reflects the view of the opponents of the Cārvāka, such as Jayantabhaṭṭa, who similarly explained: "In the Lokāyata view, no precept is indeed (positively) prescribed. It is only the assertions of a Vaitaṇḍika (representing merely, the destructive criticism of others). It is not really a body of precepts".[63] So Ś 23 does not and cannot originate from any Cārvāka source.

Ś 24-34 are taken from Kṛṣṇamiśra's allegorical play, *PC*. They are all quoted from the speech of Cārvāka, one of the dramatis personae in the play, allied to a group of vicious characters. Even though some of the sayings of this Cārvāka correspond to the Lokāyata view found in other sources (e.g., Ś 25 ~ our III.1, Ś 26 ~ our I.2, Ś 28 ~ our I.3, Ś 29 ~ our IV.1, and Ś 34 ~ our Śls. 8-9), some others are manufactured by Kṛṣṇamiśra himself to suit the context of the play. Thus Cārvāka teaches his disciple: *lokāyatameva śāstram*, "Lokāyata is indeed the science" (Ś 24). There is no reason to regard it as an aphorism.

Ś 27 and Ś 30 have already been discussed above. Ś 31 and Ś 32 run as follows: *daṇḍanītireva vidyā* and *atraiva vārtāntarbhavati*, "penal code (lit. the rule of the rod) is the science (of polity)" and "agriculture, animal husbandry, trade and commerce, etc. are included in it". The bases of these two sentences lie in taking Bṛhaspati to be the author of both the *Bārhaspatyasūtra* and the *Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstra*.[64] But the fragments of *Bṛhaspati Smṛti* show that the author was a great admirer of Manu, and the lost *Bṛhaspati Arthaśāstra* must have belonged to the same Brahminical tradition to which the *KA* belongs.[65] So the idea of *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti* as parts of the Cārvāka doctrine is utterly misconceived.

Moreover, one should be wary of accepting any view put in the mouth of a character in a play as a truthful representation of a philosophical system. Just think of Socrates as presented in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. And think how the two Buddhist and Jain monks are represented in the *ĀḌ* and the

[62] *SVṬ*, 277; Vidyānanda's *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, accr. Franco (1987, 1999), 6 and 47; *TSV*, 70; *PVSVṬ*, 26. See also Ch. 15 below.

[63] *NM*, Ch. 4, II: 388 (*C/L*, 157).

[64] Cf. *SMS*, 15; D.R. Shastri (1982), 154.

[65] Aiyangar, 27.3. See also Ch. 1 above.

PC.[66] If one is to form one's opinion about the doctrines of Buddhism and Jainism solely on the basis of the *ĀḌ* and the *PC*, the result would be, to say the least, ludicrous. No serious student of philosophy would do so. But when it comes to the Cārvāka doctrine, Radhakrishnan, Moore and many others have blindly accepted the *PC* to be a reliable source.[67] But such sources as the *ĀḌ*, *PC* and *NC* are always to be treated as dubious, and, unless confirmed by cross-reference, should better be left out of discussion.

Ś 36-38 are taken from the *ABS*. They represent the views of those who believe "the senses", "mind" and "life" to be the self.[68] Sadānanda Kāśmīraka does not explicitly attribute them to the Cārvāka-s: he simply mentions "some", "others", etc. The fact is that all the three doctrines have their origin in the Upaniṣads[69] long before the Cārvāka-s appeared in the arena. The Vedāntins, right from Śaṅkara down to Sadānanda Yati or Yogīndra or Sarasvatī (c. fifteenth-sixteenth century), mention several views of the self held by different schools.[70] The Cārvāka-s have traditionally been branded as *dehātmavādin*-s.[71] Any other theory which takes "the senses" or "mind" or "life" or anything else as the self is alien to the Cārvāka-s.[72] Nor is there any evidence that such theories were propounded by other Cārvāka schools.[73] Thus Ś 36-38 cannot be accepted as Cārvāka fragments proper.

I append below a concordance of the fragments:

[66] *ĀḌ*, Acts 1 and 2; *PC*, Act 3. Cf. *Mattavilāsaprahasana* by Mahendra Vikramavarman.

[67] Radhakrishnan(1980), 278n; Radhakrishnan-Moore, 247-249; D.R. Shastri (1928), aphorisms 59, 70 and 86; Pathak (1990), 139-141.

[68] *ABS*, Ch. 2, p. 101.

[69] Cf. *Tt. Up.*, 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.3.1 and *Ch. Up.*, 5.1.7.

[70] *ŚBh* on *BS*, 1.1.1; *VS*, Ch. 3.123-127, 69-72.

[71] *SDS*, 6.53, see also *ŚBh*, 81, 850; *Vyo*, II: 126; *PrPañ*, Ch. 8, 320.

[72] *Vyo*, II: 126, refers to the *indriyacaitanyavādin*-s and *manaścaitanyavādin*-s; *SVSS*, vv. 523-576, to many others. *ST*, 5.19, 20-24, too, mentions *indriyātmavāda*, *mana-ātmavāda* and *prāṇātmadvāda* besides *dehātmavāda*. According to Subrahmanya Sastri, those who say, *deham eva ātmā* are the Cārvāka-s, but those who call the senses (*indriya*-s) to be so, are the *Paurāṇika*-s (see *PrPañ*, 315 nn5 and 7).

[73] Opinions differed regarding the interpretation of some aphorisms among the commentators of the *Cārvākasūtra* (see *Bhās.* 18 and 19 regarding I.1, 2 and 4). But as regards I.6-8 no such difference is known to have existed.

Ś	N	RB
1	A1	I.1
2	A2,3	I.2, I.3
3	A4	I.4
Ś	N	RB
4	A5	I.5
5	A15	—
6	A14	—
7	A10	—
8	A12	—
9	A16	—
10	A17	—
11	A18	—
12	A19	—
12	A19	—
13	A20	—
14	A21	—
15	—	—
16	—	—
17	A11	IV.2
18	F4	Bhā.28
19	B2	Ś1.13
20	A13	see, III.1
21	D1	III.2
22	A9, C1	I.7
23	F5	—
24	—	—
25	See A13	III.1
26	—	—
27	—	—
28	—	—
29	—	—
30	—	—
31	—	—
32	—	—
33	—	—
34	—	—
35	D2	Bhā.17
36	—	—
37	—	—
38	—	—
39	B4	Ś1.1
40	B7	Ś1.2
41	B8	Ś1.3
42	B9	Ś1.4

Ś	N	RB
43	B10	Ś1.5
44	B11	Ś1.6
45	B3	Ś1.7
46	B12	Ś1.8
47	B13	Ś1.9
48	B14	Ś1.10
49	B15-16	Ś1.11
50	—	—
51	B6	Ś1.12
52	—	—
53	B1	—
54	B1	—

B. *Comments on the extracts from commentaries*

The extracts from the commentaries on the *Cārvākasūtra* (in so far as they can be identified with some degree of certitude) have been arranged alphabetically by the names of the commentators (Bhās.1-23; rest are anonymous). So far five names have been found mentioned in different philosophical works, viz., Aviddhakarṇa, Udbhaṭa Bhaṭṭa (Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa), Kambalāśvatara, Purandara and Bhāvivikta. All but Udbhaṭa belonged to or before the eighth century CE; Udbhaṭa, too, must have flourished by or before the ninth.[74] The names of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are also referred to in context of Nyāya. Whether they were Naiyāyika-s turned Cārvāka-s or vice versa or two different persons altogether cannot be ascertained at the present stage of our knowledge.[75]

Of the five, Udbhaṭa appears to have been an odd man out who sought to bring the Cārvāka doctrine closer to Nyāya.[76] He interpreted three fundamental aphorisms of the *Cārvākasūtra* (our I.1,I.2 and I.4) in a novel manner (see Bhās. 13 and 14). He may very well be regarded as a "revisionist" among the later *Cārvākasūtra* commentators.

That there were several schools of interpretations of the Cārvāka aphorisms even before the eighth century is clear from the *TSP* and other sources.[77] But nothing definite is known about them.

[74] See *NCC*, Vols. I, II and XII.

[75] See Franco (1997), 99 and 142, and Ch. 8 below.

[76] See Solomon, 990-991 and Franco, ibid.

[77] *TSP* on *TS*, vv. 1857-1858, 633-634; *NKC*, 342; *PKM*, 116-117; *SVR*, 1081, 1086.

C. *Comments on the verses attributed to the Cārvāka-s*

As is evident from the verses printed above, they are mostly taken from the *SDS* (eleven out of twenty).

I have first concentrated exclusively on such verses as have been cited in well-known philosophical digests like the *SDS* and independent philosophical works like the *TUS*. Some of these verses are quoted directly from the Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas. Now, there are also other verses attributed directly or indirectly to the Cārvāka-s in the same sources (some verses there have been attributed to Bṛhaspati). There is no reason why they, too, should not be admitted as Cārvāka fragments. The only problem is that there is no evidence to prove that the verses are quoted from some authentic Cārvāka source. Hence I have desisted from including such verses in this collection.

It is rather strange that neither D.R. Shastri nor Namai has included some other verses found in the *VPu*, *PPu* and *VDMP*. Similarly if the *etāvān eva* verse (our Ś1.13) is included, why should the verse that follows in Haribhadra's *ṢDSam* be left out? It neatly rounds off the parable of the wolf's footprint.[78]

One significant omission in all previous collections is another verse found in no fewer than twelve sources: *viśeṣe anugamābhāvāt*, etc. (our Ś1.16). Similarly four verses in *NM* appear to be direct quotations (versified) from some Cārvāka source. I am inclined to adopt them as genuine Cārvāka fragments (our Śls.17-20).

Versified versions of the materialist doctrine are also found in the *Mbh*, Śāntiparvan, 2.11.22-30 and in the *Rām.*, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100.2-17. But, very much like the verses found in the Purāṇas mentioned above, these passages cannot be definitely attributed to any authentic Cārvāka source. As to the Purāṇas, the most detailed account of the *nāstika* doctrines is found in the *PPu*, Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, Ch. 13.[79] This is a part of a general denunciation of the Jains, Buddhists and Cārvāka-s. The passage in the *PPu* is taken almost verbatim from *VPu*, 3.18.24-29. As I have mentioned above, some of the verses may very well be treated as *ābhāṇaka*-s and *lokagāthā*-s. Māṭhara has, in fact, quoted a verse from the *PPu*.[80] The *ABS*, too, quotes from the *VPu*.[81]

[78] See Ch. 15 below.

[79] Vangavasi ed., vv. 366-371; Anandashrama ed., vv. 370-376.

[80] *PPu*, Vangavasi ed., Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, 13.327. Quoted in *MVṛ*, on *SK*, v. 2, 111.

[81] *ABS*, 100-101, quoting four verses from *VPu*, 3.18.24-27.

To the best of my knowledge nobody has referred to the chapters on the Cārvāka in *Sarvadarśanaśiromaṇiḥ* by Śrīkāñci Rāmānujācārya and the two *SDKaumudī*-s, the first by Mādhava Sarasvatī (sixteenth century) and the second by Paṇḍit Dāmodara Mahāpatraśāstrī (twentieth century) published as late as 1965.[82] The latter is a mere rehash of the prevalent (mostly wrong) views regarding the Cārvāka-s. He quotes all the eleven verses from the *SDS* and one each from the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and *Bṛhaspatismṛti*.

Verses containing the Cārvāka view also occur in Haribhadra's *LTN* and *ŚVS*, Jayantabhaṭṭa's *ĀḌ*, Siddharṣi's *UBhPK*, Kṛṣṇamiśra's *PC*, Hemacandra's *TSPC*, and Śrīharṣa's *NC*. However, most of the verses attributed to Cārvāka or his followers are the authors' own composition. Therefore, they are not fit to be included in the collection of Cārvāka fragments. The same remark applies to such philosophical digests as the *SSS* and the *SVSS*.

Although Śāntarakṣita sometimes quotes from the works of his opponents (e.g., from Kumārila and Bhartṛhari), it is doubtful whether he has also done so in the *TS*, Ch. 22. Haribhadra and Rājaśekhara have quoted two verses which are elsewhere attributed to the Lokāyatika-s (our Śls. 13-14). There is nothing to show if any other verse in the two *SḌSam*-s is of the same kind.

There is an anthology of verses called *RKD* compiled by Jagannāthamiśra in which a number of verses have been quoted from a lost play called *Bhaktivaibhava* by Kavi Ḍiṇḍima. The *RKD* is a very late work compiled between 1725 and 1775 CE somewhere in Orissa. Nothing is known about Ḍiṇḍima. So, not much credence is to be given to the authenticity of the verses attributed to Cārvāka.[83] The play seems to have been influenced by the *PC*.

Mention may also be made of the verses printed by Sarvananda Pathak in 1960.[84] Unfortunately Pathak merely informs us that he got the verses from a manuscript (incomplete) but does not furnish any details of its author, date, etc. It may very well be a recent work. In any case, it does not warrant much discussion since content-wise there is nothing new.

[82] The second ed. was published by Oḍiśā Sāhitya Ekādemī (Academy), Bhub(v)aneshwar in 1993.

[83] Vv. 106-109 (p. 507); vv. 384-385 (p. 605); vv. 516-550 (628-631). Vv. 521-532 are reproduced from *SDS*, 2.17-18, 5.50-51 and 13.110-115.132.

[84] See Pathak (1960).

The basic issues raised in the verses are as follows:

(a) Futility of animal sacrifice (with or without the doctrine of non-violence and vegetarianism).

(b) Rejection of the irrational.

(c) Refusal to believe in any verbal testimony which appears contrary to reason.

These three are all compatible with the Cārvāka doctrine as we know it today. But the insistence on vegetarianism (implied in our Śl.11) along with (a) raises one pertinent question: does it emanate from the Cārvāka-s or from the Buddhists?

In connection with some verses in the *SDS*, E.B. Cowell referred to Eugene Burnouf's *Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhism Indien*, p. 209.[85] It contains a French translation of a passage from the *ŚKA*. F. Max Müller (1878) also remarked:

> Some of these objections [in *SDS*] may be of later date, but most of them are clearly Buddhistic. The retort, why if a victim slain at a sacrifice goes to heaven, does not a man sacrifice his own father, is, as Professor Burnouf has shown, the very argument used by Buddhist controversialists.[86]

Müller also refers to *guru* Jābāli's speech in *Rām.*, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 109.14ff (vul. ed.).[87] Similar objections to ritual violence are found in the writings of the Jains. So, we can never be sure whether *SDS*, vv. 3 and 11 (our Śls.3 and 11) originated from the Buddhist or from Jain sources. In deriding the Brahmins, the *DA* says that the cruel Brahmins devised animal sacrifice in order to partake of meat, a view which tallies with that of *SDS*, v. 11.

We may close our discussion on the note that only some twenty verses can be taken as belonging to the Cārvāka, although there is no guarantee that even these were composed by some Cārvāka philosophers. It is more probable that the satirical verses were current in one or the other part of India and were orally transmitted. Hence they are called *ābhāṇaka*-s and *lokagāthā*-s. Since many of them reflected the spirit of doubt and denunciation of Vedic re-

[85] *SDS* (trans.), 16 n20. Cowell refers to the first ed. of Burnouf's work (1844). Burnouf translated long extracts from the *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* (in *DA*) on 205-210.

[86] Müller (1901), 145. He, too, refers to Burnouf (1844), 209.

[87] Ibid., 145 n1.

ligious rites, they were attributed to the Cārvāka-s at least from the sixth century CE. Together they constitute the counterpoint in Indian philosophy—the extreme left wing, so to say.[88] Against this trend all other philosophical systems, Brahminical, Buddhist and Jain, rallied all their force, leaving no weapon unused (calumny not excluded).

[88] Cowell once (1862) noted: "We can only tell that at a very early period in Hindu speculation, the 'negative arm' was unusually vigorous; and it would not perhaps be impossible to reconstruct from still extant allusions a complete series (though not in chronological order), corresponding in Greek philosophy to that from Xenophanes to Sextus Empiricus" (382).

VII
On the Authenticity of an Alleged Cārvāka Aphorism

Erich Frauwallner's *History of Indian Philosophy* is regarded, particularly in the West, as an authentic and authoritative work on the subject. No doubt it deserves high praise for the method employed by the learned author (though his political philosophy was, to say the least, reprehensible) and his thorough grip over the whole matter.[1] In the last chapter of the work he deals with materialism in India. The situation, he says,

> became more difficult at the end of the classical period of Indian philosophy, when logical and epistemological questions moved to the forefront of interest and when every system was compelled to take into consideration, on which their systems were founded [...] Partly one tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for instance, when one explained: "The aphorisms of Bṛhaspati have only this aim, viz. to refute the opponent". But in the majority of cases one decided to discuss the doctrine of inference and to take it over at least in parts. This desertion of the original attitude led, in no way, to the consequence of the decline of the system. The taking up of foreign thoughts and occupation with them led, on the contrary, to a regular activity and to a blossoming up of a literature richer than hitherto.[2]

[1] K.K. Dixit (1971) pays handsome tribute to this work.
[2] Eng. trans. II: 225. Frauwallner quotes the alleged aphorism from Abhayadeva's *TBV*, 70. It also occurs elsewhere. See nn 5, 6 and 7 below.

Unfortunately Frauwallner did not have the time or the scope to elaborate the 'blossoming' of the later period which is disregarded by other scholars. We may presume that he had Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa in mind. Whatever little we know of them from the works of Kamalaśīla, Cakradhara, Ananatavīrya, Vādidevasūri, Vādirājasūri and Karṇakagomin is adequate to make us agree with Frauwallner's view that the literature really became richer in their hands.

In spite of my overall agreement with Frauwallner's opinion, I would like to point out that the later materialists in India *did not* give up the original attitude of the Cārvāka-s, and the sentence he quoted as epitomizing the 'old line', "The aphorisms of Bṛhaspati have only this aim, viz. to refute the opponent", is at best dubious, if not altogether wrong.

The sentence referred to by Frauwallner is first encountered in the *TBV*: *sarvatra paryanuyogaparāṇi eva sutrāṇi bṛhaspateḥ*.[3] Although Abhayadevasūri writes that the Cārvāka-s themselves declared so (*iti cārvākaiḥ abhihitam*), the sentence has the unmistakable ring of the voice of Cārvākas' opponents. It is to be noted that Anantavīrya, another Jain scholar, quoted the same sentence with one variation (*paraparyanuyogaparāṇi bṛhaspateḥ sūtrāṇi*) but called it a *sūkta*, "a good or friendly speech, wise remark", not a *sūtra*.[4] Vidyānanda also quoted this sentence but clearly associated it with the *tattvopaplavavādin*-s (whom he brackets with the Buddhist nihilists and Vedāntin brahmaists, most probably the Śaṅkaraites). Similarly, Karṇakagomin refers to this sentence in connection with the validity of inference and quotes the first line of a famous but unidentified verse (*viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvaḥ sāmānye siddhasādhanam*).[5]

The saying has been accepted as an authentic Cārvāka aphorism by D.R. Shastri, 1351 BS (1944), 15-16, later printed as an appendix in (1959), 173-76; (1982), 200-03 (the saying is numbered as Aphorism 23); Namai (1976), 39-44 (No. F5).

[3] Abhayadevasūri, however, is not the first person to mention this sentence. See n4.

[4] *SVṬ*, 277. The gloss on *sūkta* is quoted from Monier-Williams' Dictionary.

[5] Franco ((1994), 6 and 47 n9) refers to Vidyānanda's *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* (Kashi, 1914, p.62); the passage from the *TSV* was quoted earlier in the *editio princeps* of the *TUS*, vii. —Karṇakagomin writes: *punaś tatrāpi sa eva paryanuyoga ityevaṃ sarvatra paryanuyogaparāṇyeva sūtraṇi, tathā ca sūtra, 'viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvaḥ sāmānye siddhasādhanam'* (*PVSVṬ*, 26. Franco does not cite this). The last line quoted by Karṇakagomin also occurs in many other works. See Ch. 6, Śl. 16 above.

Now, as Franco notices, "[T]he ideological affinity between this fragment and Jayarāśi's interpretation of the Bṛhaspatisūtra is quite obvious."[6] This is how the arch sceptic would deny the validity of inference along with all other means of knowledge acknowledged by the Naiyāyikas.

What then about the charge of *paryanuyoga*, raising questions about the doctrines of others without stating one's own? This is precisely the objection to the Cārvāka-s noted by Jayantabhaṭṭa. If the Cārvāka-s themselves had admitted this, there would be no occasion for finding fault with them. Let us see how Jayantabhaṭṭa attacks the Cārvāka-s:

> In the Lokāyata view, no precept is indeed (positively) prescribed. It is only the assertions of a Vaitaṇḍika [disputer] (representing, merely, the destructive criticism of others). It is not really a body of precepts.[7]

What then about such aphorisms as "Live in pleasure as long as you live?"[8] Jayantabhaṭṭa dismisses the saying in the following manner: "No. The fact being naturally established, a prescription in this regard becomes useless." In other words, this affirmative instruction too is no prescription. Jayanta further says:

> As to the instructions "Religious act is not to be practised", "Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon", etc. (it is to be noted that) they are not really proper instructions, for the Lokāyata doctrine is based only upon such statements as representing the viewpoint of the opponent. Thus, there are subsequent Brāhmaṇa statements replying (to the previous ones): "Well, I am not preaching ignorance. This self, indeed, is indestructible. It only has a connection with the senses, etc. (The self is not born; it can only have connection with newer senses, etc.)" (cf. *Bṛ.Up.* 4.5. 14)

And there he rests his case:

> Thus due to its being based upon statements representing only the viewpoint of the opponent, the doctrine of the

[6] Franco (1994), 6. I, however, do not share his view that there were two kinds of Lokāyatika-s —materialists and sceptics, and Jayarāśibhaṭṭa belonged to the latter.

[7] *NM*, Ch. 4, II: 388; *C/L*, 157.

[8] For the continuously changing reading of this well-known verse, see Ch. 20 below.

Lokāyata is not an independent one; and because it is contradicted by later statements, it is not to be taken into account.

So the fragment quoted by Abhayadevasūri and so far accepted by all scholars (D. Shastri, Frauwallner, Namai, Franco and others) cannot be taken as an authentic Cārvāka aphorism. It represents the view of the opponents of the Cārvāka and is meant to mislead the students of Indian materialism. The lost collection of Cārvāka aphorisms contained both positive and negative instructions (although Jayantabhaṭṭa tried to explain away the former set) and in spite of some differences in the interpretation of a few aphorisms, the position of the materialists in ancient India (upto the twelfth century) remained basically the same.

VIII
Paurandarasūtra *Revisited*

The name of Purandara, a Cārvāka philosopher, was unknown to modern scholars before 1914. It was from the *editio princeps* of Vādidevasūri's *SVR* that they came to know of a work called *Paurandaraṃ sūtram* along with an aphorism quoted from it: *pramāṇasya gauṇatvād* (sic) *anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ.*[1] The *SVR,* however, does not seem to have attracted much attention. P.D. Gune in his introduction to the edition of Dhanapāla's *Bhavisayatthakahā* (1923) refers to a verse which mentions, among others, Akalaṅka and Purandara. He then quotes from the marginal notes on a passage found in a MS of Pupphadanta's *Tisaṭṭhimahāpurisaguṇālaṃkāra* which identified Akalaṅka as *nyāyakārakartā* and Purandara as *cārvākamate granthakartā.*[2] G. Tucci noticed this reference and mentioned it in a paper in 1925.[3] None of them refers to the *SVR.*

[1] *SVR,* 131 (as quoted by S.N. Dasgupta, III: 536). In a later edition of *SVR* (ed. M.L. Osval), the passage occurs on 265. The reading of this aphorism was later emended (e.g. by E.A. Solomon (1977-78), see n29) to *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād,* etc. See also nn 4, 5 below.

[2] Dhanapāla, 42. Gune calls such marginal notes "sometimes so useful to editors of Jain-Prakrit works".

[3] Tucci in *C/L,* 386.

The aphorism quoted in the *SVR* was also found in Abhayadevasūri's *TBV*, first published in 1924 with a variant reading: *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād*, etc., though there is no mention of Purandara in this work.[4]

The aphorism itself, however, was not a discovery. It was known from the first edition of the *NM* (1895) but it was not attributed to any work called *Paurandaraṃ sūtram*.[5] Prabhācandra also cited this aphorism in the *PKM* but spoke of the Cārvāka-s in general, not specifically of Purandara.[6] Later it was found that others too had quoted the same aphorism without, however, naming Purandara.[7]

The publication of the *TS* and *TSP* (1926) was an epoch-making event in many respects. Here, for the first time, was found a complete sentence attributed to Purandara: "The Cārvāka-s too admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]".[8] Though D.R. Shastri, Mamoru Namai and others have taken this fragment to be an aphorism from the now-lost *Bārhaspatya/Cārvāka/Lokāyatasūtram*[9] it appears to be extracted from a commentary.

[4] *TBV*, I: 70. The editors referred to the variant reading as found in two other MSS as well as to *SVR*, 131 (in 70 n2).

[5] (1895), 118, 123. See also *NM*, I: 177 (*pramāṇasyā gauṇatvād*, etc.) and 183 (*pramanasyāgauṇatvād*, etc.). G. Sastri here faithfully followed the earlier texts of the work (1936), 108, 112 and the commentary by Cakradhara (1972), 62. Subsequent references to the *NM* are to G. Sastri's (1982-84) edition.

[6] *PKM* (1941), 180. The text was first printed by the same publisher in 1912 but the copy of it is not available to me.

[7] *Vyo* (1930), 575; *NM*, II: 161; *NBh*, 210 (*pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād arthaniścayo durlabha iti*); *PVSVṬ*, 25. None of them, however, ascribes this aphorism to Purandara. Franco noted all this in his paper, "Paurandarasūtra" (1991), 161 n1.

[8] *TSP* (1926), 421; *TSP* (1968), II: 528 (vv. 1481-82): *Purandaras tvāha lokaprasiddham anumānaṃ cārvākair apīṣyata eva, yat tu kaiścit laukikaṃ mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate, tan niṣedhate iti.* It is to be noted that Purandara does not claim to have said anything new (as Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa sometimes did (see *GrBh* on *NM*, *āhnika* 7, II: 257-58), but attributes the view to the Cārvāka-s in general, not even to any particular group or subsect. —Since Purandara refers to the school he belongs to as 'the Cārvāka-s' (*cārvākaiḥ*). I prefer to use this term rather than Bārhaspatya employed by Namai (see (1976), 29 n2) and Lokāyata (used almost as a namesake, but the same word in the context of early Buddhist writings —whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna— merely suggests logic, or rather sophistry, *not* materialism).

[9] D.R. Shastri, 1351 BS (1944), 15, aphorism No. 21 (taken from the *TBV*) in (1959), 173-76; Namai (1976), 42 and nn 27-28 (aphorism No.

Franco has rightly noted. "This is probably the most significant contribution of Purandara to the Lokāyata school (at least it is the one for which he is remembered) [...]".[10]

P.L. Vaidya seems to have missed all this. In his edition (1937) of Puṣpadanta's *Mahāpurāṇa* (*Tisaṭṭhimahāpurisaguṇ ālaṃkāra*), while explaining the term, *pauraṃdariya vitti*, he said, "The doctrine of Purandara, i.e. Indra, who along with Bṛhaspati is mentioned as founder of the Cārvāka school".[11] The passage, however, leaves us in no doubt that this Purandara can be no other than the "author belonging to the Cārvāka doctrine" (mentioned above). What Puṣpadanta adds to our knowledge is that Purandara was not only the author of a *sūtra*-work, but that of a short commentary (or auto-commentary) as well (as might be deduced from the sentence quoted by Kamalaśīla).

Another reference to Purandara was subsequently found in Vādirājasūri's *NVV* (1954).[12] The work names not only Purandara but also Aviddhakarṇa (whom Vādirājasūri identifies as *cārvākaviśeṣa* while explaining the word, *kaścana* in Akalaṅka's text).[13]

With the publication of Anantavīrya's *SVṬ* (1959) another aphorism from Purandara's *sūtra*-work came to light: *caitanya[viśiṣṭa]sya mūrtasya jñānam*[14] (the emendation —within square brackets— was suggested by the editor, Mahendrakumara Nyayacarya).

D1). Namai refers only to Pathak's work, taking him to be the first compiler of the Cārvāka aphorisms (which he is not).

[10] Franco (1991), 159.

[11] *Mahāp* (1937), I: 643. The text reads: *emeya karivi appaniya utti | kiṃ jaṃpasi pauraṃdariya vitti* ("Arranging your arguments in this way, why do you blurt out the commentry of Purandara?"), xx, 18.9ab, 328. Vaidya in a gloss in Sanskrit explained *pauraṃdariya vitti* as *cārvākamatam* (idem). —I am grateful to Dr C.R. Deshpande, formerly of the University of Poona, for the translation of this difficult passage. He rendered the last phrase as 'the doctrine of Purandara, i.e. of Cārvāka' and wrote to me, "This is literal translation. However, the sense is not clear" (personal communication, 5.3.1997).—Vaidya's interpretation of Purandara as Indra does not seem to be correct. Is Indra anywhere connected with the Cārvāka-s?

H.L. Jain referred to Purandara in an article (1925) in connection with *Mahāp*. See *NCC*, XII: 121.

[12] *NVV* (1954), II: *tasyāpyaviddhakarṇasyāpi na kevalaṃ purandarādeḥ dehād anutpattiḥ*, etc., on *NV*, v. 71a 101.

[13] *iti evaṃ kaścana cārvākaviśeṣo 'viddhakarṇaḥ* (ibid., on v. 70d, 101).

[14] *SVṬ*, 306: *caitanya[viśiṣṭa]sya mūrtasya pṛthivyādicatuṣṭayasya jñānam anena pauraṃ[daraṃ]mataṃ darśitam.* Both emendations (within square brackets) have been proposed by the editor.

To the best of my knowledge that is all known so far about Purandara. On the basis of what is available, meagre as it is, we may draw the following inferences:

(a) Purandara definitely flourished before (or in) the eighth century CE (since Kamalaśīla, who belonged to the same century, refers to him as a well-known authority along with Aviddhakarṇa the Lokāyatika,[15] also flourishing in (or before) the eighth century).

(b) If Akalaṅka (eighth century) did refer to Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa[16] (as Anantavīrya says), then they might have flourished even earlier.

(c) Anantavīrya and Vādidevasūri (eleventh-twelfth centuries) refer to the *sūtra*-work compiled by Purandara, whereas Kamalaśīla quotes from the *Vṛtti*.

(d) The aphorism, *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād*, etc. is closely modelled on Bhartṛhari's *VP*, 1.42 cd: *anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ*, "The fall of one who depends mainly on inference is not hard to find".[17]

(e) This should remind us what is often forgotten (too conveniently, I think): the grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*-s) did not admit of any other means of knowledge excepting testimony, *āgama*. Both perception and inference to them were but poor substitutes for testimony. Apart from Jayarāśibhaṭṭa the *tattvopaplavavādin* and maybe Pātrasvāmin,[18] the school of grammarians also rejected inference —a position that is generally attributed to the Cārvāka-s alone. They are branded as *pratyakṣaikapramāṇavādin*-s by their opponents in their polemical writings[19] and in almost all philosophical digests.[20]

(f) Though the context of Purandara's exposition is not known, we may conjecture from Śīlāṅka's commentary on the *SKS*, 1.1.8 that it concerns the proof of the existence of the alleged imperishable soul which is denied by the Cārvāka-s.[21]

Similarly Abhayadevasūri quotes this very aphorism in connection with the existence of the other world, rebirth, etc.[22] —all presumed to be known through inference or testimony, never through perception.

(g) A parallel to Purandara's exposition is found in the view of 'the better learned ones' mentioned by Jayantabhaṭṭa.[23] They are said to have distinguished between two kinds of inference: *utpanna pratīti* (verifiable by perception) and *utpādya pratīti* (requiring indoctrination).They apparently shared the position taken by Purandara regarding the lim-

[15] For the two Aviddhakarṇas, the Naiyāyika and the Lokāyatika, see Mahendrakumara Jain's Introduction to *SVṬ*, 73, 76-77, and *NCC* (1968), I: 426-27. See also Franco (1997), 142.

[16] Mahendrakumara conjectured that "the author of Paurandarasūtra was Aviddhakarṇa" (*SVṬ*, 77). However, the separate mention of the two authors by Vādirājasūri (*NVV*, 101) and Anantavīrya (*SVṬ*, 306: *itarasya acetanasya vā bhūmyādeḥ mūrtasya, anena aviddhakarṇasya samaye darśitaḥ*) suggest otherwise. Both the Jain authors were commenting on Akalaṅka's works (*Siddhiviniścayavṛtti* and *Nyāyaviniścaya* respectively).

[17] *VP*... with the Commentaries, *Vṛtti* and *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva (1966), 8; *VP*, with the Commentary by Puṇyarāja (*Prakāśa*) (1887), 19. Cf. *VP*, I. 32: *avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedādbhinnāsu śaktiṣu* | *bhāvānumānena prasiddhir ati* [v. I. *pratītirati*] *durlabhā* ||. "Rarely are the natures of substances known from inference, since their properties vary with variations in (their) state, place or time" (trans. K. Raghavan Pillai, 6).

[18] For Pātrasvāmin, see *TS* and *P*, Ch. 18, vv. 1363-78 and 1379-1436 (presentation and refutation respectively), 494 ff.

[19] E.g., *ASVṛ* and *SKS* with Niryukti and the commentary (*vṛtti*) of Śīlāṅkācārya, (1978), 12: *yat tāvad uktaṃ pratyakṣam evaikaṃ pramānaṃ* [...], on *SKS*, 1.1.8; *SVM*, 133: *pratyakṣam-evaikaṃ pramāṇam iti manyate cārvākaḥ*, commenting on *AYVD*, v. 20 (*vinānumānena parābhisandhim*, etc.). Cf. also *pratyakṣaikapramāṇavāditaya anumānādeḥ anaṅgīkāreṇa prāmāṇyābhāvāt*, "... [the existence of the soul cannot be proved] since this school holds that perception is the source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.". *SDS* (1981), 4.

[20] The one notable exception to this is the anonymous *SMS*, 15. For further details, see below.

[21] *SKSVṛ*, 10.

[22] *TBV*, 69-71.

[23] *śusikṣitatarāḥ prāhuḥ. dvividham anumānam, kiñcid utpannapratīti kiñcid utpādyapratīti. īśvarādyanumānan tu utpādyapratīti. tatra dhūmānumānādeḥ prāmāṇayaṃ kena neṣyate* | *ato hi sādhyaṃ budhyante tārkikairakṣatā api* || *yattvātmeśvarasarvajñaparalokādigocaram* | *anumānaṃ na tasyeṣṭaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ tattvadarśibhiḥ* || (*NM*, Ch. 2, I: 184). "Now those who (think themselves to be) more learned, say that (in fact) there are two kinds of inference; 'some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself', and 'some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on somebody else's advice)'. [The former kind is valid, but the latter kind is not]. The inference of God and the like are ones in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired [on other's advice]. Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such inference, though they may not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after-world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of the probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians." (trans. M.K. Gangopadhyaya in *C/L*, 140). The reference to the omniscient being shows that the polemics are directed as much against the Brahminical theists as the Buddhists.

ited validity of inference in mundane matters (but never in the so-called supramundane ones).

(h) The word, *durlabha*, is also significant. It is not suggested that inference is invariably wrong but that more often than not it is misleading. In other words, there is no *avyabhicāritā* between the antecedent and the consequent.

(i) This again reminds us of the famous Parable of the Wolf's Footprints, found in Buddhist, Brahminical and Jain sources.[24] The *parabola docet* may be stated as follows: *apratyakṣapūrvakam anumānam agrāhyam*; if such inference can deceive even the well-versed men in mundane matters, what to speak of other cases which are not perceptible?

Can anything more be deduced from the three fragments of Purandara? I would venture to assert that by admitting the limited validity of inference, and at the same time denying its non-primacy, Purandara was *not* deviating from the 'orthodox' Cārvāka position; on the other hand, he was only elucidating that which had suffered much obfuscation in the hands of the opponents of materialism.

Erich Frauwallner, who considered Purandara to be a revisionist in this regard, refers to an aphorism, alleged to be of Cārvāka/Lokāyata origin: *anumānam apramāṇam* (along with another: *pratyakṣam evaika pramāṇam*).[25] The former (aphorism No. 6 in D.R. Shastri, A14 in Namai) is first found in Kamalaśīla, then in Śīlāṅka, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayantabhaṭṭa and Abhayadevasūri.[26] It is rather interesting that Kamalaśīla himself attributes the same aphorism to the grammarians in his *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣepa*.[27] If,

[24] For the parable itself, see *ṢDSam* (with *TRD*), ed. Luigi Suali, 303-04. References to this parable are also found in Bhāvaviveka (fifth/sixth century), Candrakīrti (sixth/seventh century), *MŚ*, (1989), II: 3, 64-65; Haribhadra, *LTN*, *MA* (see Vallée-Poussin in *ERE*, VIII: 449 n), Śīlāṅka on *SKS*, 1.1.6, 10 and 2.3.11, 49; *MVṛ* on *SK*, v. 17. Maṇibhadra in his commentary on *ṢDS*, v. 81 gives a slightly different version of the story (See *Laghuvṛtti* in *ṢDSam*, ed. K. Misra, 65-66). For a more detailed study See Ch. 15 below.

[25] Frauwallner, II: 308 (English trans. II: 225), quoting from *TBV*, 73. Bedekar does not mention the second aphorism (first in the German text).

[26] *TSP* on *TS*, v. 1455, 520; Śīlāṅka on *SKS*, 1.1.8, 12: *nānumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ, visaṃvādakatvād* [...], Vācaspatimiśra, Bhāmatī on *BS -ŚBh.* 3.3.53, and *TK* on *SK*, v. 5, 32; *NM*, Ch. 7, II: 201; *anumānaṃ tu na pramāṇam eva cārvākānām*); D.R. Shastri mentions *TBV* and *TK* only, Namai the first alone.

[27] *anumāne 'pi vipratipattir yathā - nānumanaṃ pramāṇam bhrāntisambhavād iti vaiyākaraṇaḥ*. Kamalaśīla, *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣepa* (or *-saṃkṣipti*), restored to Sanskrit from the Tibetan version, *Peking Tanjur* (*Bstan-hgyur*),

for argument's sake, we tentatively accept the Cārvāka-s as *pratyakṣaikapramāṇavādin*-s, then the grammarians too are to be called *āgamaikapramāṇavādin*-s. In other words, both of them were *pramāṇaikavādin*-s, both were anti-*anumāna*. Kamalaśīla in the *TSP* did not attribute the aphorism to the Bārhaspatyas alone; he spoke of *bārhaspatyādayaḥ*, 'Bārhaspatyas and others'.[28] Hence, even if we accept the view that the Cārvāka-s denied the validity of inference in all cases, mundane or supramundane, the fact remains that they were *not* alone in holding such a view. Thus the aphorism regarding the invalidity of inference cannot be applied exclusively to them.

Let us also see how Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, a *'paramalokāyatikammanya'* (as Vādidevasūri calls him) represents the Cārvāka view regarding the non-primacy of inference:

> In the grasping of the invariable relation of the *hetu* (probans) with its *sādhya* (probandum), three modes are recognised —(i) by two unqualified perceptions, (ii) by perception along with a qualified non-perception, and (iii) by the process of repeated perception as found in worldly behaviour (*bhūyodarśanapravṛttyā ca lokavyavahārapatitayā*). The *sūtra* is aimed at those who recognise the *hetu* as *gamaka* (capable of yielding knowledge) according to the first mode of grasping. Failure of concomitance (*vyabhicāra*) is not seen even in the case of *hetus* popularly known as such (*lokaprasiddhahetus*) (e.g. smoke, etc.); so also it is not noticed in the case of the *hetus* adopted in the special tantras or śāstras (*tantrasiddha hetu* —Śāstric *hetus*); so on the basis of the quality characterised by 'non-perception of failure of concomitance' being common to them, the *tantra-siddha hetus* are established as being *gamaka*, it is because of this that *anumāna* is *gauṇa*. Now, the knowledge of non-failure of concomitance (*avyabhicārāvagama*) in respect of *laukika* (popular) *hetus* (like smoke, etc.) is instrumental in bringing about the knowledge of the probandum but this is not there in the case of the

f. 115 a 6. I would like to thank Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan for drawing my attention to this passage and permitting me to quote from his as-yet-unpublished restoration (MS, 17).

[28] *TSP* on *TS*, v. 1455, 520. See also below.

Jñānaśrībhadra in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* brackets the Bārhaspatya and Bhartṛhari, urging both to accept the validity of inference (and quotes an obscure line from the Vedas in his support!) "*evam eva sati anena krameṇānumānaprāmāṇyam, yataḥ, vedo 'pi: 'arthāvisaṃvādaka pramāṇam, visaṃvāde tatra bhavati' iti.*" Restored from Tibetan by Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan (58). Sadhukhan could not trace the source of the sentence quoted purportedly from the Vedas. Nor can I.

tantra-siddha hetus (Śāstric *hetus*), so it is not proper that non-perceptible things should be known with the help of these. Hence it is said that the ascertainment of things is difficult to attain on the strength of *anumāna*.[29]

Udbhaṭa's position thus is similar to Purandara's in all respects.[30] He provides a more sophisticated argument, that is all. This doubtless shows a continuity of approach, but does it prove that such was the original position of the Cārvāka-s? For that, we should turn to Guṇaratna. While explaining the word, *hi* (indeed) in *ṢDSam*. v. 83. ([...] *mānaṃ tvakṣameva* hi), Guṇaratna says:

The word 'indeed' (*hi*) has been used here to indicate a speciality. The speciality, again, is that *the Cārvākas admit the validity of inference which tend to facilitate the daily activities of ordinary people* (lokayātrānirvāhaṇapravaṇaṃ), *such as the inference of fire from smoke, etc., but they never admit the validity of extraordinary inferences which seek to establish the heaven, merit and demerit, etc.*[31] (Emphasis added)

This, we presume, refers to the Cārvāka-s in general, not to a particular sect (*cārvākaikadeśīya*-s) of whom Guṇaratna speaks elsewhere in his commentary.[32]

The *SMS* (anonymous and undated) too presents the Cārvāka view in the following manner:

[29] Quoted in *SVR*, 256-66. I have used the translation by E.A. Solomon, 986-87.

[30] Solomon says, "Udbhaṭa seems to be a progressive Cārvāka, a follower of Purandara" (ibid., 990). What I would like to add is that both Purandara and Udbhaṭa were merely explicating the original and authentic position of the Cārvāka-s in this regard. The use of plural, *cārvākaiḥ*, may be honorific but more probably it refers to the Cārvāka philosophers in general. See also n8 above.

[31] *ṢDSam*, 306. English trans. in *C/L*, 273. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi explained the Cārvāka view of the dominance of the sense-organs (*indriyādhipatya*) in the following way: "Note that the Cārvāka repudiates the organs of knowledge like inference, verbal testimony, etc. which are a matter of everyday practice, and yet he declares himself to be an advocate of perception – and sense-perception at that – being the sole organ of knowledge. This only means that according to the Cārvāka, an empirical organ of knowledge —be it inference, verbal testimony, or any other— is not valid unless its findings are confirmed by sense-perception. In other words, the Cārvāka has no objection to a piece of knowledge being regarded as valid in case it is not contradicted by sense-perception." (*Prastāvanā* to his edition of Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 4; trans. in his *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, 4).

[32] See *ṢDSam*, 300 and *C/L*, 266 respectively. See also n39 below.

This rice, because of its riceness (*annatva*) satisfies hunger as it did yesterday – such an inference as this is included there (*sc*. in the Lokāyataśāstra), due to its being rooted in perception. The fruits of worldly goods (*abhyudaya*) and *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*), the matter of religion and *brahman* as well as the Veda are devoted to the pretersensual, hence are not (to be admitted as) means of knowledge —this is the conclusion.[33]

This view is further supported by the fact that while denigrating (in the name of refuting) the Cārvāka-s, their opponents always make them quote Bhartṛhari whose philosophical position was diametrically opposite to materialism. Śāntarakṣita quotes three verses *verbatim* from the *VP* (vv. 32-34) in the text of *TS*; so do Śīlāṅka (v. 42), Vācaspatimiśra (v. 32), Jayantabhaṭṭa (vv. 32, 42 and 34, in this order, both in the *NM* and *ĀḌ*) and Vādidevasūri (v. 32).[34] If there were any aphorism denying the validity of inference in the *sūtra*-work of the Cārvāka-s, why did they all quote Bhartṛhari and then set out to refute his words —all the while referring to the Cārvāka-s as their *pūrvapakṣin*-s instead of the true author of the verse or verses?

One has the impression that Jayantabhaṭṭa and others simply used the Cārvāka as their Śikhaṇḍin: the butt of their attack was really Bhartṛhari or the school of the grammarians, although they never declared it in so many words.[35] Śāntarakṣita, on the other hand, devotes a whole chapter to all those who had found fault with this or that aspect of inference and systematically sets out to refute them all. He starts with Pātrasvāmin (vv. 1363-1436)[36] and moves on to refute Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa the Naiyāyika (vv. 1438-39), Kumārila and others (v. 1442 *et seq*). Then he refers to 'some' (*kecana*) in v. 1455b before quoting from Bhartṛhari (vv. 1459-61= *VP*, I. 32-34). It is Kamalaśīla who identifies *kecana* as *bārhaspatyādayaḥ* (*TSP* on *TS*, v. 1455).

[33] *SMS*, 15. Trans. mine.

[34] *TS*, 521-52; Śīlāṅka on *SKS*, 1.1.8, 10; *Bhām*, 850; *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 177, 179, 183; *ĀḌ*, Act 3, 59; and *SVR*, 262 (all in connection with the Cārvāka).

[35] Both Śāntarakṣita and Jayantabhaṭṭa refute Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *śabdabrahman* (*TS*, Ch. 5, vv. 85-96, 128 ff and *NM*, Ch. 6, II: 107ff respectively).

[36] Since we know absolutely nothing about Pātrasvāmin (Potter does not even name him in his *Bibliography*), we cannot be sure of his exact position regarding inference. But it is to be noted that Kamalaśīla does not mention him as a Cārvāka, nor does anybody else. Sukhlalji considers Pātrasvāmin as a Jain [*TUS* (1987), 30].

The text then takes up Bhartṛhari and Bhartṛhari alone (vv. 1457-61). Now, excepting Bhartṛhari, none of the philosophers whose views on inference have been examined in this chapter can be branded as anti-inference *per se*.

Therefore, it cannot be concluded on the basis of Śāntarakṣita's presentation that the Cārvāka-s were opposed to inference as such. It is true of Bhartṛhari alone. Purandara thus was simply stating the traditional position of the Cārvāka-s in which inference preceded by perception was accepted as tantamount to perception and obviously such inferences would be confined to everyday life and mundane matters.

It may appear to be an exercise in futility if, even in the face of overwhelming evidence of all non-materialist philosophers and almost every digest-writer, I propose to establish the view. In fact, barring the statements found in the *SMS* and *TRD* (both quoted above), we do not have much of an evidence in support of the view that the Cārvāka-s, like the Vaiśeṣikas (*kāṇāda*-s), one particular school of the Naiyāyikas and Buddhists (of the realist kind),[37] admitted both perception (absolutely) and inference (conditionally). However, we shall try to stake our claim on the basis of some conspicuous *omission* of reference to Purandara's view (as quoted by Kamalaśīla) in the works of the antagonists of the Cārvāka.

When Vācaspatimiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa ridicule the Cārvāka-s for being inferior even to the animals (because they would not rely on inference at all which even the beasts do),[38] they steer clear of stating that at least one school of the Cārvāka-s, if not others too, held a different view. Are we to assume that such prodigious scholars as Vācaspatimiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa did not know anything about Purandara while Kamalaśīla before them and Anantavīrya and Puṣpadanta after, refer to this distinguished commentator? Nor does S-M refer to any deviant or revisionist school of the Cārvāka-s.

[37] Cf. *pratyakṣam ekaṃ cārvākāḥ kaṇādasugatau punaḥ* | *anumānañca taccātha sāṃkhyāḥ śabdaśca te ubhe* || *nyāyaikadeśinopyevam upamānañca kecana* |, etc. This verse is found in Sureśvara's *Mān* (*Vārttika*), v. 2. 17-18ab, 20, also in *Tārkikarakṣā* and the anonymous *SMS*, 14, attributing the verses to a *nyāyavit*. Sureśvara might have flourished in the ninth century, but apparently did not know anything about Purandara's exposition of perception and inference (as Kamalaśīla did). Hence he simply repeated the view of the detractors of the Cārvāka, who made no distinction between inference preceded by perception (the only kind of inference admitted by *NS*, 1 1.5) and that based on verbal testimony alone.

[38] *Bhām* on *BS-ŚBh*, 3.3.54, 852; *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 179; *ĀḌ*, Act 3.

We do read of the *cārvākaikadeśīya*-s in connection with the interpretation of some other aphorisms and alternative views regarding the number of elements to be admitted.[39] But as regards the question of the means of valid knowledge we are told by all that the Cārvāka-s (apparently without exception) depend on perception and perception alone.

This, I contend, is a sheer misrepresentation of the original position of the materialists in India. In what may be taken as the earliest record of the materialist view (found in the *Mbh*) it is stated as follows:

pratyakṣaṃ hyetayor mūlaṃ kṛtāntaitihyayor api |
pratyakṣo hyāgamo 'bhinnaḥ kṛtānto vā na kiṃcana ||
yatratatrānumāne 'sti kṛtaṃ bhāvayate 'pi vā |
anyo jīvaḥ śarīrasya nāstikānāṃ mate smṛtaḥ ||[40]

The conclusion based on inference and tradition —both are rooted in perception. Perception and testimony (what we are told to believe in) are identical; reasoned-out truth (= inference) too is nothing else (but perception).

It is proved everywhere that the body exists. What the *āstika*-s think —that there is a soul without the body— is not (proven).

This is what the materialists in India meant by the primacy of perception. They would have no objection to inference —or even to verbal testimony— if the conclusion had been arrived at on the basis of actual observation and hence was verifiable by perception. The priority (*jyeṣṭhatā*) of perception over all other means of knowledge is also admitted by the Naiyāyika-s,[41] though not by the Jains (who, however, admit that perception alone is clear, *viśada* and unambiguous, whereas inference, etc., not being immediate, are lacking in clarity).[42] This basic position is retained and explicated by Purandara against the misrepresentation by the opponents of materialism. He asserts that inference does not have an

[39] Guṇaratna refers to 'some section of the Cārvākas' (*kecit tu cārvākaikadeśīya*) who considered *ākāśa* (ether, space) to be the fifth form of matter in addition to the four stated by Haribhadra (v. 83), 300. Interestingly enough, this (or these) school/s is/are mentioned only by the Jains (See Śīlāṅka on *SKS*, 1.1.6 and 2.3.11, 10, 49). See also n49 below.

[40] *Mbh*, Śāntiparvan, crit. ed., 211. 26-27 (218.27-28 in the vulgate edition). See also the notes by Belvalkar on this chapter.

[41] Cf. *evaṃ pramāṇajyeṣṭhe 'smin pratyakṣe lakṣite sati...* (*NM*, Ch. 2, I: 164).

[42] *aviśadaḥ parokṣam*. Hemachandra, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, I. 2.1, 83.

independent status as a means of knowledge (since it has to be preceded by perception), hence it is called anu-*māna*, not pra-*māṇa*.

The aphorism, *pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād*, etc. has to be explained in this light, rather than in the way the Jain antagonists like Prabhācandra and Vādidevasūri did.[43] Udbhaṭa's interpretation of the aphorism (quoted above) endorses the position of Aviddhakarṇa and adds new and subtle arguments in favour of the primacy of perception and non-primacy of inference, etc.[44] All the Cārvāka-s, earlier or later, stuck to their original doctrinal position: inference in the affairs of the world (*lokavyavahāra*) is acceptable; but perception alone is primary, inference is secondary.[45] Where they differed from the Naiyāyikas is that the latter admitted inference as a primary means, as much as perception. That is what the Cārvāka would not concede.[46] The whole rigmarole regarding the significance of *pakṣa* and *pakṣadharmatā* and the enumeration of the grounds for rejecting inference so elaborately amplified by the Jain savants are quite off the mark.[47]

Any interpretation of the aphorism under discussion would be faulty *ab initio* if one starts from the premise that the Cārvāka-s were originally *pramāṇaikavādin*-s (perception alone), and only later, under the impact of Dharmakīrti, they were constrained to modify their position by admit-

[43] For a survey of various interpretations (along with a new one suggested) see Franco (1991).

[44] See Solomon, 987-88.

[45] *PVSVT*, 19, 25. It is after accepting inference as a valid means of knowledge from the empirical point of view (*lokapratītvāt*) that Aviddhakarṇa raised objections to the validity of inference in connection with probans, *liṅga*. Cf. *atha naiva pratyakṣānumānāyoḥ pramāṇatvaṃ pratiṣidhyate*, etc. ibid., 26.

[46] Dr Nagin J. Shah (personal communication, 15.4.1998) kindly pointed out to me the difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Cārvāka-s in this regard.

[47] Franco (1991) also notes that "Vādi's interpretation does not convey the original meaning of the sūtra" (*pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād*, etc.) "for it simply makes no sense" (155). When the Jain commentators deal with the Cārvāka-s as *pūrvapakṣin*-s, they make them say not only what they had actually said but also what they might have said (of course, the Jains are not the only ones to do so). Hence, Prabhācandra rattles no less than nine alternative arguments against the validity of inference (*NKC*, I: 71) whereas Vādidevasūri is content with seven arguments only (*SVR*, 266). Apparently most of these were manufactured by the *uttarapakṣin*-s. It was to this kind of logic-chopping that the 'well learned ones' [as Jayantabhaṭṭa puts it (see n23 above)] objected.

ting limited validity of inference.[48] This is not to deny that there were differences of opinion and interpretation among the later commentators of the *Cārvākasūtra* regarding other issues. They held divergent views as to the appropriate *adhyāhara* (supplementary word) in explaining the aphorism, *tebhyaś caitanyam*, 'out of those, consciousness': whether it should be 'is manifested' (*abhivyajyate*) or 'is produced' (*prādurbhavati/upajāyate*).[49] But so far as the non-primacy of inference is concerned, there was perfect unanimity of opinion among all the commentators, beginning from Purandara down to Udbhaṭa. Similarly, all of them accepted a sort of limited validity of inference along with the primary importance of perception.

[48] Frauwallner, II: 308; Eng. trans., II: 225.

[49] *TSP* on *TS*, vv. 1857-58, 633-34; *NKC*, 342; *PKM*, 116-17 (for translation, see *C/L*, 161-62, 304, 318). S-M, however, speaks of one view only (viz. *upajāyate*, 'is produced') in *SDS*, 4, 6 as did Śīlāṅka (viz. *abhivyajyate*, *SKSVṛ*, 11). To this we may add *PVA*, 54 and *SVR*, 1073, 1081 (*abhivyaktim upayāti*), 1074 (*vyañjayanti*). See also Cakradhara in *NM*, Ch. 7, II: 257-58.



IX

What Did the Cārvāka-s Mean by sukhaṃ jīvet?

I

Opponents of the Cārvāka-s were never wanting. Idealist and fideist philosophers and custodians of different religious groups rallied to refute the Cārvāka doctrine, not only on philosophical grounds with arguments but also by spreading false charges and calumnies in order to make the doctrine appear morally reprehensible.

Two such oft-quoted charges will now be examined on the basis of original sources.

The Cārvāka system of philosophy is generally known as one of hedonism. The following verse is supposed to epitomize its basic position:

jāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīved ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet |
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punar āgamanaṃ kutaḥ. ||[1]

While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs into debt;
When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?

[1] *SDS* (trans.), 11-12.

It has been shown that the earlier sources of this verse read the second hemistich differently: *nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ* (no one is beyond death) in place of *ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet.*[2] Apparently this slight but skilful alteration was made by S-M in order to make the doctrine appear in an unfavourable light.

However, the fact remains that the verse does urge people to 'live happily', *sukhaṃ jīvet.* What could the Cārvāka-s mean by it? Did they not advocate enjoyment of sensual pleasure as the *summum bonum* of life?

I shall attempt to answer this question. Needless to say, where the Cārvāka-s are concerned, there are very little positive evidence to go by, for everything is culled from the polemical writings of their opponents. Hence the answer proposed by me cannot but be conjectural.

II

On the basis of this floating verse, many a philosopher —both Brahminical and Jain— has branded the Cārvāka-s as mere lotos-eaters, devoid of all morals, and having no faith in god, after-life, and the sense of good and evil.[3] Interestingly enough, none of them quotes any *sūtra,* aphorism, in support of his contention. The verse indeed denies rebirth and tells us that no happiness is to be expected in any future life. Hence happiness can be obtained in this life alone, and nowhere else. That is all that the verse says.

The charge of hedonism has been brought against all materialist philosophers both in India and abroad. Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, lived the life of an ascetic, wearing a blanket made of hair (so he was called 'of the hair-blanket') which, as the *Tipiṭaka* says, made him feel hot in summer and cold in winter (did he take it off then?). He preached a proto-materialist doctrine, denying such things as good or bad action, rebirth etc.[4] This made the members of his school the butt of attack by the Jains: "Thus undertaking various works they engage in various pleasures and amusements for their own enjoyment."[5]

[2] For a detailed survey of various readings of this verse, see Ch. 20 below.

[3] To name a few: *ṢDSam,* vv. 80-82; *PC,* Act 2; *TSPC,* I: 340-45; *NC,* 17. 50, 60, 69, 72; *TRD* on *ṢDSam,* v. 81.

[4] *SPhS* (*DN*), II: 48.

[5] *SKS,* 2.1.17; SBE 45, II: 341. Goonasekere points out that such accounts as are found in Buddhist and Jain sources cannot "be expected to

The Sāṃkhya philosophers too have been abused in the same way. A verse attributed to them runs as follows:

hasa piba lala moda nityaṃ viṣayān upabhuñja kuru ca mā śaṅkām |
yadi viditaṃ te kapilamataṃ tat prāpsyase mokṣasaukhyañ ca ||[6]

Laugh, drink, play, enjoy every day; have pleasure of the senses; don't be afraid;
If you know the doctrine of Kapila, thereby you get both emancipation and happiness.

All this raises a counter-question: how much credence is to be given to such canards against the doctrines that deny God, after-life, etc.?

A parallel case is found in Greece regarding the teachings of Epicurus. He was generally called a sensualist. Horace, the Latin poet, contemptuously refers to "the sty of Epicurus"[7] and the modern English word 'Epicurean' suggests one "devoted to refined and tasteful sensuous enjoyment."[8] It has been pointed out that all this represents the anti-materialistic views of the dominant philosophers.[9] Epicurus in fact abstained from taking rich food or drink. He ate only white bread, supplemented by a little cheese on feast days.[10] He did teach that pleasure was the aim of life. However, by 'pleasure' he meant something totally different from the 'eat, drink and be merry' kind of attitude towards life. As F.A. Lange puts it:

be free from prejudice". Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327.

[6] *MVṛ* on *SK,* v. 37, 149. Trans. mine. See also *ṢDSam* (Rājaśekhara), 74 and *TRD,* 96 for variants.

[7] "As for me, when you want a laugh, you will find me in fine fettle, fat and sleek like a hog from Epicurus's herd (*Epicuri de grege porcum*)." Horace, *Epistles,* I: 4.16.

[8] See *OED,* s.v. 'Epicurean'.

[9] "Epicurus taught that the highest good was pleasure, but because every joy entailed some pain, he taught his disciples (Epicureans) to exercise moderation in all things. Epicurus also taught that pleasure was gained not through sensual enjoyment but by self-control and achieving tranquillity of mind. His teachings have been misunderstood at times, however; some have seen them as defending the unashamed pursuit of bodily pleasure." Manser, 62.

More forthright is Blackburn's comment: "The aim of all philosophy is, however, to enable to live well, which is not to live in the hedonistic trough the word Epicureanism now suggests, after centuries of propaganda against the system." s.v. Epicurus.

[10] Russell, however, facetiously says that Epicurus' "method proved successful in his case, but he was a valetudinarian, and most people would need something more vigorous"(199).

Epikuros was opposed to Aristippos from whom he had learnt so much, in teaching that intellectual pleasure was higher and to be preferred to physical pleasure, for the mind is stimulated not only by the present, but also by the past and the future. Yet Epikuros also was so far consistent that he explained that the virtues must be chosen for pleasure's sake alone, just as we resort to medicine for the sake of health; but he added that virtue is the only permanent element of pleasure, all besides may be separated from it as being perishable.[11]

Lange further points out:

So near logically stood Epikuros to his opponents Zeus and Chrysippus, who declared that virtue is the only good; and yet, in consequence of the difference in the points of departure, we find the utmost difference in the system.

In a letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus clearly outlined what he meant by pleasure:

When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain and of the soul from confusion. For it is not... continued drinkings and revels... that make life pleasant but sober contemplations which examine into the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which put to flight the vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion arises which troubles the soul.[12]

We know of a few Cārvāka philosophers who commented on the *Cārvākasūtra* (now lost) and from the tantalizingly small fragments available to us we may concur with Frauwallner's opinion that they produced a "a literature richer than hitherto".[13] Purandara, Kambalāśvatara, Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa—all were thinkers of high intellectual calibre. Vādidevasūri, the diehard Jain opponent of materialism, refers respectfully to Udbhaṭa as *jarad-dvijanmā mahānubhāva*, "the veteran twice-born and having great influence (or

[11] Lange, 103. The quotation that follows is taken from the same page.
[12] Diogenes Laertius, 10. 129 and 131-32. Trans. Copleston, s.j., I. ii: 352.
[13] Frauwallner (trans.), II: 225. However, I do not agree with his view that the later Cārvāka-s took up 'foreign thoughts' and deserted the 'original attitude'. See Ch. 7 above.

capacity)".[14] If they really believed in sensual enjoyment alone, they would not write on logic and epistemology with such finesse and acumen.

In fine, the charge brought against the Cārvāka-s on the ground of unrestrained gratification of the senses is a mere calumny. To say that there is no pleasure beyond this world is not to say that pleasure alone is the sole end of life.

In any case, the clause, *yāvajjīvet sukhaṃ jīvet,* as Hiriyanna observed, "seems to be parody of the Vedic injunction —*yāvajjīvaṃ agnihotraṃ juhoti.*"[15] He also said, "Even if we explain its extreme views as due to a reaction against the free speculations and the austere asceticism that were widely current in ancient India, the system, we must admit, should once have inculcated less objectionable principles. The form in which it is now presented has an air of unreality about it."[16]

There is another way to show how false is the charge of indulgence in excessive eating, etc., generally brought against the Cārvāka-s. The apocryphal *Bṛhaspatisūtra* and the *TRD* say that the Cārvāka-s urged people to take meat and themselves practised what they preached.[17] But in the account given in the *PPu* the Cārvāka-s condemn the eaters of flesh and drinkers of liqueur. The Brahminical gods are rejected because they were married![18] The last half-verse quoted in the *SDS* (15. 132) also speaks against non-vegetarian diet: *māṃsānāṃ khādanaṃ tadvan niśācarasamīritam,* "the eating of flesh is similarly commanded by the night-prowlers (i.e. demons)".[19]

What should we conclude from such contradictory reports: some Cārvāka-s were vegetarians and some were not; some were allied to the Kāpālika-s and some practised total sexual

[14] *SVR*, 764.
[15] Hiriyanna, 194 n2.
[16] Ibid., 194-95.
[17] The *Bārhaspatya Sūtram arthāt Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstram* urges the king: *āsavāni sevayet* ("Let him make use of fermented liquers", iii. 57), *māṃsāni ca* ("also flesh food", 59), *mattakāminyāḥ sevyāḥ* ("the printed text reads" —*kasinyāḥ*) ("Gay ladies are to be used," 63), etc. But the same text advises the king not to enjoy women (i.15), not to drink intoxicants (i. 16), etc.

The book in fact is a poor piece of forgery and utterly undependable. Kangle declares that it is a very late work and does not represent the views of this (sc. Bārhaspatya) school as referred to in the works. II: 6n4. See also ibid., III: 43. For the *TRD*'s view, see 300. 10-15.
[18] *PPu*, Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, Vangavasi ed., Ch. 13. Some of these verses have also been quoted (without any reference to the source) in the *MVṛ* on *SK*, v. 2, 111.
[19] *SDS* (trans.), 12.

abstinence? I think it will be wiser not to give any credence to any of these. The opponents of the Cārvāka-s jumbled up the positions of all anti- or non-Vedic schools and made a nice mess of the *nāstika* views, imputing one's ideas to others.

The two meanings of the word 'materialism' —one technical (as used in philosophy) and the other popular (found in short or pocket dictionaries)— have led to a ready acceptance of the misinterpretation that philosophical materialists are addicted to the gratification of the senses, whereas all idealists are averse to it. (Here too the two meanings of the word, 'idealism', provide room for misconception). As we have shown above, the philosophical idealists and the philosophical materialists are to be distinguished from 'idealists' (followers of some ideal) and 'materialists' (devoted to material needs, to the neglect of spiritual matters).[20] As it is not done, sometimes even by the scholars, the confusion and canard continue to grip the mind of laymen.

III

What, then, about another fragment attributed to the Cārvāka-s: *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ,* pleasure alone is the end of life?[21] Some others speak of both *kāma* and *artha* as the twin ends of the Cārvāka-s.[22] Warder has made a short shrift of the difference by commenting that the latter version"is from a different Lokāyata source, giving a slightly different view. Otherwise we must understand that wealth is necessary as a means of pleasure."[23] I, however, would suggest that this 'slight difference' is a pointer to the fact that nobody knows what exactly the Cārvāka-s thought of the ends of life (*puruṣārtha*). It is highly doubtful whether the Cārvāka-s at all thought in terms of the Brahminical ideas regarding the four ends of life. On the other hand, both the

[20] See *OED,* s.v. 'idealism' and 'materialism'. None of these terms is encountered before the seventeenth century.

[21] D.R. Shastri, No. 5; Namai, A15. Shastri refers to Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary on *Gīta,* 16.11 as well as to *ABS* (1930), 99; Namai, to the *ABS* alone. Guṇaratna says that the Cārvāka-s admit no virtue except pleasure, *dharmaṃ kāmād aparaṃ na manyate* (*TRD,* 300. 13).

[22] D.R. Shastri, No. 27. Namai has not included it in his collection of fragments, presumably because it would go against his A15 (= Shastri's 5). The idea of the twin ends of life attributed to the Cārvāka-s is first found in *PC,* Act 2.

[23] Warder (1971), 39.

so-called *sūtra*-s are examples of poor attempts to put the Cārvāka view in the Brahminical straitjacket.

In support of this contention I may again refer to S-M's account of the Cārvāka philosophy. He first says that the Cārvāka-s consider wealth and pleasure the only ends of man (*arthakāmau eva puruṣārthamanyamānāḥ*), but after a few lines he writes (in verse): "The pleasure arising out of embracing a woman is the end of man" (*aṅganāliṅganājjanya sukhameva pumarthatā*).[24]

It is also to be noted that unlike the Brahminical and Jain controversialists, the Buddhists never refer to the Cārvāka view regarding *puruṣārtha* or *apavarga* (nor do such eminent writers as Saṅkara and Prabhācandra).[25]

IV

Considering all things I would say that the Cārvāka doctrine was basically a this-worldly philosophy with its own systems of logic, epistemology, ontology and ethics. It had nothing to do with fideism, faith in *karman,* the ideas of divine or supernatural retribution and rebirth. But there is no incontrovertible evidence to suggest that the Cārvāka-s were akin to the pleasure-seekers mentioned in the Old Testament,[26] who have been called 'Epicureans' by some commentators, although, as has been shown above, the term is a misnomer.[27]

[24] *SDS* (trans.), 3, 6.

[25] See in particular the exposition and refutation of the Cārvāka in *TS,* Ch. 22. See also Śaṅkara on *BS,* 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53-54; *PKM* and *NKC* (relevant sections). All the passages will be found translated in *C/L,* 169-240, 298-342.

[26] Isiah, 22:13, Wisdom, 2:6: "Let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die". The sentence is also quoted in I Corinthians 15:32. Muir mentions it in connection with the *yāvaj jīvet* verse (*C/L,* 366 n5).

[27] Addison G. Wright points out that the wicked depicted by the author of the Book of Wisdom are not Epicureans or Sadducees. "Actually the philosophy of life pictured here differs essentially from the doctrine of all those mentioned and is really an eclectic assemblage of ideas." Brown *et al* (eds.), 514.

X

Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*: A Re-View*

Kauṭilya (or Kauṭalya) speaks of four kinds of *vidyā*: Ānvīkṣikī, Trayī, Vārtā and Daṇḍanīti.[1] Trayī refers to the three Vedas (*Ṛk*, *Sāman*, and *Yajuḥ*), i.e., theology; Vārtā means agriculture, animal husbandry, and commerce, i.e., economics; and Daṇḍanīti stands for the management of the state, i.e., politics.[2] What is Ānvīkṣikī?

Kauṭilya himself explains that Ānvīkṣikī comprises three studies: Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata.[3] Since he mentions the first two separately, it has been assumed that he refers to the earlier Sāṃkhya (not the syncretic Sāṃkhya-Yoga); the Yoga is obviously Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, and the Lokāyata must be the materialist philosophy of the Cārvāka-s.[4]

Shamasastry in his English translation of the *KA* was not so sure about the identification of Lokāyata. He wrote within parentheses: 'Atheism?'[5] The two earlier commentaries, *Jayamaṅgalā* and *Nītinirnīti*, however, clearly identify Lokāyata with Nāstika philosophy expounded by Bṛhaspati.[6]

[1] *KA*, 1.2.1. Kangle (1969), I: 4. Cf. Kāmandaki, 35.
[2] 1.3. and 1.4. Kangle, I: 4-6.
[3] 1.2.10. Kangle, I: 4.
[4] Jacobi (1970), 551; Kangle (1965), III: 100, 130.
[5] Shamasastry, 6.
[6] G.H. Sastri, 10; Muni Jina Vijaya, 5.

The only discordant note is heard in the Malayalam commentary (c. twelfth century). It explains Lokāyata as the Nyāyaśāstra taught by Brahman, Gārgya *et al.*[7] MM. T. Ganapati Sastri preferred to follow this gloss in his new Sanskrit commentary.[8] MM. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa was also of the opinion that in ancient times the Nyāyaśāstra was called Lokāyata.[9]

So we have one problem here: What did Kauṭilya mean by Lokāyata —materialist philosophy or logic?

The word, *Ānvīkṣikī*, too is open to various interpretations. Some have taken it to mean an esoteric doctrine (*ātmavidyā*), some others, logic (*tarkavidyā*).[10] Modern scholars have generally opted for 'Philosophy' or 'Philosophical system'.[11] Jolly provided a compromise solution: 'Logical philosophy' (by *lokāyata*, however, he meant 'materialist system').[12]

Yet another problem lies in the interpretation of the word, *yoga*. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa proposed to take the word either in the sense of Nyāya or the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. If, however in *KA*, 1.2, *lokāyata* referred to Nyāyaśāstra, *yoga*, he said, would mean only Vaiśeṣika.[13] MM. S. Kuppuswami Sastri also held that *yoga* here refers to Vaiśeṣika.[14] Both of them mentioned Vātsyāyana's commentary on *NS*, 1.1.29 as well as other sources in support of their contention.

We have then three problems to deal with: the meanings of *ānvīksikī*, *yoga*, and *lokāyata* in the context of the *KA*.

In the Buddhist (Pali) tradition, Lokāyata is taken by all commentators and lexicographers to mean 'the science of disputation', *vitaṇḍasattham*.[15] Rudolf Otto Franke, however, was of the opinion that it referred to a 'logically proven explanation of nature' (*logisch beweisende Naturerklaerung*).[16] Rhys Davids also interpreted the word as 'Nature-lore'.[17] Though K.C. Chattopadhyata agreed with this rendering to some extent, both Tucci and Dasgupta were opposed to it.[18]

[7] Kangle (1972), II: 6 n10.
[8] T.G. Sastri, 27.
[9] Tarkavāgīśa (1981), I: xiv; Gangopadhyaya (1990), 23-26.
[10] Kāmandaki, 39; so *Manu*, 7.43 and his commentators. Dave, II: 31-32; see also Böhtlingk and Roth, I: 649.
[11] Jacobi, 549; Kangle, III: 99-100, 130; D. Chattopadhyaya (1976), 649.
[12] Jolly and Schmidt (1924), II: 3 (1923), I: 4.
[13] Tarkavāgīśa, I: xvii.
[14] S.K. Sastri, xvi.
[15] Jayatilleke, 46-55.
[16] Cited in Rhys Davids and Stede (1975), s.v. Lokāyata.
[17] Rhys Davids (1899), 171.
[18] K.C. Chattopadhyaya, 139-40, 152-53; Tucci in *C/L*, 389-90; Dasgupta

Pañcānana Tarkaratna believed that the word, *laukāyatika*, had been derived from *lokāyati*, not *lokāyata*. *Āyati* means future, *uttarakāla*. Hence those who have no faith in the future state or after-life (*paraloka*) or to whom this world itself is the *āyati*, are called *lokāyatika*-s.[19] Phaṇibhuṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa also noted this derivation as probable.[20]

One problem of accepting this derivation is that no earlier authority or usage has been mentioned by them in support of this contention. On the other hand, Pāṇini clearly speaks of the *ṭhak* Pratyaya to be applied in the sense of 'one who studies and understands'.[21] The word, *laukāyatika*, is thereby derived only from *lokāyata*, not from *lokāyati*. In any case, such a derivation would not suit the context of the *KA*, where it is reckoned as a branch or division of Ānvīkṣikī.

Sources from the Common Era do not help us much to comprehend the original meaning. Right from the *Kāmasūtra*, *Kādambarī* and Buddhist Sanskrit works we learn that the Lokāyatika-s were antagonistic to religious duties (*dharma*) and believed in sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the only valid means of knowledge.[22] Their ideas were avidly controverted by the Jain, Buddhist and Brahminical philosophers from the eighth to the eleventh centuries.[23] It is only from their writings that we know that the Lokāyatika-s denied the authority of the Vedas, the existence of after-life, rebirth, soul and God. Haribhadra, S-M, and other authors of philosophical digests speak in the same vein.[24]

But the question remains: did Lokāyata mean this sort of philosophical system in Kauṭilya's times too? And we have to solve two other cruxes as well, viz. the meanings of *ānvīkṣikī* and *yoga* in the *KA*.

I would propose the following interpretation on the basis of two postulates:

(1940, 1975), III: 514 n3.
[19] Tarkaratna (1334 BS), 41, on *KS*, 1.2.30.
[20] Tarkavāgīśa (I: xv n2). N. Jha (9) takes Lokāyati to be the name of a person who ramified the Bārhaspatya philosophy. He too does not mention any authority in support of this contention.
[21] *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 4.2.60 and *Gaṇapāṭha*, 23 in Katre, 416, 1271. See also Kane (1968), I: 226n.
[22] *KA*, 1.2.25; Bāṇabhaṭṭa (*Kādambari*, 513), but see his *Harṣacarita* (Cowell and Thomas (trans.), 236) in which a Lokāyatika is found in a hermitage (*tapovana*); *TS*, Ch. 22, I: 523-29; II: 633-37.
[23] Almost all the aphorisms and verses so far collected in D.R. Shastri (1959, 1982), 200-201 and Namai (1976), 39-44 belong to these four centuries.
[24] *ṢDSam* in Suali (1905-14), 30; *SDS* (1978), 1-5; *ṢDSam* in K. Misra(1979), 5-6; *SMS*, 15-16.

1. Meanings of words change in course of time, so we have to study the matter chronologically.[25]

2. The same name has been applied to different philosophical systems in India (Nyāya once meant Mīmāṃsā as in Jaimini's famous work, *Nyāyamālāvistara*).

The Buddhist (Pali) tradition uniformly takes *lokāyata* to mean the science of disputation.[26] This, I suggest, is the right meaning applicable to the *KA* context. This is the earliest definition we have and it tallies with the explanation given in the Malayalam commentary. In the Buddhist (Sanskrit) tradition too, the word seems to carry the same sense, though translators have been much influenced by the latter meaning of the word.[27] A pronouncedly materialist system also called Lokāyata (or its many namesakes like *dehātmavāda, bhūtacaitanyavāda, Cārvākamata, Bārhaspatyamata,* etc.) must have been a later development. The proto-materialist doctrine of Ajita Keśakambalin, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, was known as *ucchedavāda,* not *lokāyata.*[28]

Similarly, *ānvīkṣikī* in the *KA* can only mean a 'logic-based philosophical system', as opposed to others based on the scriptures (e.g. Mīmāṃsā, and perhaps Vedānta). No clear-cut distinction had yet been made between logic and philosophy in Kauṭilya's times. The same holds true for the *NS* as we have it to-day. Lokāyata too was both logic and philosophy. The Nyāyaśāstra propounded by Brahman, Gārgya *et al.* (as the Malayalam commentary says) must have been a predecessor of Gautama's *NS.*

The word, *yoga,* too can only mean the Ur-Vaiśeṣika here. It too was originally a mere nature-philosophy like the Ur-Sāṃkhya. The Vedāntins considered both to be their chief enemy and branded them as outside the pale of the Vedas.[29] In Kauṭilya's days the battle-lines had not yet been drawn, and these three systems —Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata— were still considered to be secular (though the Mānava school of Arthasāstra did not consider *Ānvīkṣikī* to be essentially non-Vedic).[30]

[25] Kane often (I: 225-26, III: 47-48, V: ii: 1205 n1956) speaks of the changes in meaning in relation to Lokāyata.

[26] Rhys Davids (1899), 171.

[27] *SDPS,* 70, 166, 266-67; Burnouf, 62,168, 280; Kern, 236, 97, 438. See also Rhys Davids (1899), 169-70 n4 and D. Chattopadhyaya (1969), 110.

[28] Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 325-27.

[29] *BS,* 2.1.1ff and 2.2.1-17.

[30] *KA,* 1.2.3. Kangle, I: 4.

That Lokāyata was cultivated among the learned Brahmins is also proved by the references to its commentaries (*Varṇikā* and *Vartikā*), especially one called *Bhāgurī* in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya.*[31] The word *cārvī* (which means 'intelligence') is applied to its *ācārya*-s as well.[32]

Hence *KA,* 1.2.10 may better be understood in the following way: "The logic-based philosophical system comprises the Ur-Sāṃkhya, Ur-Vaiśeṣika and the science of disputation called Lokāyata, and nothing else."

[31] 7.3.45 (7 and 8) in Kielhorn III: 325-26; Dasgupta, III: 515-16; Kangle III: 130; Limaye in Thite ed., 18-19.

[32] Vāmana-Jayāditya, Jinendrabuddhi and Haradatta Miśra on *Aṣṭ* 1.3.36; in Shastri and Shukla, I: 438-49.

XI
Yogācāra against the Cārvāka: A Critical Survey of Tattvasaṅgraha, *Chapter 22*

The publication of the *TS* along with its commentary, *Pañjikā (TSP)* in 1926 was an epoch-making event in the history of Indian philosophical studies.[1] It is a voluminous work consisting of 3645 verses divided into twenty six chapter.[2] Śāntarakṣita, the author of the work, was the rector (*upādhyāya*) of the University of Nalanda (the remains of which are still to be seen in Bihar) in the second half of the eighth century CE. He then left for Tibet where he founded bSam-yas, modelled on the Buddhist monastery of Odantapurī. Tibetan scholars in this institute were trained to translate Buddhist texts from Sanskrit into Tibetan. After staying in Tibet for twenty five years or so, Śāntarakṣita died in the first decade of the ninth century.

The commentary on his work was written by his disciple, Kamalaśīla, who had accompanied his master to the land of snow. He is said to have been killed by some rivals whom he defeated in a public debate.

[1] An English translation by Ganganatha Jha was published (1937 and 1939) from the Oriental Institute, Baroda. Another edition of the text has been brought out by Dwarikadas Shastri (1968, 1981).

[2] The Varanasi edition has one verse less than the Baroda edition (see above). All subsequent references to the text are to the Varanasi edition.

Both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla belonged to the Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy. The *TS* was written with a view to refuting all other philosophical systems and establishing the Yogācāra view. The book has been called "a veritable encyclopaedia for us of Indian philosophy current in his (*sc.* Śāntarakṣita's) time."[3]

One of the many philosophical systems that Śāntarakṣita examines in the *TS* is the Lokāyata (Chapter 22). As usual he first presents the exponent's view (*pūrvapakṣa*) and then proceeds to refute it. He writes:

> If there is no entity that has continuity of existence, then there can be no other world, because there is none belonging to the other world. (v. 1856)
> The body, cognition, the sense-organs and the rest being destroyed every moment, they cannot pertain to the other world. There is nothing else that is admitted (by you, Buddhists). (v. 1857)
> Hence, consciousness must be regarded as produced from and/or manifested by, certain material substances, just like acids, the constituent elements of liquer and such things. (v. 1858)
> The names, 'body', 'sense-organ', and so on are applied to special combinations of earth and other material substances; there is nothing other than these. (v. 1859)
> There can be no cause-effect relation between the two minds (consciousnesses) under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies, just like the cognition of the cow and that of the horse. (v. 1860)
> Cognitions (consciousnesses) cannot be the effects of the cognition (consciousness) in question, because they are intelligence, like intelligence connected with another series. (v. 1861)
> The dying consciousness of the man beset with affections cannot bring about the contiguity of another mind (consciousness), because it is dying consciousness —just like that of the persons free from afflictions (passions and impurities). (v. 1862)
> It follows that consciousness proceeds from the body indeed in which are seated Prāṇa, Apāna and the rest of the five life-breathes, as it is said by Kambalāśvatara. (v. 1863)
> It is audacious to assert that there is cognition in the foetus,

[3] D. Chattopadhyaya, Editorial note on Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in *C/L*, 160. Ganganatha Jha, however. said: "The work [*TS*] is rather disappointing; it is purely and almost entirely polemical, its avowed aim being the demolition of all views contrary to the texts of orthodox Buddhism –the doctrinaire part of which is neatly– though not at all clearly –set forth in the six opening verses of the Text" (n1 above, Introduction, x).

> etc; no object is apprehended (at this stage), as the sense-organs are yet to appear.(v. 1864)
> Cognition can have no other form than the apprehension of objects. This is why there is no cognition in such states as swoon. (v. 1865)
> Nor does intelligence (cognition) reside in the form of potency, because no potencies exist without a support. (v. 1866)
> There being no soul that may be the support of cognition, the body is the only support for it. So, at the end, when the body has ceased to exist, what will support cognition? (v. 1867)
> When the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required support is the body that is subsequently born? (v. 1868)
> How, too, could the cognition residing in different bodies, be related to the same chain of cognitions —it being like the consciousness of the elephant, the horse and other animals? (v. 1869)
> For these reasons, as the support of cognitions, you (*sc.* Buddhists) have to seek a transmigrating personality without beginning and end or accept disbelief (in the existence of the other world.) (v. 1870).[4]

After this, Śāntarakṣita begins his elaborate refutation of the basic Lokāyata position which, as he understands, is as follows:

(a) Denial of the existence of the other-world (*paraloka)* and the resident of the other-world (*paralokin*), i.e., the soul or spirit,

(b) Denial of the existence of consciousness independent of and not dwelling in the body,

(c) Denial of rebirth (both of previous and prospective lives),

(d) Denial of the possibility of the transference of consciousness from one body to another, and

(e) Denial of the Buddhist notion of 'the chain of consciousness'.

Apparently, Śāntarakṣita elected to deal with only such issues as were relevant to establishing and defending the system of philosophy he championed, an idealist system called Yogācāra. Thus the pronounced atheism of the Lokāyata did not affect him, for he, too, was an atheist (In *TS*. Ch.2

[4] I have translated the passage myself but have also taken help from Jha's translation (see n1) which has been reproduced in *C/L*, 161-66. It should be noted that the terms, *cetas, citta, jñāna, vijñapti* and *vijñāna* used in this passage (as elsewhere) by the Buddhist philosophers all mean 'consciousness'.

A rather free translation of the verses will be found in B. Bhattacarya's Foreword, Baroda ed., xv ff.

he refutes the existence of God). Similarly, Buddhists of all sorts deny the existence of the imperishable and eternal self (*ātman*). They, however, firmly believe in the doctrine of rebirth and the passage of consciousness from one person to another. This forced them to believe in the existence of the momentary consciousness without any human body to support it. This, in its turn, made them the butt of attack not only of the Lokāyata-s but also of the adherents of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. It is intriguing that in representing the Lokāyata view, Śāntarakṣita quotes three verses from Kumārilabhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārtika*. Satkari Mookerjee was the first to note this fact. He said:

> The entire argument put in the mouth of the materialist is bodily taken *mutatis mutandis* from Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika*. The *Ślokas* from 1865 to 1868 [Varanasi ed. 1864-67] are reproduced *verbatim* and Śls. 1869 to 1871 [Varanasi ed., 1868-70] are but a summarized version of Kumārila's *Ślokas* 59-64 and 69 to 73, *Ātmavāda*, Ś.V., pp. 703-07.[5]

More recently Franco has noted that the Mīmāṃsaka-s and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s are found to criticize the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth "with arguments that bear a baffling resemblance to those of the Cārvākas".[6] He further says: "It seems that the most orthodox and most heterodox schools (*sc.* the Mīmāṃsā and the Lokāyata) have joined forces to criticize the Buddhists [...] Yet the question arises whether these are Mīmāṃsā arguments adopted by the Cārvāka or vice versa."[7] Franco thinks that "the latter is the case, because these arguments are disjointed from their surroundings in the *ŚV*, whereas they form a coherent whole with their immediate context in *TS* 1863."[8]

[5] Mookerjee, 204 n2. He further notes: "It is strange that the editor of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* has failed to enumerate the Ślokas 1865 to 1868 in that work in the list of quotations from Kumārila, given as an appendix. Perhaps the omission to mention Kumārila as the author of the same by Kamalaśīla is responsible for this overt omission on the part of the editor. It is absolutely necessary that these *ślokas* should be noticed in the appendix of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*" (ibid). Nothing of the sort has been done in the 1984 edition (which is but a reprint of the 1926 ed.).

[6] Franco (1997), 99.

[7] Ibid., 100.

[8] Ibid. Franco tends to assume that "Kumārila put the Cārvāka arguments into verse and that it was simply easier for Śāntarakṣita, who knew that they were Cārvāka arguments, to quote them in an already versified form" (101).

The fact is that Śāntarakṣita often quotes from Kumārila and the present case may not be an exception. The other possibility is that both of them have taken the said verses from the same source. Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that Śāntarakṣita, like Dharmakīrti before him, had to reckon with opposition from all sides, orthodox Vedists and anti-Vedists.

The choice that the Lokāyata offers to the Buddhist at the end of his argument (v. 1870) is rather intriguing. Did the Lokāyata-s call their doctrine *nāstikatā*, or was it an appellation devised by the *āstika*-s themselves? Originally the two terms, *āstika* and *nāstika*, were coined to designate those who affirmed the existence of the other-world *(paraloka)* and those who denied it.[9] Later on they came to suggest many things, including 'theist' and 'atheist'.[10] In the given context, *nāstikatā* cannot mean atheism. The issue of debate is belief in rebirth and transmigration of cognition. So the word here can only mean: denial of the existence of cognition after one's death.

The Lokāyata asserts the basic materialist tenets as they developed in ancient India, viz. (a) the primacy of body over cognition, (b) everything in the world, including the body, consists of four material substances, earth, air, fire and water, (c) consciousness is produced from or manifested by certain material substances. As to the last item Kamalaśīla tells us that there were two different approaches to the aphorism, "From them (the material substances), consciousness". Two sets of commentators supplied two different verbs to complete the sentence. "Some said 'Consciousness is produced' and others, 'Consciousness is manifested'."[11] This is important inasmuch as the existence of at least two commentaries on the *Cārvākasūtra* (now lost) is thereby attested. (Prabhācandra, an eleventh-century Jain writer, also corroborates this view).[12]

Before examining the Lokāyata as a doctrine Śāntarakṣita has controverted the Cārvāka view on inference in Ch.18. This chapter is devoted to the refutation of the views of many known (and a few unknown) philosophers whose concepts of inference differ from that of the Yogācāra Buddhists.

[9] See Vāmana-Jayāditya, *Kāśikā* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 4.4.60.

[10] Manu describes a *nāstika* as the reviler of the *Veda* (2. 11). See also the views of his commentators on 3. 150; 4. 30; 4.163; 8.22 and 11.67, which mostly agree with those of the grammarians. For other views see Hopkins, 86.

[11] Comments on v. 1858 (Varanasi ed., 633-34).

[12] *PKM*, 116-17; *NKC*, 342.

Śāntarakṣita first takes up the concept of one Pātrasvāmin[13] (vv.1363-18) and refutes it at length (vv. 1379-1436). He then proceeds to deal with Uddyotakara (v. 1438), Aviddhakarṇa the Naiyāyika (different from his namesake, the Lokāyatika) (v. 1439), Kumārila (vv. 1442-44) —the verses are directly quoted from *Ślokavārtika*, Inference, Section 5, vv. 141-43— and 'some others' *(kecana*, Kamalaśīla explains that they refer to 'the Bārhaspatya and others') (vv. 1455-58). Śāntarakṣita then controverts Bhartṛhari (vv.1459-61), quoting *VP*, I. 32-34. Next comes the issue of 'Inference for the sake of others' (*parārthānumāna*) (vv. 1462-66, refuted in v. 1467) and the refutation of corroborative inference (cited by the opposition in v. 1456) and of the view expressed in v. 1458 (vv. 1468-70 and 1471-73 respectively). Then he sets out to refute the views of Bhartṛhari and others (1474-80). Suddenly he goes back to tackle Purandara (vv. 1481-83) and finally presents and refutes the view of Aviddhakarṇa the Lokāyatika in a couple of verses (vv. 1484-85). There ends the chapter.

The name of Purandara, a Cārvāka philosopher, is found elsewhere as an author of a *sūtra*-work and its commentary.[14] Kamalaśīla quotes a line presumably from the commentary *(vṛtti)* which gives a lie to the calumny that the Cārvāka-s reject all inference as a means of right knowledge. Purandara says: "The Cārvāka-s, too, admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]."[15] In other words, the Cārvāka-s are prepared to accept inference in so far as it relates to mundane matters, verified or verifiable by perception.[16] But when the limit is extended to include such unseen and invisible 'objects' as the ephemeral or imperishable soul, God, the other-world *(paraloka)*, etc., the Cārvāka-s refuse to admit the validity of such inferences based on scripture or logical jugglery. Jayantabhaṭṭa, too, refers to this distinction, although instead of attributing it to

[13] Nothing is known about this philosopher. H. Potter does not even mention his name in his monumental *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. I). Sanghvi considers Pātrasvāmin to be a Jain philosopher (1941), reprinted in the Varanasi ed. of *TUS*, Appendix, 30.

[14] See Pupphadanta, *Mahāpurāṇa*, 20. 18. 9 ab, I: 328 (refers to a *Pauraṃdariya vitti*); *SVR*, 265 (refers to a *Pauraṅdaraṃ sūtram*).

[15] *TSP*, II: 528 (on *TS*, vv. 1481-82).

[16] This is how the *NS* defines inference in 1.1.5. After defining perception in 1.1.4, it says: inference is preceded by it [i.e., perception].

Purandara, he obliquely refers to 'the better learned ones'[17] *(suśikṣitatarāḥ)*. He writes as follows:

> Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they may not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of the probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians.

The same interpretation of the Cārvāka view regarding inference is found in a philosophical digest, *SMS*, and *TRD*.[18]In our own times, no less a scholar than Pandit Sukhlaji Sanghvi has also explained the Cārvāka position in the same way.[19]

In spite of all this, some opponents of materialism have consistently and persistently distorted the Cārvāka view. Frauwallner could not deny what Purandara had said. However, he claimed that the later Cārvāka-s had deserted their original position by admitting inference.[20] He did not mention that even Purandara did not admit inference in all matters (e.g. the extrasensory) and the primacy of perception continued to be the basic position of all later Cārvāka-s like Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa.

It is in connection with Purandara's views that Kamalaśīla refers to a work called *Tattvaṭīkā* by Aviddhakarṇa. Kamalaśīla also mentions the arguments that the Cārvāka-s employ to prove why inference cannot be regarded as a means of right cognition.[21] It should also be noted that Śāntarakṣita crosses swords with a number of philosophers who accept the validity of inference but are also conscious of its shortcomings. Uddyotakara and Kumārila are the most prominent among his opponents. Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa, too, did not deny the validity of inference in common usage *(lokavyvahāra)*. So it is unfair to represent them as belonging to a school of phi-

[17] *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 184; *C/L*, 140.

[18] *SMS*, 15; *TRD*, 306. The Avacūrṇi on the same text echoes Guṇaratna (508).

[19] Prastāvanā to his edition of Hemacandra's *PM* (1961) 4. See also his article mentioned in n13 above, 23-24.

[20] 1956, Band II: S. 296: Trans. 225. More recently Franco and Preisendanz have also treated Purandara and others as revisionists in *REP* (VI: 180).

[21] Comments on *TS*, vv. 1458 and 1484 (521, 529).

losophy which accepted only one means of right knowledge (viz. perception) as the Vaiyākaraṇa-s believed in *āgama*, the Vedas, and in nothing else, not even perception. In fact the grammarians alone can be labelled unconditionally as 'anti-inference', for they state in so many words why inference is not acceptable to them.[22] Jayantabhaṭṭa, Vācaspatimiśra, Śīlāṅka, and Vādidevasūri quoted Bhartṛhari and glibly attributed the idea (rejection of inference as such) to the Cārvāka-s.[23] Apparently they could not locate any Cārvāka aphorism or even a floating verse *(ābhāṇaka* or *lokagāthā)* in support of their attribution.

It is also of interest to note that Kamalaśīla himself writes elsewhere that the grammarians are of the opinion that inference cannot be accepted as a means of valid knowledge since there is a possibility of error.[24] In his *Pañjikā*, however, he attributes the same statement, *nānumānaṃ pramāṇam*, to "the Bārhaspatya and others."[25]

The fourth chapter of the *TS*, dealing with *svabhāva* (own being) is taken by some to refer to the Cārvāka philosophy.[26] This, I contend, is based on sheer misunderstanding. One cannot fail to notice that there is no reference to any Lokāyata work or author either in the text or in the commentary on this chapter. Nor do the *TS* and *TSP* refer to the doctrine of *svabhāva* in Chs. 18 and 22. As a matter of fact, although *svabhāvavāda* is a very ancient doctrine, mentioned side by side with those of Time *(kāla)*, Destiny *(niyati)*. Accident *(yadṛcchā)*, etc.,[27] it is never identified with the Lokāyata before the sixth century when *svabhāvavāda* was already a 'lost philosophy'.[28] Even by the eighth century, *svabhāvavāda*

[22] *VP*, Brahmakhaṇḍa, vv. 32ff.

[23] For further details see Ch. 8 above.

[24] *Nyāyabindu-pūrvapakṣa-saṃkṣepa*. *Peking Tanjur*, f. 115 a 6, restored to Sanskrit from the Tibetan version by Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan. I am indebted to Dr Sadhukhan for drawing my attention to this passage and permitting me to refer to his as-yet-unpublished restoration of the work (MS 17).

[25] Comments on v. 1455. Cf. comments on v. 2968: "The Lokāyatika says, 'Perception is the (only) means of knowledge, not inference'."

[26] D. Chattopadhyaya has included both Chs. 4 and 22 in his anthology, *C/L*.

[27] *Śv. Up.*, 1.2.

[28] Randle says: "Some of these 'lost philosophies' (so to speak) were probably fathered by Brahmanical tradition on the *Lokāyata* or *Cārvāka* school and some of them are possibly to be found in the strange assortment of doctrine reviewed in [*NS* 4.1]". 16 n3.

came to mean two diametrically opposite views: (a) one that denied the existence of any creator-God but affirmed the laws of nature as the first cause *(jagatkāraṇa)* and the only determining factor in the universe (thereby admitting causality of a sort) and (b) the other denied the existence of both creator-God and causality; the universe, according to it, was ruled by chance-accident.[29] Amalānanda and Guṇaratna treat the doctrines of *svabhāva* and *yadṛcchā* as two opposite views whereas the Buddhists and Naiyāyika-s represent *svabhāva* as one of the many forms of accidentalism.[30]

In view of all this, we may safely disregard *TS*, Ch.4 in our analysis of the Cārvāka as represented in the *TS*.

To sum up, then: we are indebted to both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla for providing us with (a) the names of three Cārvāka philosophers, Aviddhakarṇa, Kambalāśvatara and Purandara,[31] (b) some extracts from their works,[32] (c) the name of Aviddhakarṇa's commentary,[33] and (d) no fewer than eleven fragments from the *Cārvāka-* or *Paurandara-sūtra* (although two of them denying the validity of inference as such are of dubious authenticity).[34] Of these eleven fragments two are not encountered anywhere else.[35] It is from the *TS* and *TSP* that we come to know that the contradiction between the Cārvāka-s and the Yogācāra Buddhists lay mainly in the issue of rebirth, and hence in admitting the separable existence of the cognition apart from the body. It

[29] Kamalaśīla in his comment on *TS*, v. 110 refers to these two schools or *svabhāvavādin*-s. V.M. Bedekar says, "The distinction tends to be metaphysical and abstract" (11 n46). Not quite, for by denying even *svabhāva* as the cause the distinction between *svabhāvavāda* and *yadṛcchāvāda* (accidentalism) was blurred by the second school. See Ch. 2, n30 above.

[30] See *Kalpataru* on *BS*, 2.1.33; *SDS*, Ch. 1:13 ff. The identification of *svabhāvavāda* with the Lokāyata is not encountered before the tenth century (Utpalabhaṭṭa in his commentary on Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, 1.7), although such a view is implied in a sixth-century commentary on *SK* v. 61 (translated into Chinese by Paramārtha). See Bedekar, 10 n45. See also *NS*, 4.1.22-24.

[31] See *TS*, v. 1863 (Kambalāśvatara), *TSP* on v. 1481 (Purandara), *TSP* on v. 1484 (Aviddhakarṇa).

[32] See above and *TSP* on vv. 1456-58.

[33] *TSP* on v. 1458.

[34] See *TSP* on vv. 1857-58, 1859, 1868-70, 1871-73, 1938-40, 1945 and vv. 1455, 2968.

[35] The one concerning the other-world (quoted in *TSP* on vv. 1871-73) and the other on remembrance of previous birth (*TSP* on v. 1945). The fragments may have been taken from some commentary (or commentaries) of the *Cārvākasūtra*.

also highlights the unique position of the Cārvāka in Indian thought. This was the only school that refused to accept the dogma of the transmigration of the soul which the two other heterodox schools, viz. Jains and Buddhists, did not deny.

Postscript

It may be rewarding to compare *TS*, v. 1862 with what Bhāvaviveka presumably quotes (or paraphrases) from a Cārvāka work in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakaśāstra*, 16.1: "The dying consciousness of Devadatta is not recognized by another consciousness because the consciousness is about to die, as the dying consciousness of the *arhat*."[36] Namai has included the passage as a Cārvāka saying in his compilation of Cārvāka fragments.[37] Franco notes: "This Cārvāka syllogism has been repeatedly referred to and criticized by Buddhist authors upto Ratnakīrti [fl. 1070] and Mokṣakaragupta [fl. 1100]. Until now the fragment [quoted above] has been considered anonymous, but I would like to attribute it, at least as a working hypothesis, to Kambalāśvatara."[38]

I have no objection to this hypothesis but would only like to point out that besides Kambalāśvatara, several commentators on the *Cārvākasūtra* were already there when Kamalaśīla wrote his *TSP* (See his comments on *TS*, v. 1864: *kecid vṛttikārāḥ* [...] *anye)*. Anyone of them might have been the author of this fragment.

[36] Bhāvaviveka, *PrPr*, in *MŚ*, II: 3.

[37] Namai (1976), 44, marked F3. Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan, to whom I am indebted for the English translation from the Tibetan passage quoted in this postscript, points out that the Tibetan word *ñin mstams* as printed in Namai's article should be *ñin mtshams*. Franco (1997), 116 also suggests the same (although instead of *ñin* mstams as found in Namai he quotes *ñin* mtsams, which may very well be a printing mistake).

[38] Franco (1997), 116.

XII
Jayantabhaṭṭa's Representation of the Cārvāka: A Critique

The *NM* of Jayantabhaṭṭa is a seminal work of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy. The author was a staunch opponent of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata and missed no opportunity of reviling it in the strongest possible terms. One of his favourite abuses employed against his adversaries is *varāka*, 'wretched'. On one occasion he remarks: "But in such kind of assemblies (discussing philosophical questions), who would indeed care to remember the (name of the) wretched Cārvākas?"[1] He always mentions the Cārvāka-s in a tone of derision and his attempts are directed to the refutation of the materialist tenets as they developed in India, viz.

a. bhūtacaitanyavāda (the doctrine of consciousness arising out of matter).

b. śarīrātmavāda or *dehātmavāda* (the doctrine of the self as something inseparable from the body, i.e., there can be no self independent of the body).[2]

The Cārvāka-s are made to appear as an opponent *(pūrvapakṣin)* in relation to a third question, viz.

[1] *GrBh*, Ch. 3, I: 299; *C/L*, 157. Hemacandra also employs the same adjective: *varaṃ varākaścārvāko yo 'sau prakaṭanāstikaḥ*, *YŚ*, 2.38, f. 96b. See also Ch. 14 nn25-26 below.

[2] See *NM*, Ch. 7. II: 201-02, 214-17; *C/L*, 110-25.

c. whether or not inference (*anumāna*) is to be admitted as a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*).[3]

Here, too, Jayanta ridicules the Cārvāka-s who allegedly do not recognize any other means of valid knowledge except perception (*pratyakṣa*). It is in this connection that he refers to the well-learned (*suśikṣita*) and cunning (*dhūrta*) Cārvāka-s.[4] These two adjectives gave rise to the idea that there were at least two schools of the Cārvāka-s. This view has been accepted uncritically by almost all historians and analysts of Indian philosophy.[5]

There are reasons to believe that in many respects Jayanta has misrepresented the Cārvāka and misled generations of scholars in their comprehension of materialisim.

Before going into a detailed critique of Jayanta's polemics against the Cārvāka-s a few more facts may be mentioned. First, he was also the author of a philosophical play in five acts called *ĀD*.[6] Admittedly a closet play, it contains (in Act 3) the same sort of misrepresentation and refutation of the Cārvāka as is found in the *NM*. He did not add anything new in the play. It is a mere rehash.

Second, Jayanta refers to a number of aphorisms purportedly of Cārvāka origin. Most of them are mentioned elsewhere, both before and after his work was composed. However, there are two aphorisms that are found in the *NM* alone. They are as follows:

1. Religious act is not to be performed (*dharmo na kāryaḥ*).
2. Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon (*tad upadeśeṣu na pratyetavyam*).[7]

It is rather strange that these two fragments, existing in print since 1895,[8] escaped the notice of D.R. Shastri and Namai.[9]

Now to the critique of Jayanta. His representation of the two basic tenets of materialism, viz. the primacy of matter over consciousness and non-existence of the self without the body (the self being neither imperishable nor perennial) suffers from oversimplification. It is one thing to say that the self cannot be separated from the body and another to say that the body and the self are one. Jayanta writes: "[T]he Laukāyatikas who deny that there is any 'other world' (*paraloka*) think that there is no self other than the body itself as 'endowed with consciousness' (*caitanyakhacita*)."[10]

The Cārvāka-s always insist on (a) the primacy of four natural elements, earth, air, fire and water, (b) a particular combination of these elements constituting the animal body, and (c) consciousness being produced or manifested from the living organism.[11] Jayanta, however, blurs all this and equates the self with the body.

It is interesting to note that the Laukāyatika-s are branded as those who deny the existence of the other-world. Jayanta is keen to refute them because he needs to establish the existence of the other-world. Not only Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all other systems of Indian philosophy (except the Cārvāka, of course), whether orthodox (pro-Vedic) or heterodox (anti-Vedic), including the Buddhists and the Jains, hold the other-world and whatever that entails (rebirth, etc.) to be their chief article of faith. We shall see afterwards that Jayanta has a stake in establishing the existence of the imperishable self and its transmigration from one body to another. The Cārvāka-s' refusal to accept this constitutes the chief obstacle without overcoming which he cannot reach the more important issue, viz. the validity of inference as an independent means of knowledge. When he comes to deal with the issue of inference he falls prey to confusion and makes contradictory statements. For example, at first he declares that according to the Cārvāka-s "there is only one kind of *pramāṇa* which is perception (*pratyakṣa*)."[12] A few pages after he writes: "The Cārvākas, the well-learned ones (*suśikṣita*) say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of *pramāṇa*(s)."[13] Elsewhere he says: "According to the Cārvāka-s, inference is not a *pramāṇa* at all."[14] But then again he refers to 'the better learned ones' (*suśikṣitatarāḥ*, presumably the Cārvāka-s again) who say that there are two

[3] *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 175-84; *C/L*, 128-41.

[4] *NM*, Ch. 1, I: 52,100; *C/L* 154-55.

[5] One of the few execptions to this trend has been D. Chattopadhyaya (1989), 55-56. He refers to M.K. Gangopadhyaya (1984), 31-32. More recently Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz have accepted Cakradhara's identification of *suśikṣitacārvāka* and *cārvākadhūrta* as Udbhaṭa. See "Materialism, Indian School of", *REP*, VI: 179.

[6] See *ĀD*, Act 3.

[7] *NM*, Ch. 4, I: 388; *C/L*, 157.

[8] The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 10, is the *editio princeps* of the work.

[9] For details see Ch. 8 n9 above.

[10] *NM*, Ch. 7, II: 201; *C/L*, 110.

[11] Regarding the diversity of views, viz., 'produced' or 'manifested', see Ch. 8 n49 above.

[12] *NM*, Ch. 1, II: 43; *C/L*, 154.

[13] *NM*, Ch. 1, II: 52, 100; *C/L*, 154-55.

[14] *NM*, Ch. 7, II: 201; *C/L*, 111.

kinds of inference, "some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself" *(utpannapratīti)* and "some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on somebody else's advice) (*utpādyapratīti*)".[15]

Apparently Jayanta means to suggest that, according to them, the former kind is valid but the latter kind is not. He then explains which inferences are admitted by them and which are not. He writes:

> The inferences of God and the like are ones in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on others' advice). Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they may not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after-world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of the probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians.[16]

That 'the better learned ones' cannot but be the Cārvāka-s is borne out by what Purandara says regarding inference:

> The Carvākā-s too admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference (by some) transgressing the worldly way is prohibited (by them).[17]

Instead of declaring a blanket ban on inference as such, the Cārvāka-s, it appears, have no objection to inference in the affairs of daily life. Their opponents like Jayanta, however, make them deny even this limited validity of inference. In two consecutive verses Jayanta writes:

> Even ordinary people like a woman, a child, a cowherd or a ploughman determine, beyond doubt, the presence of one object from the presence of another object which has an invariable relation with the former.
> If the validity of inference is denied, (perception would he the only source of valid knowledge). But the everyday life of people in general cannot be carried on with the help of

[15] *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 184; *C/L*, 140.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Qtd. in *TSP*, II: 528 (on *TS*, Ch. 18, vv. 1481-82). For others confirming this view see Ch. 8 above. See also Sanghavi's Hindi article (1941) reprinted as an appendix in *TUS* (1987), particularly pp. 23-24.

> perception alone, and hence, the world would have been as motionless as a figure drawn in a picture.[18]

Then he adds (in prose):

> Even in the case of objects which are being perceived, common people apply the probans 'it is of the same nature' (as previously produced pleasure or pain) in respect of them, and thus determine them (by inference) to be either a cause of pleasure or a cause of pain, and accordingly, take them up or avoid them.[19]

Thus Jayanta criticizes and refutes the Cārvāka-s by making them deny what they never denied! *Lokavyavahāra* (common usage) is as much important to them as perception and perhaps it is in this sense that Udayana speaks of *lokavyavahārasiddha* (established by common usage) as the God *(bhagavān)* of the Cārvāka-s.[20] In fact, besides actual perception, the Cārvāka-s believe in nothing else except *lokavyavahārasiddha* and the worldly way *(laukikamārga)*. Jayarāśibhaṭṭa asserts the unavoidability of the worldly way by quoting two apophthegms: "The worldly way is to be followed [...]" and "As regards common usage the ignorant (lit. child) and the scholar are alike."[21]

As to the Cārvāka-s who, according to Jayanta, refused to accept any definite number of *pramāṇa*-s, we have only his words to go by. No other writer known to us has spoken of such a view and attributed it to the Cārvāka-s.

At this juncture a question automatically arises: if the Cārvāka-s were not averse to inference as such but only to such inferences as are employed to justify the existence of the self, God, an omniscient being, the other-world and so on, who exactly is Jayanta's adversary? Whom is he controverting in defence of inference?

[18] *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 179. Cf. *ĀḌ*, Act 3. 22, 62.
[19] Ibid, Cf. Vācaspatimiśra, *Bhāmatī* (on *BS*, 3.3.53-54), Varanasi ed., 852, in which he satirizes the Cārvāka as being 'more beastly than a beast'. See *C/L*, 243.
[20] *NK*, 1.2, 5. The word, *lokavyavahāra*, has been interpreted by others to suggest (a) idols of gods and goddesses, and (b) king. But in my opinion, 'common usage' suits the context better. See Ch. 13 below. Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, contrasts *lokaprasiddhahetu* (probans well-established in the world) with *tantrasiddhahetu* (probans established by scripture). Udbhaṭa also uses the term *lokavyavahāra* along with *bhūyodarśana* (repeated observation) in his novel commentary on a Cārvāka aphorism. See *SVR*, 266.
[21] *TUS*, 1. For a detailed discussion of these two apophthegms see Franco (1994), 43-44, 68-69.

The answer is obvious. The true opponent is Bhartṛhari, the founder of the philosophical system of the grammarians. There is no other system in the history of Indian philosophy that denies the validity of all means of knowledge excepting verbal testimony, more particularly, the authority of the Vedas. It is, therefore, not surprising that Jayanta, while presenting the alleged view of the Cārvāka-s on inference, quotes three verses from the *VP* in both *NM* and *ĀḌ* without, however, mentioning their source. They run as follows:

> It has, thus, been said that since various things differ in their powers (*śakti*) due to the change of circumstances, time, space, and the like, it is hardly possible to determine the things (in their true nature) by inference. When a blind person hurries on in an uneven path, mainly depending upon inferences by the touch of hands, etc., he stumbles down, not infrequently, on the ground. An object may be determined (to be of a particular nature) with an inference carefully formulated, by persons who are quite adept in the art of inference; still the same may be described to be of a quite different nature by others who are more learned.[22]

All this makes it abundantly clear that there was no authentic Cārvāka aphorism or even any verse *(ābhāṇaka/lokagāthā)* that could be cited in support of the deliberate misrepresentation of the Cārvāka view on inference. Hence this unjust resort to the *VP.* I have deliberately used the word 'deliberate' for Jayanta was doubtless aware of the true Cārvāka view regarding perception and inference. Perhaps this is why, while representing it in another section of the work, he does not refer to the Cārvāka-s by their true name but resorts to the ironical appellation, *suśikṣitatarāḥ,* 'the better learned ones'.[23]

Why does Jayanta try so hard to establish the status of inference as an independent means of knowledge on a par with perception? Why does he consider it necessary to prove that inference is as much a primary means of knowledge as perception? The Cārvāka-s, we have shown, have no objection to admitting inference in so far as it concerns perceptible matters, like fire from smoke. But they draw the line there. At the

[22] *NM,* Ch. 2, I: 177, 179 quoting *VP,* 1.31, 42, 34 (in this order). See *VP* (1966), 88-89, 98; *ĀḌ,* Act 3. 15-17, 59. For others who have quoted Bhartṛhari while refuting the Cārvāka-s, see Ch. 8 n33 above. M.K. Gangopadhyaya (1984) noted some of these earlier.

[23] *NM,* Ch. 2, I: 184; *C/L,* 140. See also *NM,* Ch.7, II: 256-57. In the last instance Jayanta indirectly refers to Udbhaṭa.

same time, they do not believe that any invariable relation can be established between two events on the basis of mere observation. They affirm that the means of valid knowledge must be primary *(agauṇa).* Since inference is to be preceded by perception as *NS,* 1.1.5 states categorically, it is at best a secondary *(gauṇa)* means of knowing things.

Now the problem with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s is that the existence of God, the other-world, etc. cannot be proved by means of perception; scriptural authority and inference drawn from authoritative statements have to be resorted to. The existence of God is established by the following inference: Everything that is an effect has a maker, so the earth, etc., too, must have a maker. But the existence of the other-world is more important to them. As Jayanta says: "The reply to (the objections to the admission of God raised by) the Bārhaspatyas would simply be the establishment of *paraloka.*" And Cakradhara elucidates: "When *paraloka* is established, their (sc. the Cārvākas') objections are automatically rejected."[24]

How to establish the other-world? *Āgama* (scripture) is the sole resort. This is why Vātsyāyana defines *anvīkṣā* in this peculiar way:

> The inference (*anumāna*) which is not contradicted by perception *and scripture* is called *anvīkṣā,* that is knowing over again (*anu,* literally 'after') of that which is already known (*īkṣita*) by perception *and scripture...* The inference which is contradicted by either perception *or scripture* is pseudo-*nyāya.*[25] (Emphasis added)

This is flying in the face of what *NS,* 1.1.5 says: "Next [is discussed] inference *(anumāna)* which is preceded by it *(tatpūrvaka)* (i.e. by perception) [...]".[26] There is not the slightest hint of scripture here. Jayanta, too, has to uphold the view of *anvīkṣā* as proposed by Vātsyāyana in order to establish the existence of the other-world.

I may now attempt to clarify what Jayanta means by *suśikṣitacārvāka* and *cārvāka-dhūrta,* the well-learned and the cunning Cārvāka-s. On the basis of these references some have conceived two schools of the Cārvāka-s. It should be remembered that no scholium on the *NM* was available to them. Now that

[24] *NM,* Ch. 3, I: 275; *C/L,* 156.

[25] Vātsyāyana on *NS,* 1.1.1. I quote from the translation by M.K. Gangopadhyaya (1982), 4.

[26] Ibid., 17.

the *GrBh* by Cakradhara has been published.[27] we are in a better position to judge whether Jayanta could mean anything of that sort. Cakradhara identifies both the 'well-learned Cārvāka-s' and the 'cunning Cārvāka' as referring to Udbhaṭa and others.[28] This, I believe, may very well be true. Jayanta was prone to ridicule his opponents by using such ironical appellations. For example, he employed the term, *suśikṣita* to designate the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka-s twice in *NM*.[29]

The name of Udbhaṭa is well attested. Vādidevasūri also quotes from his work and refers to him quite respectfully.[30] There was another Udbhaṭa, a rhetorician (some have identified the two as the same person although there is no evidence to support it). Kahlaṇa refers to one Udbhaṭa who was a minister of Jayāpīḍa, king of Kashmir in the eighth century.[31] In any case, there is no reason to doubt the historicity of Udbhaṭa (as Chattopadhyaya does).[32]

Jayanta further criticizes the Cārvāka-s on the following ground:

> In the Lokāyata view, no precept is indeed (positively) prescribed. It is only the assertions of a *vaitaṇḍika* (representing merely the destructive criticism of others). It is not really a body of precepts.[33]

This is a rather strange assessment. Jayanta himself notes a probable objection to this assertion and refutes it as follows:

> But then, there it has been (positively) prescribed: "live in pleasure as long as you live". No. The fact being naturally established, a prescription in this regard becomes useless. (It is not a prescription at all).

[27] N.J. Shah (ed.), is the *editio princeps*. It has been reprinted in *NM* (1982-84).

[28] See: *NM*, Ch.1, I: 52, 100. See also n23 above.

[29] *NM*, Ch. 3, I: 249; Ch. 5, II: 4.

[30] *SVR*, 764. For all references to Udbhaṭa, see E.A. Solomon (1977-78), 985-92.

[31] See V. Raghavan (ed.), *NCC*, II: 341, referring to *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, IV. 495; *NM*, I: Introduction, (8); *C/L*, 155. Interestingly enough, the rhetorician Udbhaṭa along with Bhāmaha has often been called *cirantana* (S.N. Dasgupta and S.K. De, I: 534 n1) whereas Cakardhara distinguishes Ubdhaṭa from the *cirantana-cārvākācārya*-s such as Bhāvivikta (*NM*, Ch. 7, II: 257).

[32] D. Chattopadhyaya (1993), 70 (misprinted as 86). He doubts whether Jayanta knew of any Udbhaṭa at all.

[33] *NM*, Ch. 4, II: 388; *C/L*, 157. The two extracts that follow are quoted from the same source.

> As to the instructions "Religious act is not to be performed", "Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon," etc., (it is to be noted that) they are not really proper instructions, for the Lokāyata doctrine is based only upon such statements as represent the viewpoint of the opponent (*pūrvapakṣa-vacana*). Thus there are subsequent Brāhmaṇa statements replying (to the previous ones): "Well, I am not preaching ignorance. This self is indeed indestructible. It only has a connection with the senses, etc. (The self is not born; it can only have connection with newer senses, etc.)".[34]

On the basis of all this Jayanta dismisses the Lokāyata out of hand:

> Thus due to its being based upon statements representing only the viewpoint of the opponent, the doctrine of the Lokāyata is also not an independent one; and because it is contradicted by later statements, it is not to be taken into account.

It is very odd that Jayanta who most probably possessed the book of Cārvāka aphorisms (now lost) as well as at least one commentary on it (composed by Udbhaṭa) would deny the existence of anything positive in the Cārvāka philosophy. The Cārvāka-s, of course, abide by the materialist conception of nature and man. Hence, they have nothing to do with any religious duty to ensure their passage to heaven or attaining final liberation from the cycle of rebirth. Quite naturally they forbid people to follow the instructions of priests and gurus. But this should not make one blind to the fact that these apparently negative instructions were firmly rooted in certain positive views of nature and man, e.g., the four elements are the fundamental principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced, and when these are destroyed intelligence at once perishes also.[35]

Second, it is highly doubtful whether the Cārvāka-s ever quoted any passage from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads or ever drew sustenance from those texts.[36] On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that the authors of the Upaniṣads were controverting the views of some pre-Cārvāka materialists.[37]

[34] Jayanta here quotes from *Bṛ.Up.*, 4.5.13.

[35] These are the basic tenets of the Cārvāka quoted by many opponents in their works as well as in all digests of philosophy. See e.g., *SDS*, Ch. 1 (*C/L*, 247-57).

[36] *S-M*, too, says that the Cārvāka-s quote the *śruti* in support of their contentions and cites *Bṛ.Up.*, 2.4.12. See *C/L*, 248.

[37] The *asura* view found in the *Mai.Up.* and the *Gītā* as well as in the

Third, the Cārvāka-s never claim to have anything to do with the Vedas. They refuse to believe in the veracity of scriptural precepts unless they are verifiable by sense-perception. They are not at all eager to be counted as 'the sheep'.

In order to understand Jayanta's refusal to admit the Cārvāka-s, we have to look at the context of these remarks. A question has been raised (presumably by some fellow Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) whether or not the precepts of the Lokāyata and others should be considered valid in view of the fact that they, too, are based on Vedic statements.[38] Earlier Jayanta has shown catholicity by declaring that all precepts based on the Vedas are to be considered valid. He, however, is not prepared to be so catholic as to entertain the view of the more liberal ones. It is, therefore, necessary for him to prove that the Cārvāka-s are basically anti-Vedic —a fact that the Cārvāka-s never deny! What Jayanta is doing here is merely disabusing some liberals of the notion that the precepts of the Cārvāka-s, too, have their roots in the Vedas. In order to do so, he has to go to the extent of denying the existence of anything positive in the Cārvāka view.

I have intentionally ignored all passages in which Jayanta simply takes a fling at the Cārvāka-s who, according to him, 'are only to be thrown away' (i.e. refuted).[39] He also adds a rhetorical question: "Therefore, where is the scope for enumerating their very insignificant logic (*kṣudra tarka*) in this list of *vidyāsthāna*?"[40] Yet the fact remains that he has to spend much ink in defence of the disembodied self and the validity of inference independent of perception.

To sum up then: Jayanta in his polemics against the Cārvāka-s does not help us to reconstruct the basic tenets of ancient Indian materialism. On the contrary, he has misrepresented the Cārvāka view on inference. Being a staunch theist, he had no alternative but to controvert the Cārvāka-s. However, the way he has done it makes him appear as a debator who is not loath to resort to *jalpa* and *chala*, manoeuvre and intentional distortion. Although the *NM* since its first publication has been treated as a major source for the reconstruction of

Ch. and the *BṛUp.*-s. may very well be related to some ancient materialist thinkers. See D. Chattopadhyaya (1973), 42-48. See also his study of Uddālaka in (1991), II: 98-148. For a bird's-eye view of the freethinkers mentioned in the *Mbh*, see Hopkins, 86-90.

[38] *NM*, Ch. 4, I: 387-388; *C/L*, 175.

[39] *NM*, Ch. 1, I: 9; *C/L*, 154.

[40] Ibid.

the Cārvāka view, Jayanta's polemical zeal and fideistic bias make his exposition of the Cārvāka even less reliable than Śaṅkara's. Śaṅkara does not distort the Cārvāka view while crossing swords with it. He, too, has a very low opinion of the Cārvāka-s whom he brackets with 'the unlearned people'.[41] But he does not go to the extent of misrepresenting the doctrine. This is precisely what Jayanta does.

Postscript

Jayanta writes: "The Cārvāka-s, the well-learned ones, say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of *pramāṇa*-s" (Ch. 1, I: 52).

The same statement is attributed 'to the cunning Cārvāka' who cites certain forms of valid knowledge which cannot be said to be produced by the accepted *pramāṇa*-s like perception, etc. Jayanta then sets out to refute such a view by referring to "the ascetic (*tapasvī*), though he is adept in inventing such instances of awareness, does not really know the nature of either perception or inference." Jayanta concludes his refutation with the following observation: "Therefore, the *nāstika*-s, not having enough intelligence to determine the power of the *pramāṇa*-s have been clamouring in vain that in the case of *pramāṇa*-s there is no specific rule as to the number." (ibid., 100ff).

No Cārvāka aphorism known to us speaks of the indeterminability of the number of *pramāṇa*-s. On the contrary, the Cārvāka-s have been accused of being *pramāṇaikavādin*-s, i.e., they professed only one sort of *pramāṇa*, viz. perception. Wherefrom did Jayanta learn about the Cārvāka-s propounding indeterminability of *pramāṇa*-s?

The answer, I believe, is to be found in the mysterious identity of the 'ascetic' (apparently used satirically). Cakradhara tells us that Jayanta meant Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa and others (*udbhaṭādayaḥ*) when he applied such ironical and insulting adjectives as *suśikṣita* and *dhūrta* respectively. Udbhaṭa is known to have denied the traditional Cārvāka view that the number of elements is four and four only (see Comm. 16 in Ch. 6 above). It is possible, but by no means certain, that Udbhaṭa was also the progenitor of the view that the number and definition of pramāṇa cannot be specifically stated.

[41] *ŚBh.* on *BS*, 1.1.1, 82; *C/L*, 234.

The source, I presume, was Udbhaṭa's commentary on the *Cārvākasūtra*. In any case Udbhaṭa was a 'revisionist' among the later Cārvāka-s and his odd interpretation of some *Cārvākasūtra*-s is not to be accepted as representative of the original Cārvāka view.

XIII
What Does Udayana Mean by lokavyavahārasiddha iti cārvākāḥ?

At the beginning of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* Udayana, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher, in his endeavour to prove the existence of God, declares all men to be theists at heart. Every school of philosophers and even non-philosophers like the craftsmen, he says, believe in Him in some form or the other, notwithstanding the difference in calling Him by various appellations. By way of example he refers to the Cārvāka-s who, according to him, consider 'What is established in the worldly practice' to be their God (*lokavyavahārasiddha iti cārvākāḥ*).[1]

Commentators have tended to explain the term, *lokavyavahāra* in two ways. Varadarājamiśra, the earliest known scholiast, offers two alternatives: (i) the visible king and the like, or (ii) idols of gods in the form of having four arms.[2]

He is followed by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa and T. Vīrarāghavācārya Śiromaṇi.[3] Four other commentators,

[1] Prose section following *kārikā* 1.2.

[2] *lokavyavahārasiddhaḥ rājādidṛśyamānaścaturbhujādirūpā pratimā vā.* Varadarāja, 4.

[3] *lokavyavahāreti, yathā loke vyavahriyate caturbhujādyupeta dehavān īśvara na tvadṛśya iti tathā. athavā lokavyavahārasiddhaḥ rājā 'lokasiddho rājā parameśvara 'ityukteḥ.* Kāmākhyānātha, 8; *prajāpālakamahārājarūpeṇa vā ālayādiṣvabhi-manyamānapratimādirūpeṇa vā vilakṣaṇaprabhāvaśāliśrīrāma kṛṣṇādirūpeṇa vā.* Vīrarāghavācārya, 5.

viz., Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, Śaṅkaramiśra and Guṇānanda Vidyāsāgara, mention only the second interpretation.[4] The point they wish to make is that one needs a visible entity for one's god, not an invisible one.

When does a commentator offer two or more alternatives in interpreting a word or a passage in the text? Instead of digressing into a long excursus, the question may be answered briefly as follows: If a commentator finds several interpretations equally appropriate to the context and/or equally logical but is not sure which of them corresponds to the author's intention, he records all the possible ones. In short, alternatives betray uncertainty in the mind of the commentator himself.

In this case, why some later commentators opted for one interpretation only is not clear. Perhaps they found the other alternative inappropriate or redundant or both.

Whatever the case may be, I propose that both the interpretations are wide of the mark. *Lokavyāvahārasiddha* is a term used to distinguish between two kinds of probanses—the first actually seen and verifiable in everyday life, such as smoke from which one can and does infer the existence of fire, and the second which concerns unseen and unverifiable inferences regarding God, the other-world *(paraloka),* heaven and hell, etc. which have to be established with the authority of the scriptures. This is how Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa elucidates the difference between *lokaprasiddha* and *tantrasiddha hetu*-s.[5] Apparently, Udayana intends to suggest that the Cārvāka-s make

[4] *yathā loke vyavahriyate caturbhujādyupetadehavān, natvadṛśya ityarthaḥ.* Vardhamāna, 6; *lokavyavahārasiddhaḥ pratimādyākāraḥ,* Rāmabhadra, 7; *lokavyavahārasiddhaitipratimākāraityarthaḥ,*Śaṅkara, 8; *lokavyavahārasiddhaḥ caturbhujādiśarīraṃ tādṛśī pratimeti kecit.* Guṇānanda, 8.

[5] *yat tu tenaiva paramalokāyatammanyena* (sc. Udbhaṭena) lokavyavahāraikapakṣapātinā lokaprasiddhadhūmādyanumānāni *puraskṛtya* śāstrīyasvargādisādhakānumānāni *nirācikīrṣata* [...] lokaprasiddheṣvapi hetuṣu *vyabhicārādarśanamasti* tantrasiddheṣvapi *tena vyabhicārādarśanalakṣaṇaguṇasādharmyataḥ* tantrasiddhahetunāṃ *tathābhāvo vyavasthapyata.* Quoted in Vādidevasuri, *SVR*, 256-66. Even before Udbhaṭa, Purandara referred to the 'worldly way': lokaprasiddham anumānaṃ *cārvākair apīṣyata eva, yat tu kaiścit laukikaṃ mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate tan niṣidhyate.* Quoted by Kamalaśīla, *TSP*, II: 528. Other works by non-Cārvāka authors also refer to such 'inferences as tend to facilitate worldly activities' admitted by the Cārvāka-s. For example, *viśeṣaḥ punaścārvākair* lokayātrānirvāhaṇapravaṇaṃ dhūmādyanumānamiṣyate *kvacana na punaḥ svargā dṛṣṭādiprasādhakamalaukikamanumānamiti.* Guṇaratna, *TRD* on *ṢDSam*, v. 83, 306. The anonymous *Avacūrṇi* on the same text also contains the same sentence (508). (All emphases mine).

God out of their insistence on perception: whatever is not and cannot be perceived in this world is rejected by them.

Two maxims (*nyāya*) found in some philosophical works also uphold the importance of 'the worldly way' and 'worldly practice'. They run as follow: *laukiko mārgo 'nusartavyaḥ* and *lokavyavahāraṃ prati sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau.*[6] "The worldly way should be followed. As regards worldly practice, the ignorant (lit. child) and the scholar are similar."

It is well-known that even a world-denying philosophy like the Advaita Vedānta, with all its disavowals of the objectivity of the material world, has to speak of *vyāvahārikasattā* (practical existence) as the idealist Buddhists had thought of *saṃvṛti satya.*[7] As to everyday practice, no amount of philosophizing and logic-chopping can make one deny that food is required to satisfy hunger, water to quench thirst. This kind of everyday practice is followed by all, whether he is an ignorant man or a scholar.[8]

S-M in his presentation of the Cārvāka system refers to a saying, "The king, established in the world, is the supreme lord" *(lokasiddho rājā parameśvaraḥ* [...] *lokasiddho bhaved rājā pareśo nāparaḥ smṛtaḥ*).[9] What S-M has in mind is that, according to the Cārvāka-s, there is no invisible overlord: the king on earth is the only visible lord one can think of. The key-word is *lokasiddha,* as in the other two maxims mentioned above.

I therefore suggest that *lokavyavahārasiddha* in Udayana should be taken to mean "what is established in worldly practice, i.e., perceptible and hence followed by all in actual life".

[6] Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, *TUS*, 1 [68 in Franco (1994)], quotes both; Vyomaśiva quotes only the second, twice (II: 108, 172). On both occasions Vyomaśiva calls it a *nyāya*. D.R. Shastri and Mamoru Namai have accepted the second one as a Bārhaspatya aphorism (No. 54 and 41, B1 respectively). But see Franco (1994), 299 n4 and Intro., 43-44.

[7] See D. Chattopadhyaya (1964), 98-100.

[8] Franco, however, interprets the maxim in a quite different way in conformity with his thesis regarding Jayarāśi as a sceptic Lokāyatika. Matilal's reference to Sextus [quoted by Franco (1994), 43] is, in my opinion, misleading. The question is not of being active or inactive, but of accepting reality as reality, not as illusion, whatever one's philosophical view might be.

[9] *SDS* (1978), 6. The second extract is taken from the versified version following the prose statement.

XIV
Hemacandra on the Cārvāka: A Survey

Hemacandra, respectfully called *kalikālasarvajña* (the omniscient one of the Kali era), was not the first Jain author to write about the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Long before him Haribhadra had dealt with this system of philosophy in his *ṢDSam, SVS* and *LTN.* So had Siddharṣi in his *UBhPK.* However, some passages in Hemacandra's works contain something of special interest in connection with the Cārvāka.

A passage in the *AC* runs as follows:

syādvādavādyā"rhataḥ syāt śūnyavādī tu saugataḥ |
naiyāyikastvākṣapādo yaugaḥ sāṃkhyastu kāpilaḥ |
vaiśeṣikaḥ syādaulūkyo bārhaspatyastu nāstikaḥ ||
cārvāko laukāyatikaścaite ṣaḍapi tārkikāḥ |[1]

Hemacandra mentions six systems of philosophy:

1. Syādvādavādin or Ārhata (i.e. the Jain), 2. Śūnyavādin or Saugata (i.e. the Buddhist), 3. Naiyāyika or Ākṣapāda or Yauga,[2] 4. Sāṃkhya or Kāpila, 5. Vaiśeṣika or Aulūkya, and 6. Bārhaspatya or Nāstika or Cārvāka or Laukāyatika.[3]

[1] *AC,* 3.525-527.

[2] The use of the word, *yauga* (one who studies or knows Yoga), in this sense (instead of referring to the Pātañjala system of philosophy) is not unknown or unprecedented. See Tarkavāgīśa, I: xvii, 278-80.

[3] Not having access to Hemacandra's auto-commentary on *AC,* Colebrooke

Why Hemacandra excludes Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Yoga is rather puzzling. Haribhadra in his *ṢDSam* begins with a short exposition of the Buddhist system and proceeds to deal with Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jain, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Cārvāka. He too excludes Vedānta. But his inclusion of the Cārvāka seems to have been an afterthought. Having concluded the section on the doctrine of Jaimini (i.e. Mīmāṃsā), Haribhadra suddenly remembers that some scholars preferred to treat Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as a single system and, according to them, the number of the *āstikavādin*-s is five, not six (v. 78). So in order to maintain the magic number, six, he decided to fill in the gap with the Cārvāka (v. 79). Apparently, by the term, *āstikavādin* (affirmativist), Haribhadra means those systems of philosophy which believe in the existence of the other-world (*paraloka*).[4] Hence he includes the Buddhist and Jain systems in his list. Hemacandra seems to have followed Haribhadra in maintaining the number, six, and in excluding both Vedānta and Yoga. But his choice of six systems is markedly different. He speaks of six *tarka*-s (dialectical systems). The term is also found earlier in *NM* although they are not enumerated.[5] We are indebted to Rājaśekhara (fourteenth century CE) for the exposition of the six *tarka*-s. Rājaśekhara divides Ānvīkṣikī into two *pakṣa*-s (views, lit. sides). The *pūrvapakṣa* (exponent's view) comprises Arhat,

was mistaken in his interpretation of this passage. He said: "HEMACHANDRA... mentions and discriminates the various sects: viz. 1st, *Ārhatas*, or *Jainas*, 2dly, *Saugatas*, or *Bauddhas*, and, 3dly: six philosophical schools, viz. 1st. *Naiyāyica*; 2d. Yoga; 3d. CAPILAS [sic] *Sānchya*; 4th. Vaiśeshica; 5th. *Vārhaspatya* or *Nāstica*; and 6th. *Chārvāca* or *Locāyata*." [(1837), II: 219. The article was first published in *The Asiatic Researches*, Vol. IX, 1807].

Hemacandra, however, specifically explains that the schools, right from the Ārhata, are called *tārkika* (*ete ārhatādyaḥ, tarkaḥ prayojanameṣātārkikāḥ*). *AC*, 344. Colebrooke was presumably wrong in treating Yoga as a separate system and taking Bārhaspatya and Cārvāka as two distinct 'sects'. On this basis he concluded: "The two last (sc. his 5th and 6th) are reputed atheistical, as denying a future state and a providence. If those be omitted and the *Mimānśas* (sic) inserted, we have the six schemes of philosophy familiar to the Indian circle of the sciences" (Ibid., 219). Apparently he had only the *āstika* (affirmativist) systems in mind. Hemacandra, on the other hand, never mentions the Pātañjala Yoga, and although he mentions Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta elsewhere (e.g., *AYVD*, vv. 11-14), he does not do so in *AC*.

[4] For different meanings of *āstika* and *nāstika*, see, besides the standard dictionaries, Hopkins, 86-87.

[5] *NM*, Ch. 1, I: 9: *vaiśeṣikāḥ punarasmadanuyayina evetyevamasyāṃ janatāsu prasiddhāyamapi ṣaṭtarkyāmidameva tarkanyāyavistaraśabdābhyāṃ śāstramuktam.*

Bhadanta (Buddhist) and Lokāyata; Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika constitute the *uttarapakṣa* (opponent's view).[6]

Hemacandra takes Ānvīkṣikī and Tarkavidyā to be synonymous,[7] but he does not mention Cārvāka along with the Jain and Buddhist systems as distinguished from the pro-Vedic ones (Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika). Traditionally 'the six systems' mean the six pro-Vedic (*āstika*) systems only, the Buddhist, Jain and Cārvāka systems are called *nāstika* (negativist) for they do not accept the inerrancy of the Vedas. But the two terms, *āstika* and *nāstika*, have been explained variously from different points of view. As F.W. Thomas notes in another context: "The negative term, *nāstika* sometimes denotes those who reject the Veda and its *dharma*, in which case it includes the Buddhists: more generally it is those who deny moral responsibility and a future life: which seems to be the sense here (*sc. AYVD*, v. 20), as the Buddhists, and the Jains themselves, escape."[8]

However, the omission of Mīmāṃsā, Yoga and Vedānta in *AC* is intriguing. Hemacandra in his *AYVD* refutes Mīmāṃsa and Vedānta (vv. 11-14) along with Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Buddhist and Lokāyata (vv. 4-9, 10, 15, 16-19 and 20 respectively).[9] In his *YS* he condemns animal sacrifice and brands Jaimini as a monster (2.38). What induced Hemacandra to make a new list of six *tarka*-s, quite distinct from all other lists, seems inexplicable. As to Yoga, he perhaps did not consider it as a system distinct from Sāṃkhya, or he may not have accepted it as a philosophical system at all.

Hemacandra gives four synonyms for the materialist philosophy in the *AC*. In his auto-commentary he explains Bārhaspatya as the *śāstra* made by Bṛhaspati. Such is the traditional view found in the Purāṇa-s.[10] A *nāstika*, according to Hemacandra, is one who thinks that there is no virtue and vice, *nāsti puṇyaṃ pāpam iti matirasya nāstikaḥ*. The word, *cārvāka*, is derived from the root *carva*, "to chew". A Cārvāka chews the self (*carvatyātmānaṃ cārvākaḥ*). He refers to his own grammatical work, *Uṇādisūtra* 37, which runs as follows:

[6] *KM*, Ch. 2, 191: *dvidhā ānvīkṣikī pūrvottarapakṣābhyām | arhadbhadantadarśane lokāyataṃ ca pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ. sāṅkhyaṃ | nyāyavaiśeṣikau cottaraḥ ta ime ṣaṭ tarkāḥ ||*

[7] *AC*, 2.165 cd, 107: *ānvīksikī tarkavidyā mīmāṃsā tu vicāraṇā.*

[8] Thomas, 124 n3 on *AYVD*, v. 20.

[9] Hemacandra in fact devotes two separate verses, one to Jaimini (v. 11) and the other to Kumārila (v. 12).

[10] See *PPu*, Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, Ch. 13. Cf. *HV*, Harivaṃśaparvan (vulgate ed.), Ch. 28. The passage has been omitted in the critical edition (21.327, 148).

mavāka-śyāmāka-vārtāka-jyontāka-gūvāka-bhadrākādayaḥ.[11] Each of these words ends with the *āka* suffix and is formed irregularly *(ete ākapratyayāntā nipātyante)*.[12] Although the word, *cārvāka,* does not occur in the *sūtra* itself, the auto-commentary mentions it along with some other words of which *cārvāka* is one (*...svonāka-cārvāka parākādayo bhavanti*).

Hemacandra's derivation of *cārvāka* has not been universally accepted. Other authorities speak of another irregular formation: *cāru + vāc > cārvāc, cārvāka.*[13] In this case too it is not definitely known whether the word *cāru* is to be taken as an adjective (meaning agreeable, pleasant, etc.) or as a noun (which is another name of Bṛhaspati).[14] All the derivations proposed are plausible in so far as the formation of the word is admitted to be irregular. As to the *āka* suffix, even though the word, *śyāmāka* is cited by Rāyamukuṭa as an instance of *ākaḥ* ending, he refers to another suffix, *makan* and mentions Halāyudha as his authority.[15] Guṇaratna, another Jain writer, however, follows Hemacandra but instead of *carvayātmānam* he opts for the following explanation: *carvanti bhakṣayanti tattvato na manyante puṇyapāpādikaṃ parokṣajātam iti cārvākāḥ,* "The Cārvāka-s chew up, eat up, i.e. do not consider as realities a host of entities such as virtue, vice, etc. which are imperceptible."[16]

Hemacandra explains *lokāyata* as *lokeṣvāyatam lokāyatam bṛhaspatipraṇītaśāstram;* one who knows or studies such a *śāstra* (science) is a *laukāyatika.* The problem is that the meaning of *āyatam* is uncertain and Hemacandra does not throw any light on it.[17]

It is to be noted that the word, *nāstika* is used to mean exclusively the Cārvāka. The word, as we have noted above, has been interpreted in various ways. Hemacandra himself uses the word as a term of abuse. In the *YS* (2.37) he condemns Manu and other Brahminical law-givers who prescribe animal sacrifice. Hemacandra calls them *nāstikebhyo 'pi nāstikaḥ,* the worst of the *nāstika*-s.[18] In the *AYVD,* however, the word, *nāstika,* is reserved for the Cārvāka alone (v. 20).

[11] *ŚHVP,* 740.
[12] Hemacandra's auto-commentary (*Bṛhadvṛtti*) on *ŚHŚA,* 740.
[13] Whitney, Rule 233a, 80. Cf. Tarkavācaspati, s.v. *cārvāka.*
[14] See Monier-Williams, s.v. *cāru.*
[15] Rāyamukuṭa, 2: 269 (on Vanauṣadhivargaḥ, 211) and n.
[16] *TRD,* 300. Trans. *C/L,* 267.
[17] See Ch. 6 above.
[18] In his auto-commentary Hemacandra writes: *paramanāstika ityarthaḥ* (on *YŚ,* 2.37, f. 96b).

In the *AYVD* Hemacandra makes the Cārvāka appear as one who believes perception to be the sole instrument of knowledge:

> *vinānumānena parābhisandhimasaṃvidānasya tu nāstikasya |*
> *na sāṃpratam vaktumapi kva ceṣṭā kva dṛṣṭamātraṃ ca hahā pramādaḥ ||*[19]

> But of (for) the Nāstika, who without inference is not aware of the intent of others, it is not apposite even to speak: what of a movement, what of a mere look! Alas! error![20]

Malliṣeṇa in his commentary, *SVM,* explains the Cārvāka view as follows:

> That perception alone is Demonstrant is the view of the Cārvāka (*pratyakṣamevaikam pramāṇam iti manyate cārvākaḥ*). For that he girds himself: *anu-,* 'after', following upon, aprehension and memory of the mark and the connection; *-miyate,* 'is measured', 'is outlined', a thing remote in place, time and own-nature by this species of cognition, accordingly *anumāna.* From the context it is inference for self. That, inference, proof with a Middle Term; without lacking; intent of others, view of others; is not aware of, not correctly cognizing. The word but is for the purpose of pointing out the difference from the previous disputants; of those previous disputants, as they are affirmativist (*āstika*), he has made discussion on the points of disagreement. But of (for) the Negativist it is not even proper to speak; how is discussion with him possible?[21]

We have shown that Hemacandra uses the term, *nāstika,* either as a general term for abuse or to mean the Cārvāka. Malliṣeṇa offers further explanation:

> Or else, his (*sc.* Cārvāka's) view being that there is no future world, merit and sin, (because of the exception noted in the grammatical rule [*ŚHŚA,* 6.4.66] concerning the formation of the three words *"nāstika-āstika-daiṣṭika,"* he is called Nāstika), for that Negativist, the Laukāyatika, to speak even is not apposite, even to utter a word is not proper; hence only to remain silent is preferable for him; to say nothing of entering into a company of authorities on logic and debating on propounding a means of proof.[22]

[19] *AYVD,* v. 20.
[20] Trans. Thomas, 126.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 126-27. As to the grammatical rule, cf. Pāṇini, *Aṣṭ,* 4.4.60. How-

It is rather strange that Hemacandra in his polemical zeal tends to misrepresent the Cārvāka position regarding inference as an instrument of knowledge. The Cārvāka-s never denied the validity of inference in mundane matters.[23] Among the Jains, Ratnaprabhā and Guṇaratna, too, explain the Cārvāka view concerning inference in the same way, as does Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi in our own times.[24]

That there was no love lost between Hemacandra and the Cārvāka-s is also illustrated by his use of the word, *varāka,* which means 'wretched, low miserable, pitiable'. However, he reserves his uttermost hatred for the Mīmāṃsaka. In the *YS* he writes:

> *varaṃ varākaścārvāko yo 'sau prakaṭanāstikaḥ* |
> *vedokti-tāpasacchadmacchannaṃ rakṣo na jaiminiḥ* ||[25]

> Rather Cārvāka who is worthy of pity and an open negativist than Jaimini, a demon, hidden under the disguise of an ascetic, mouthing the words of the Vedas.[26]

Last but not least, in his *TSPC* (*Lives of Sixty three Divine Personages),* Hemacandra takes a fling at the materialists, presumably the Cārvāka-s.[27] Following the traditional mode of narrative found in some Buddhist and Jain tales,[28] Hemacandra also introduces a king whom his ministers, belonging to different philosophical persuasions, try to persuade according to their philosophical inclinations. Sambhinnamati, a minister speaking in favour of materialism, accuses his fellow minister, Svayambuddha for upholding *dharma,*

ever, *Manu* 2.11: *nāstiko vedanindakaḥ*. Hemacandra explains the words, *nāstika, āstika* and *daiṣṭika* as follows: *ete tadasyetyarthe ikaṇantā nipātyante* (*Laghuvṛtti* on *SHŚA*, 6.4. 66).

[23] See Ch. 8 above.

[24] Ratnaprabhā on *PNTA*, 540; *TRD*, 306 (on *ṢDSam*, v. 83), *C/L*, 273; Sanghvi, *ASILM*, 4.

[25] *YŚ*, 2. 38, f. 96b. Cf. *YŚ*, 3.10: *na jānāti paraṃ svaṃ vā madyāccalitacetanaḥ* | *svāmīyati varākaḥ svaṃ svāminaṃ kiṅkarīyati* || (f. 257b).

Jayantabhaṭṭa, too, employs the same derogatory adjective, *varāka*, to the Cārvāka-s. See *NM*, Ch. 3, I: 299.

[26] In his auto-commentary, Hemacandra explains *varāka* as one who is to be pitied because of his lack of pride (*dambharahitatvād anukampyaḥ*), f. 97a. Elsewhere, too (e.g., on *YŚ*, 3.10), he says, a *varāka* is one who is worthy of pity because of his lack of consciousness (*varākaścaitanyahīnatvād-anukampanīyaḥ*, f. 258a).

[27] *TSPC*, I. 325-45.

[28] Cf. *SKa, JM, UBhPK, YTC.*

righteousness. Sambhinnamati's speech runs as follows:

> Well said! Svayambuddha. You desire the Master's welfare, for intention is inferred from speech like food from vomiting. Only hereditary ministers like you, no others, speak thus for the pleasure of the Master who is always sincere and gracious. What teacher, harsh by nature, taught you, that you spoke thus to the king, like an untimely stroke of lightning? The Master is served here by attendants seeking pleasure themselves. Why should they say, "Do not enjoy pleasures"? Abandoning pleasures of this world and striving for them in the next world is like licking the elbow, leaving what is to be licked in the hand. Dharma is said to have its fruit in the next world. That is very improbable. There is no next world from the very fact of the non-existence of people for the next world. Consciousness arises from earth, water, fire, and air, like the power of wine itself from sugar, flour, water, etc. Certainly there is no soul apart from the body which will go to another world after it has left the body. Therefore, pleasure of the senses is to be constantly enjoyed without fear. One's own soul must not be deceived. Destruction of one's desires is foolishness. Dharma and non-dharma, obstacles to pleasure are not to be feared; since they indeed do not exist at all, like donkey's horns. What merit has been acquired by one stone that it is worshipped by bathing, ointment, wreaths, clothes, and ornaments? What evil has been acquired by another stone that it is polluted? If people are born and die according to karma, as a result of what karma do bubbles appear and disappear? Therefore, so long as consciousness exists, it acts, as it desires. Of consciousness that has perished, there is no further birth. 'Whoever dies is born again,' that is mere talk with entirely inconclusive argument. Therefore, our Master should unhesitatingly enjoy himself with young women charming with beauty of form on a couch like *śirīṣa* petals. He should eat at will nectar-like food and drink. He is an enemy who hinders. Day and night, remain anointed with camphor, aloe, musk, sandal, etc., as if made of fragrance alone. O king, constantly look at whatever abounds in gardens, vehicles, people, picture galleries, etc., for the pleasure of the eyes. Day and night, O Master, have nectar for your ears with sounds of songs echoing with flutes, lutes and drums. So long as one lives, let him live happily with pleasures of the senses. He should not trouble himself by religious actions. Where is the fruit of dharma and non-dharma?[29]

What is to be noted in this passage is the juxtaposition of crude hedonism and materialism. Some of the philosophi-

[29] Trans. Helen M. Johnson, I: 37-38.

cal doctrines attributed to the Cārvāka-s are also encountered here, e.g.,

1. There is no other-world.
2. Consciousness arises from four forms of matter.
3. There is no soul apart from the body.
4. There is no rebirth.
5. Religious duties are not to be performed.[30]

Opponents of the Cārvāka doctrine, whether a Vedāntin like Śaṅkarācārya, Buddhists like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, or a Jain like Prabhācandra have controverted all this and quoted the relevant aphorisms from the now-lost *Cārvākasūtra*.[31] However, none of them has called the Cārvāka a hedonist or a eudaemonianist – not at least in the same vein as Hemacandra does.[32] In the Brahminical tradition, writers like Kṛṣṇamiśra and Śrīharṣa have echoed Hemacandra.[33] Jayantabhaṭṭa in his allegorical play, *ĀḌ*, has tarred the Jain and Buddhist mendicants as well as a *kāpālika* with the same brush. The Cārvāka view represented by Bṛddhāmbhi, however, is not branded as hedonistic there.[34] The Cārvāka-s' opposition to all religious rites, it seems, has been misconstrued deliberately to suggest (as a *reductio ad absurdum*) that they preached a kind of 'eat drink and be merry' approach to life.

The same kind of baseless charge has been brought against Epicurus (341-270 BCE).[35] He did preach that pleasure was the aim of life. But it was not sensual pleasure, but intellectual pleasure that one derived from prudence. In a letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus wrote:

> When we say, then pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyments of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.[36]

Simon Blackburn has rightly noted:

> The aim of all philosophy is, however, to enable us to live well, which is not to live in the hedonistic trough the word Epicureanism now suggests, after centuries of propaganda against the system. Rather, practical wisdom, attained through philosophy, is needed to attain the pleasant life, which consists in a preponderence of *katastematic* pleasures, capable of indefinite prolongation, over merely *kinematic* or volatile sensory pleasures.[37]

Hemacandra in his work was merely lampooning the Cārvāka. Svayambuddha, in his turn, sets out to refute the Cārvāka system and speaks against sensual pleasures. His puritanism, however, is typical of the Jain attitude to life.

Sambhinnamati's discourse ends with a rewritten version of a popular verse attributed to the Lokāyatikas:

yāvajjīvet sukhaṃ jīvet tāvat vaiṣaikaiḥ sukhaiḥ |
na tāmyed dharma-kāryāya dharmādharmaphalaṃ kva tat ||[38]

In its earliest known form the verse runs as follows:

yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ |
bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ ||[39]

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:

[30] For the Cārvāka fragments, see IV. 2, I. 4, I. 6-8, IV. 1, V. 1 in Ch. 6 above.

[31] See *ŚBh* on *BS* 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53-54; *TS*, Ch. 22 and *TSP*; *PKM*, 48-49, 110-21, 177-80; *NKC*, 3.7, 341 ff.

[32] As against the widely prevalent notion that the Cārvāka-s were gross hedonists, Richard Garbe (*ERE*, 8: 138) and M. Hiriyanna (195) expressed their doubts, but writers of modern college textbooks and handbooks of Indian philosophy prefer to perpetuate the unsupported notion propagated by the opponents of the Cārvāka, mostly through poems and plays like *PC*, Act 2; *NC*, 17. 58-59, 69, 70.

[33] See Chs. 9 and 15 for further details.

[34] In *ĀḌ*, Act 1, both a Buddhist and a Jain monk are portrayed as despicable sensualists, but Cārvāka is spared. In Act 3 he is represented as a sober philosopher with whom the *āstika*-s are engaged in a prolonged debate.

[35] Epicurus has been maligned as a gross sensualist as early as the first century BCE in a poem by Horace (*Epistles*, 1.4.14-16). Horace invites Tibullus, his melancholic friend, to visit him at his farm: "As for me, when you want to laugh you will find me in fine fettle, fat and slick, a hog from Epicurus' herd (*epicuri de grege porcum*)" (276-77). Cf. modern English words, 'epicure' and 'epicurean' used to suggest "person with refined taste in food and drink" and "person fond of pleasure and luxury" respectively (as glossed in the *Little Oxford Dictionary*).

[36] In Diogenes Laertius, 10.131-32, 2: 657.

[37] Blackburn, 122.

[38] *TSPC*, 1.245, 12.

[39] *VDMP*, I. 108, 18cd-19ad, f. 70a; *TSP*, 17; *NM*, Ch. 7, II: 257 and *SDS*, 3.

When once this frame of ours they burn.
How shall it ever again return?[40]

The verse evidently relates to the denial of the concept of rebirth. Some other writers, however, have made it appear as an encouragement to unrestrained hedonism. Hemacandra, too, shifts the emphasis from the issue of rebirth to that of dharma and non-dharma.

To sum up: Hemacandra's stray remarks and comments on the Cārvāka do not help us much in reconstructing the Cārvāka system of philosophy which is known to us only through a few fragments. Some of these fragments, however, appear to be spurious. What is transparent is Hemacandra's all-out antipathy to the materialist system.

Here, too, there is a paradox. In his polemics against the Mīmāṃsaka, Hemacandra cites an anonymous verse, which is generally attributed to the Cārvāka. The verse runs as follows:

mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṃ yadi tṛptirbhavediha |
nirvāṇasya pradīpasya snehaḥ saṃvardhayecchikhām ||[41]

If (the *śrāddha* ceremony) satisfies the dead beings here, then oil might increase the flame of an extinguished lamp.

Malliṣeṇa also quotes this verse (with some variants) in his commentary on *AYVD*, v. 11, which is devoted to controverting the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā doctrine enjoining *hiṃsā* (ritual killing):

mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṃ śrāddhaṃ cet tṛptikāraṇam |
tannirvāṇapradīpasya snehaḥ saṃvardhayecchikhām ||[42]

If even to dead beings the Śrāddha is the cause of satisfaction.
Then oil might increase the flame of an extinguished lamp.[43]

Thomas notes that the verse "is clearly in the style of Cārvāka comments; but in the *Sarva-darśanā-saṃgraha,* where the first line is given as such, the second line differs."[44] The variant is insignificant: *nirvāṇasya pradīpasya* for *tannirvāṇapradīpasya.* But what is more significant is that while the second hemistich of the first line as quoted in the *YS-vṛtti* differs from the

[40] Trans. E.B. Cowell. For a detailed discussion of the many variants of this notorious verse, see Ch. 20 below.
[41] *YŚ*, f 98b (on 2.47).
[42] *SVM*, 69.
[43] Trans. Thomas, 69.
[44] Thomas, 69 n36.

SDS (*śrāddhaṃ cet tṛpti kāraṇam*), the second line, however, is identical with what is found in the *SDS.*[45] But the *SDS* is not the only source of this verse. It first occurs in the *PC.*[46] S-M might have taken the verse from this source inasmuch as the readings in both the *PC* and *SDS* are identical.

From whichever source Kṛṣṇamiśra, Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa might have got the verse, only Kṛṣṇamiśra attributes it to the Cārvāka whereas the Jain writers simply utilize it in order to assail Jaimini. Given Hemacandra's antipathy to the Cārvāka-s it is difficult to believe that he did not know that the verse had been attributed to the Cārvāka-s.

Kṛṣṇamiśra's attribution of the verse to the Cārvāka-s in the *PC* is then open to doubt. In fact, the verses at the end of *SDS*, Ch. 1, might have been gathered from various sources, including the Buddhist and Jain ones, and then attributed to Bṛhaspati.[47] But that is a different issue.

Postscript

In certain editions of *AC* (e.g., Kālīvara Vedāntavāgiśa ed., Kalikata, 1284 BS and Nārāyāṇacandra Bhaṭṭacāryya ed., Kalikata, 1314 BS) there is an additional (seventh) Kāṇḍa named Śiloñcha (residue). A verse in this Kāṇḍa runs as follows:

vaiśeṣike kaṇādo 'pi jaino naikāntavādyapi |
cārvāke(a) laukāyatikaḥ kṛṣiprasṛtamityapi ||

In all probability the whole seventh Kāṇḍa is a later addition. The verse quoted above, in any case, adds nothing new to what has been said in *AC*, 3. 525-27.

[45] *SDS* (BORI ed.), 13, v. 4. It is, however, possible that Thomas used the BI ed. or the Ānandaśrama ed. of the *SDS* (or any of their verbatim reprints) in which the second line of the verse runs as follows: *gacchatāmiha jantūnāṃ vyarthaṃ pātheyakakalpanam.*

In later editions (e.g. BORI ed.), this is the first line of another additional verse (v. 5). (Joshi prints the text of *SDS*, Ch 1, from the BORI ed. but retains the trans. by Cowell who followed the BI ed. and so had no access to this verse). Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa, however, seem to have got the verse in question from the same source.
[46] *PC*, Act 2, v. 21, 40.
[47] See Ch. 6 above.

XV
Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, *Verses 81-84: A Study*

Humour is not a strong point of ancient Indian philosophers, or philosophers in general. Besides some sharp repartees, ingenious ironies and downright abuses, humour proper is seldom to be met with in philosophical works. One notable exception is the parable of the wolf's footprint. In what follows I propose to discuss the parable in some detail. The parable most probably originated with the Cārvāka-s and was quite well known in the Jain, Buddhist and Brahminical circles.

The first allusion to the parable occurs in the *MBh*, Śāntiparvan, Mokṣadharma-parvādhyāya.[1] Bhīṣma tells Yudhiṣṭhira that the acquisition of righteousness (*dharma*) and wealth is the direct object of a Kṣatriya (one born in the warrior caste) and one should not get involved in deciding what is righteousness and what is not, for no one has seen their results. So it is as useless as the discussion about the wolf's footprint:

adharmo dharma ityetad yathā vṛkapadaṃ tathā

Nīlakaṇṭha in his commentary left the word, *vṛkapadaṃ*, unexplained, presumably because he did not know the par-

[1] *Mbh*, crit. ed., 132. 1 ef-2ab; vulgate ed., 134.2.

able behind the simile. He wrote, "As the judgment regarding the footprint on the ground —whether it belongs to a wolf or a dog or a leopard— is futile, so is the judgment whether something contributes to righteousness or to its opposite."[2]

An earlier scribe fared no better. Baffled by the word, *vṛkapadaṃ,* he 'emended' it to read *vṛkṣaphalaṃ,* 'fruit of a tree'. Vādirāja (fourteenth century) in his commentary on the Śāntiparvan, explicated it accordingly: *etad anayoḥ phalaṃ vṛkṣaphalaṃ yathā tathā kālāntare dṛśyate.* "The fruit (result) of these (righteousness and its opposite) is seen, like the fruit of a tree, at a different time."[3]

Although the parable was known right from the first centuries of the Common Era and attributed to the Lokāyatika-s by the sixth century, we have to wait for Somatilakasūri (fourteenth century) and Guṇaratna to learn the parable itself.[4] Both were commenting on a verse in Haribhadra's *ṢDSam.* S (Somatilaka) takes the following reading:

etāvān eva loko 'yaṃ yāvān indriyagocaraḥ |
bhadre vṛkapadaṃ paśya yad vadanti bahuśrutāḥ ||[5]

This world consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) is but similar to (the statement) 'Oh, Blessed one! Look at the footprint of the wolf!'

S then explains it as follows:

For those chatter-boxes who accept the validity of inference, verbal testimony, etc. and seek to establish pleasure and pain in the forms of heaven and hell, etc. to be achieved through the agencies of virtue and vice, and never cease in their efforts, an illustration is cited: 'Oh ! Blessed one! Look at the footprint of the wolf!' Thus, for example, a certain person, after drawing with the movement of his own fingers, the shape of a wolf's footprint on the layer of dust made even by a very gently blowing breeze, said to his wife, who had become eager to see the footprint of a wolf, 'Oh! Blessed one! Look at the footprint of the wolf!'[6]

[2] *Mbh,* vulgate ed., 1505.
[3] Quoted in the crit. ed., 696n.
[4] *ṢDSam* (H) on v. 81. 452-53.
[5] Ibid.
[6] *C/L,* 258ff with minor changes. S's commentary appears there in the name of Maṇibhadra's, presumably following Damodar Lal Goswami's edition of *ṢDSam* (H) (Benares,1905). However, Dalsukh Malvania in his

G (Guṇaratna) narrates the parable in greater detail:

Here is a traditional story. Once there was a man, his mind deeply inculcated with ideas advocated by the *nāstika* (heterodox) doctrine. But his own wife had her mind deeply rooted in the *āstika* (orthodox) doctrine. Very diligently, every day, he tried to convince her with arguments set forth in his own system. But as she was not convinced, (he hit upon a plan) and thought to himself, 'She will be convinced by this process.' So thinking, in the later part of the night, he went out of the city along with her, and said to her: "Oh! Blessed one! In this city there live some people who maintain that inference has validity in respect of imperceptible things, and they are held as men of great wisdom by ordinary people. But just mark their dexterity in the matter of critical judgement."
Then starting from the city-gate up to the junction of the four roads, on the main thoroughfare where the mass of dust had been made even by the breeze blowing gently, he made footprints of the wolf on the mass of dust, on both sides of his own body, by pressing upon the three fingers joined together of both his hands. Then in the morning. finding those footprints, a large crowd gathered on the main thoroughfare. The men of great wisdom who also arrived there said to the people: "As the footprints of the wolf cannot be explained otherwise (it is to be concluded that) at night some wolf must have come here from the forest."
So the man finding them speaking in such terms, said to his wife: "Oh! Blessed one! My beloved one! Look at, consider, the case of these footprints of the wolf!"

This explains the verse satisfactorily in all respects. It should be noted that S speaks of one *footprint* only (as the verse employs the singular form, *vṛkapadam*), but G refers to the *footprints (vṛkapadāni)* made by the husband. But the reading that G adopted contained *abahuśrutāḥ,* 'not vastly learned'. However, he also knew of the variant reading, *bahuśrutāḥ.* Thus he wrote:

If the reading accepted is 'what the vastly learned ones say' etc. then the implication is to be explained as 'they are vastly learned only according to popular belief' (and not in reality).

S explained the significance of the verse as follows:

Preface (*prastāvanā*) to M.K. Jain's ed. of *ṢDSam* (H) has shown that the author of the *Laghuvṛtti* was Somatilakasūri, not Maṇibhadra (21).

What is the implication? Just as her skilled lover fulfilled her desire for seeing the footprint of a wolf—she, being an artless lady, was unaware of the real fact— by deceiving her only with the mark made by his fingers, so also these people —knaves in the garb of the pious, and bent upon only cheating others— and ordinary people, by somehow convincing them of the infallibility of certain inferences and verbal testimonies, into the dilemma of what is to be eaten and what is not, who is fit for copulation and who is unfit, what is desirable and what is to be avoided, etc., by enticing them away with the hope of enjoying pleasures to be attained after reaching heaven, etc. and produce blind faith in pious acts.

The two versions (S's and G's) differ on a number of points, viz.

(a) S refers to the parable as 'an illustration' (*dṛṣṭānta*), G calls it 'a traditional story' *(sampradāya)* as well as 'an introduction' *(upadarśana)* to a *dṛṣṭānta*.

(b) S does not refer to the man as a *nāstika* as G does, he calls him 'a skilled lover' *(vidagdha ballabhaḥ)*.

(c) S does not mention any occasion for drawing the wolf's footprint other than the wife's interest in seeing it.

(d) In S's version only one footprint drawn on dust suffices whereas G mentions several.

(e) The fourth *pāda* of the verse is left unexplained by S.

(f) S refers to the woman as 'an artless lady who was deceived by her lover': G describes her as an *āstika* (orthodox) who had to be convinced by her husband with the help of a suitable demonstration.

(g) S does not explicitly relate v. 81 to the next verse which G does.

Let us now look at the verse in the chronological order of its appearance (with variants, as usual).

Bhāvaviveka (fifth/sixth century CE) was the first to quote this verse in his commentary on the *Madhyamakaśāstra*. Restored to Sanskrit it reads:

yāvān indriyagocaraḥ puruṣaḥ etāvān eva |
bhadre bahuśrutāḥ yad vadanti te vṛka-(pada)-cihṇavat ||[7]

[7] *PrPr*, ff. 203b8 and 232b6-7. I am indebted to Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan for restoring the verse from its Tibetan translation which is printed at the end of *MŚ*. —It is to be regretted that Pandeya in his Sanskrit restoration of *PrPr* writes: *etāvāneva loko 'yaṃ* (on *MŚ*, 16. 1. II: 3) and *bhadre vṛkapadaṃ brūhi* [...] (on *MŚ*, 18.6. II: 64). On both occasions, the Tibetan version has *skyes-bu (puruṣaḥ)*. The word, *bruhi* is not there in the Tibetan translation at all. (It has neither *hyetad* nor *paśya*, but only 'like the wolf's print').

Man consists only of as much as is within the scope of the senses. Oh! Blessed one! what the vastly learned ones say is like the footprint of the wolf.

Fortunately enough, we have the original Sanskrit verse in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (sixth century CE):

etāvāneva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocaraḥ |
bhadre vṛkapadaṃ hyetad yadvadanti bahuśrutāḥ ||[8]

Man consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) is but similar to (the statement), 'Oh! Blessed one! This is the footprint of the wolf.'

This is most probably the original reading of the first line which is found in the works of later authors such as Jinabhadra Gaṇi, Kamalaśīla, Śīlāṅka and Māṭhara.[9] They all have *puruṣo* instead *loko 'yaṃ* which is found in the works of Haribhadra, Maladhārī Hemacandrasūri, Rājaśekharasūri and the anonymous author of *LṢDSam*.[10] (For a table of the variants, see Appendix B).

There can be no doubt that the verse as found in the earliest sources contains the correct reading. The difference between the readings adopted by Haribhadra and some other Jain writers on the one hand and all others on the other, lies mostly in the choice between *puruṣo* and *loko 'yaṃ*, *paśya* and *abahuśrutāḥ* being of little consequence. Since *puruṣo* appears to be the right reading, we intend to proceed on its basis.

Yet the other reading, viz. *loko 'yaṃ,* is not altogether inappropriate. If *puruṣa* leads to the doctrine of *dehātmavāda, loka* (which G explains as 'this perceptible world, the human world')[11] leads to another seminal doctrine of the Cārvāka-s, viz. *paralokavilopavāda* as well as *pratyakṣaprādhānyavāda*: no inference or verbal testimony unless preceded by perception is to be considered valid. Thus no credence is to be given to the existence of *paraloka* since there can be no *par-*

[8] *PrPa* on *MŚ*, 18.6 (II: 65).

[9] *VABh/SVṛ*, I: 186 (first line only), II: 344 (full verse) and II: 439 (first line only). On the first and third occasions there is *etāvān eṣa* instead of *etāvān eva; TSP* on *TS*, v. 1871, 637; *SKSVṛ* (on *SKS*, 1.1.6, 10.6 and also on 2.3.10, 49.18) and *MVṛ* (on *SK*, v. 17), 129 (my copy has *yāvad* instead of *yāvān*).

[10] Commentary on *GV*, 1.5 (1553),10; *LṢDSam*, 2, 5, 6; *LTN*. v. 33, f. 24b; *ṢDSam* (H), v. 81: *ṢDSam* (R), v. 160, 81.

[11] *ayaṃ pratyakṣo loko manuṣyalokaḥ*. Unfortunately this sentence is missing in the translation in *C/L*, 268.

alokin (i.e. in the absence of any disembodied self, there cannot be any abode for it).[12]

Now we shall see whether the parable as narrated by S and G (based on the reading found in Haribhadra) tallies with the original reading of the verse.

It is of interest to note that Bhāvaviveka cites another verse in his glosses on *MŚ*, 16.1 and 18.6. Restored to Sanskrit it would run as follows:

> *sundari cārulocanabhūtvā khāda varagātri te atītaṃ yat tat na* ||
> *bhīru gataṃ na nivartate kalevaram idaṃ samudayamātram (iti)* ||[13]

Evidently this is a translation of the following verse as it occurs in Haribhadra's *ṢDSam* (as also in Rājaśekharasūri's):

> *piva khāda ca cārulocane yadatītaṃ varagātri tan na te* |
> *na hi bhīru gataṃ nivartate samudayamātram idaṃ kalevaram* ||[14]

> Oh! The one who possesses beautiful eyes! Drink and eat. Oh! The one with a charming body! That which is past does not belong to you. Oh! The timid one! The past never comes back. This body is only a collectivity.

The verse is also found in Śīlāṅka's commentaries on the *ĀS* and *SKS*.[15] In the *SKSVṛ* the verse occurs immediately after the *etāvān eva* verse with one variant in the first line: *sādhuśobhane* in place of *cārulocane* as found in the *ĀSVṛ*. Śīlāṅka quotes the verse again with the same reading, but accompanied only by the *pratīka* (first part) of the *etāvān eva* verse.[16]

I hope most readers would agree that this second verse, too, forms a part of the parable of the wolf's footprint. The parable, it may be remembered, was originally concerned with the existence of imperceptible things which are deduced solely on the basis of inference from a major premise which is itself faulty. The premise is something like this: 'If there is a mark on the dust that looks like a wolf's footprint, it must have been made by a wolf.' People who said so (whom the *nāstika* husband considered to be lacking in

[12] *paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ* is a well-known Cārvāka aphorism found in a number of sources. See Ch. 6, IV. 2 above.

[13] *PrPr*, ff. 203b8-204al and 232b7-8 (on *MŚ*, 16.1 and 18.6); II: 3, 64.

[14] *ṢDSam*(H), v. 82; *ṢDSam* (R), v. 161, 81.

[15] *ĀSVṛ* (on *ĀS*, 1.4.2, 123); *SKSVṛ* (on *SKS*, 1.1.6, 10. 6-7 and 2.3.10, 49, 17-18).

[16] *SKSVṛ* on *SKS*, 2.1.47, 186. 29-30.

sufficient knowledge) did not care to think that a man, too, could have made such a mark with his fingers. Through the demonstration of the folly of such learned people, blindly relying on inference unpreceded by perception, the husband convinced his wife that the śāstric injunctions relating to the edible and inedible, etc. are all bogus. G concludes his elaborate exposition of the parable with the following remark:

> Now, these persons who do not know well the actual fact regarding the footprints of the wolf, speaking, though many in number like a single person, may create confusion in the minds of ignorant men; but still, their words would never be acceptable to those who are well-aware of the truth. So also, there are many preachers *(vādin)* who are really cunning fellows disguised as pious ones and who have the sole aim only of cheating others.

G then introduces his comments on the next verse *(ṢDSam*, v. 82) as follows: "To show what her husband advised her to do after that the author says."

S offers an alternative (slightly different) interpretation of 'drink and eat':

> Or, 'drink' means 'drink the lips, etc. (of the beloved)' (i.e. engage in the act of kissing) and 'eat' means 'enjoy the objects of pleasure.' And all this is the advice coming from an impassioned man. That is, crown your youth with success.

This is an Indian parallel to the *carpe diem* (enjoy the day) theme well known in European poetry.[17] It also follows from the Cārvāka doctrine that opposed senseless asceticism, the followers of which fondly hoped that some virtue would accrue from all kinds of abstinence and self-torture (a concept so dear to the Jains).[18]

The oldest reading of the second verse (*ṢDSam*, v. 82) also shows its link with the first verse: 'This body is only a

[17] See Baldick, 31.

[18] Dharmakīrti in his auto-commentary on *PV*, 1.342 said: *vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ* | *saṃtapārambhaḥ pāpahānāya ceti dhvastaprajñānāṃ pañca liṃgāni jāḍye* || "(Belief in) the authority of the Vedas, and in some creator (of the world), desiring merit from bathing, pride in (high) caste and practising self-denial for the eradication of sins —these five are the marks of the stupidity of one whose intelligence has been destroyed." Quoted in: Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana, 806 n1.

collectivity' refers back to 'man' *(puruṣaḥ)* in v. 81a; vv. 83-84 continue the theme of the elements and their collectivity:

kiṃ ca pṛthvī jalaṃ tejo vāyurbhūtacatuṣṭayam |
caitanyabhūmireteṣāṃ mānaṃ tvakṣajameva hi ||
pṛthyādibhūtasaṃhatyāṃ tathā dehādisaṃbhavaḥ |
madaśaktiḥ surāṅgebhyo yadvattadvatsthitātmatā ||[19]

Moreover, earth, water, fire and air are the four forms of matter. According to them, these four are the basis *(bhūmi)* of consciousness, and the only valid form of knowledge is the one produced by the senses.
When there is a collectivity *(saṃhati)* of the forms of matter, the earth, etc., there is production of the body and others. Just as the power of intoxication (is produced) from the ingredients of a spirituous drink, so is determined (in the body) the presence of the self's essential mark *(ātmatā,* i.e. consciousness).

The emphasis is on what is elsewhere called 'a special combination' *(pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ)* of the four elements which gives rise to consciousness just as non-intoxicating objects (water, sugar, molasses, etc.) combine to give rise to the power of intoxication.[20] In both cases, it is not just any combination, but a special kind of it that matters.[21]

The parable was certainly meant for disabusing people of the notion of the existence of an imperishable self distinct from the body and all that such a notion entails, e.g., the other- world, rebirth and release.[22] Bhāvaviveka quotes the couple of verses in connection with the idea that there is no other world to which one can go from this world. On the three occasions that Jinabhadra quotes the *etāvān eva* verse (or its first line only) in *VBh/SVṛ,* his emphasis is on the Lokāyatika's denial of the existence of the other world since it is not apprehensible by the senses.[23] He also refers to a line from *Bṛ.Up.*, 2.4.12 (also found in ibid., 4.5.13) which runs as

[19] I have quoted from the text followed by Somatilakasūri. The text followed by Guṇaratna in his commentary contains some variants which do not concern us here.

[20] For *pariṇāmaviśeṣa,* see *PV,* 3.40; *PVSVṬ,* 21; *PVA,* 54-55; *NM,* Ch. 1, 201; *NVV,* I: 56; *NKC,* 343; *SVR,* 1074. 'From those, consciousness' *(tebhyaścaitanyam)* is a well-known Cārvāka aphorism. See Ch. 6, I.4 above.

[21] *samudayamātram idaṃ kalevaram. SDSam* (H), v. 82d.

[22] Jayantabhaṭṭa quotes some verses to this effect presumably from a Cārvāka source. See *NM,* Ch. 2, I: 184; *C/L,* 140.

[23] For details see n9 above.

follows: "The one of pure knowledge, appearing out of these forms of matter, gets dissolved again only into them; there is no awareness after death."[24] Whether or not Jayantabhaṭṭa, Maladhārī Hemacandrasūri and S-M were conversant with Jinabhadra's work and took the cue from him, the fact remains that all of them have cited the same *Bṛ.Up.* passage in their exposition of the Cārvāka view.[25] S-M even says that the Lokāyatika-s quote the *śruti* for this (*sc.* intelligence is produced from the four elements only when they are transformed into the body) and then cites the passage from the *Bṛ.Up.* (In this connection E.B. Cowell noted: "Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation applying it to the cessation of individual existence once the knowledge of the Supreme is attained".[26] He also proposed a comparison of this passage with the commentary on *Jaimini-sūtra.* 1.1.5).

In course of presenting the exponent's view (*TS,* v. 1871) Śāntarakṣita said: "As regards 'the other world', there is no such other world apart from the 'chain of causes and effects, in the form of cognition and the rest'."[27] Kamalaśīla in his commentary then contradicts it by saying: "This is exactly as you (Cārvākas) who are addicted to merely perceptible pleasures apply the name 'other- world' to some other part of this same visible world; as is declared in such assertions as: 'Man consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses' and again: 'The other world consists in another place, another time or another state'."[28]

Śīlāṅka, too, describes the Cārvāka-s as saying that there is no such thing as the self *(jīva)* which is extramaterial and capable of visiting the other-world.[29] Māṭhara quotes the first line of the first verse (v. 81) in connection with his comments on the existence of the self independent of the body, senses, intelligence, etc.[30]

[24] Instead of following Śaṅkara's commentary (which gives an idealistic twist to this passage) I have given a literal translation from *C/L,* 157.

[25] See *NM,* Ch. 4, II: 114; *GV Comm.* 10 [on 1. v. 5 (1553)], and *SDS,* Ch. 1. 3.

[26] *C/L,* 255 n4.

[27] *TS,* v. 1871, 637.

[28] *TS,* 637 (Instead of 'Materialists'. I have opted for 'Cārvāka-s'). While the first sentence quoted by Kamalaśīla has long been recognized as a genuine Bārhaspatya (Cārvāka) fragment, the second one quoted by him escaped the attention of both D.R. Shastri and Mamoru Namai. See Ch. 6, Bhā. 26 above.

[29] See *SKSVṛ,* 10. 4-5; 49. 16-17.

[30] *MVṛ* on *SK,* v. 17, 124.

Thus the point of controversy in all cases where the two verses (or a part of them) are quoted has been the existence of the imperishable self and its abode called the other-world, *paralokin* and *paraloka*. The Cārvāka-s' insistence on perception as the primary means of knowledge makes them deny both. It is against this heretical idea that the Jain, Buddhist and Brahminical philosophers have always been up in arms.

The parable, particularly the second verse that is attached to it as a part of the *parabola docet*, 'the parable teaches', is double-edged: it emphasizes the importance of perception without the support of which any conclusion arrived on the basis of inference or verbal testimony remains suspect. Such conclusions include the whole world of unverifiable notions, such as the imperishable soul, the other world, God, the omniscient being, etc.[31] At the same time, the moral of the story exposes the futility of following śāstric injunctions regarding what is potable and what is not, what is edible and what is not. The second verse is not an exortation to heedless hedonism (as some readers take it to be): it merely exposes the unreliability of the śāstric injunctions regarding food and drink. By implication, the verse also advises people not to be burdened with any sense of guilt for not being able to observe such injunctions.

S's alternative interpretation of the second verse is therefore improbable. But by following G's interpretation of the couple of verses we can better comprehend the intention of the author of these verses.

Appendix A

Sources For The Verses

L. de la Vallée Poussin ("Materialism (Indian)" in *ERE*, VIII: 499n) refers to *LTN*, *ṢDSam* (H), *PrPa* and *MA* as the sources for the *etāvān eva* verse. His translation reads as follows: "There is nothing in man except what is visible to the senses. *Look*, dear friend, at what these *so-called scholars* call the traces of the wolf" (Italics mine). Apparently he prefers *puruṣo* to *loko 'yaṃ*, *paśya* to *hyetad* and *bahuśrutāḥ* to *abahuśrutāḥ* —a composite reading of *PrPa* and *ṢDSam* (H) (G). See Appendix B for details.

D.R. Shastri (1959/1982, p. 202) mentions only one source, viz. *TSP*. Namai (1976, 40 n 21) refers to *PrPr*, *PrPa*, *TSP* and *ṢDSam* (H) (G). I have located six more sources (see Ch. 6, Śl. 13 above). However, the census of sources is not claimed to be exhaustive.

[31] See *NM*, Ch. 2, I: 184; *C/L*, 140.

D.R. Shastri includes the first line of the *etāvān eva* verse in his "Bārhaspatyasūtram" (200, No. 19 – misprinted as No. 16 in Namai, 41) while Namai quotes the whole verse (on 41, B2). Namai also quotes the *piva khāda* verse on 41 n23 but does not include it in his collection of fragments (nor does D.R. Shastri).

The *piva khāda* verse is found in *PrPr* (twice), *ĀSVṛ* (reads *sādhuśobhane* for *cārulocane*) and *SKSVṛ* (thrice), *ṢDSam* (H) (S reads *jātaśobhane* for *cārulocane*), *ṢDSam* (R). A Tibetan version occurs in *MA*, after v. 100 (see Warder(1971), 35).

Appendix B

Variants of the etāvān eva *Verse*

(a) The full verse is quoted in *MA*, *PrPr* (twice), *PrPa. VBh/SVṛ*, *LTN*: *ṢDSam (H)*, *SKSVṛ* (twice), *GV Comm*, *ṢDSam (R)* and *LṢDSam*.
VBh/SVṛ (twice), *TSP* and *MVṛ* refer to the first line only; *SKSVṛ* quotes the *pratīka* only on 186.

(b) There are three variants:

(i)	*puruṣo*	*loko 'yaṃ*
	PrPr(twice)	*ṢDSam* (H)
	PrPa	*LTN*
	MA	*GV Comm.*
	VBh/SVṛ (twice)	*ṢDSam* (R)
	TSP	*LṢDSam*
	SKSVṛ (twice)	
(ii)	*hyetad*	*paśya*
	MA	*ṢDSam* (H)
	PrPr	*SKSVṛ* (twice)
	VBh/SVṛ	*GVComm*
	LTN	*LṢDSam*

The Tibetan translation of *PrPr* has neither *hyetad* nor *paśya* but reads *vṛkacihṇavat.*

(iii)	*bahuśrutāḥ*	*(nty)abahuśrutāḥ*
	MA	*ṢDSam* (H) (G)
	PrPr (twice)	*SKSVṛ* (twice)
	PrPa	*ṢDSam* (R)
	VBh/Vṛ	
	ṢDSam (H) (S)	
	LTN	
	GVComm	
	LṢDSam	

Vallée Poussin in the *editio princeps* of *MadVṛ* with *PrPa* writes: "In the Lokatattvanirṇaya of Haribhadra (Giornale della Societa Asiatica Italiana, 1905, p. 290) the 'Bhūtavādin' (=Cārvāka) also expresses himself: etāvān eva *loko* 'yam yāvān indriyagocaraḥ, bhadre vṛkapadaṃ hy etad yad vadanty *abahuśrutāḥ*. But the editor, M.L. Suali notes the variant Ṣaḍdarśanasaṃgraha *(sic)*, verse 81: bhadre vṛkapadaṃ *paçya* yad vadanti *bahusrutāḥ;* and he refers to the commentary in course of being edited in the Bibliotheca Indica." (360 n5, translated from the French). In the edition of *ṢDSam* with *TRD* Suali, however, printed: *vadantyabahuśrutāḥ* (301). (G noted the variant, *bahuśrutāḥ* in his commentary (304) which has been quoted above).

XVI
The Significance of Lokāyata *in Pali*

Lokāyata (substantive) along with its derivative *lo(lau) kāyatika* (adjective) is often encountered both in Pali and Sanskrit, and as *logāyata, logayaya* or *loyāyata* in Prakrit.[1] The word does not seem to be Vedic. In Sanskrit it first occurs (indirectly) in the *Pāṇinīya Gaṇapāṭha* 23; in Pali in the Tipiṭaka itself.[2] The word, both in Prakrit and Sanskrit, has generally been taken to mean the materialist system of philosophy, later known as the Cārvāka and that is how it is generally rendered in English.

T.W. Rhys Davids, however, noticed that on many occasions in the Pali Sutta-s, the rendering, viz. "materialism", does not suit the context. Accordingly the PTS *Pali English Dictionary* decided to omit this meaning altogether. It glossed *lokāyata* as

> what pertains to the ordinary view (of the world), common or popular philosophy, or as Rhys Davids (*Dial.* i. 171) puts it: "name of a branch of Brahmin learning, probably *Nature lore*"; later worked into a quasi system of "casuistry, sophistry."[3]

[1] See Böhtlingk and Roth, Monier-Williams, Rhys Davids and Stede, and Vijaya Rājendrasūri, *s.v. lokāyata.*

[2] *Aṣṭ,* 1271. See also Kane, 1. 226n.

[3] Rhys Davids (1899), 22, n4; Rhys Davids and Stede, s.v. *lokāyata.*

The Dictionary also refers to Rudolf Otto Franke's German translation of the *DN* in which *lokāyataṃ* is rendered as "logically proven explanation of nature" *(logisch beweisende Naturerklärung)*.

Thus the chief meaning in Pali and Sanskrit seems to have diverged into two altogether different ways, having no apparent relation to each other. It is not that such a case is unprecedented. What is interesting to note is that the gloss provided in the *PTS Dictionary* never found favour with any Pali scholar excepting Rhys Davids himself.[4] Even the translators of the *Saṃyutta-* and *Aṅguttaranikāya-s* (Books of Kindred Sayings and Gradual Sayings) in the PTS rendered the term *lokāyatika* as "skilled in metaphysics" and "world-wise" respectively. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya pointed out that such renderings merely proved the translators' uncertainty regarding the proper meaning of the word.[5]

Rhys Davids, again, was the only scholar who refused to believe that once there was a system of philosophy in India called Lokāyata. He challenged the lexicographers who had taken *lokāyata* to mean so. He even thought that Śaṅkarācārya had controverted "a curious opinion which he ascribes to the Lokāyatikas —*possibly wrongly* as the very same opinion was controverted ages before in the Piṭakas, and not there called Lokāyata, though the word was in use in Piṭaka times."[6]

Apparently Rhys Davids had in his mind the proto-materialist doctrine of Ajita Kesakambala which is called *ucchedavāda*, not Lokāyata in the *SPhS* (*DN*).[7] The same doctrine (or a variant of it) is known as *tajjīva-taccharīrvāda* in the Jain tradition.[8] Rhys Davids also believed that S-M's exposition of the Lokāyata view in *SDS*, Chapter I, was "very able" but had "all the appearance of being drawn from his own imagination".[9]

[4] Jacobi in 1911 had taken *lokāyata* in the sense of 'infidel philosophy' or materialism (1970: 551) but in 1919 sought "to make out that the school (*sc.* Lokāyata) was in origin merely the popular natural philosophy." Keith dismissed this idea rather perfunctorily (32 n1). K.C. Chattopadhyaya endorsed the view of Rhys Davids in 1975 without adducing any new instance or argument.

[5] *The Book of Gradual Sayings*, trans. E. M Hare, IV: 287; *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, trans. Mrs. C.F. Rhys Davids, II: 53. D. Chattopadhyaya (1969), 99 n162.

[6] T.W. Rhys Davids (1899), 171-72.

[7] *DN*, I. 48-49. PTS Dictionary, however, does not refer to Ajita in connection with *uccheda*.

[8] *SKSVr*, 185.

[9] T.W. Rhys Davids (1899), 172. C. Bendall (*Athenaeum*, 30.6.1900) pointed out that Rhys Davids was wrong: traces of the real existence of a school of philosophy that called itself Lokāyata were numerous. See *ERE*, 8: 493 n4.

This is an excellent example of cutting the Gordian knot —by denying the very existence of a school of philosophy!

After the discovery of the *KA* (and its subsequent publication in 1909) and of a considerable number of digests and polemical works, it is idle to doubt the existence of the Lokāyata/Cārvāka.[10] Since the *KA* stands chronologically nearer the Tipiṭaka, it will help us comprehend the meaning of *lokāyata* in Pali if we can make out its meaning in the *Arthaśāstra* context. I propose to proceed on the basis of two postulates, viz. (a) meanings of words change in course of time; so we have to study the matter in proper chronological sequence, and (b) the same name has been applied to different systems of philosophy in ancient India.[11]

In the earliest times, the word, *lokāyata*, both in Sanskrit and Pali, it appears, stood for logic, or rather, *disputatio*, the art of disputation. Kauṭilya wanted the princes to learn Ānvīkṣikī along with Trayī (the three Vedas), Vārtā (agriculture, animal husbandry and commerce) and Daṇḍanīti (management of the state).[12] Lokāyata (which belongs to Ānvīkṣikī) then was not considered to be something irreligious or anti-Vedic. At the same time, it was studied as a *secular* subject, on a par with two other systems of philosophy, viz. Sāṃkhya and Yoga (most probably Vaiśeṣika).[13] As Paul Hacker points out cogently:

> It is misleading to translate the word *ānvīkṣikī* by *philosophy* as H. Jacobi had done... *Ānvīkṣikī* consists in *examining by reason*, i.e. in reasoning and reflexion (*hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā*) and is practised in *all* sciences...the future king requires instruction in logical thinking and he can find it principally in each of the three systems.[14]

[10] Special mention may be made of Śāntarakṣita's *TS* and Haribhadra's *ṢDSam*. Both of them have persented and controverted Lokāyata in some details.

[11] Kane (I: 225) admitted that the meaning of Lokāyata had changed with time (see also III: 47-48). As to the second postulate, it may be mentioned that Mīmāṃsā was also called Nyāya (as in Jaimini's *Nyāyamālāvistara*) and Yoga represented Vaiśeṣika (as in *NS*, 1.1.29, as Vātsyāyana explains) or Nyāya or even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. See Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa. I: xvi, 270-80; Kuppuswami Sastri, xvi: K. Chattopadhyaya, 855.

[12] Kangle (ed.), 1.2.1, 10.

[13] See Ch. 10 above for a detailed discussion of this issue.

[14] Hacker, 164 (italics in the original). He refers to Jacobi (1911), 1970, 547-58.

Even though some translators and scholars still take Lokāyata in the sense of atheism/materialism in the *Arthaśāstra* context, the parallel systems mentioned along with it make it amply clear that Ānvīkṣikī and hence Lokāyata can only mean 'philosophical system based on logic',[15] as opposed to those others based on scripture (e.g., Mīmāṃsā, and perhaps also Vedānta).

It is also to be noted that one Malayalam commentary of the *KA* explains Lokāyata as a Nyāyaśāstra taught by Brhaman, Gargya and others.[16] T. Ganapati Sastri preferred to follow this gloss in his Sanskrit commentary (all other commentaries, however, take *lokāyata* to mean Bārhaspatyamatam or Nāstikaśāstra). Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa was also of the opinion that in ancient times Nyāyaśāstra was called Lokāyata, and in the context of the *KA* it could mean the same.[17]

This, we contend, is also the original meaning of the word, *lokāyata,* in Pali and Sanskrit. Both *Saddanīti* by Aggavaṃsa and *Abhidhānappadīpikā* by Moggallāna retain the meaning of Vitaṇḍa-(Vāda)-satthaṃ, the art of disputation.[18] It was much later that Lokāyata and Cārvāka came to designate materialism (*dehātmavāda, bhūtacaitanyavāda,* etc.). It has been observed that the word, *cārvāka,* is conspicuous by its absence in the Tipiṭaka.[19] It is also to be noted that the word *laukāyatika* in the sense of an anti-religious hedonist is not encountered before the *Kāmasūtra,* and the word, *cārvāka,* though found as a proper name of a demon in the *Mbh,* does not appear to designate 'materialism' before the eighth century CE.[20] But

[15] Kangle, II: 6 n10.

[16] Ganapati Sastri (1924), 27. See also G. Haridas Sastri, 10; Jina Vijaya Muni, 5.

[17] Tarkavāgīśa, I: xiv. See also Gangopadhyaya (1990), 124-26.

[18] Smith, I: 361 (section 396). The reading in this edition differs considerably from what Rhys Davids had cited (1899: 168). Dasgupta thought that Rhys Davids's translation of the passage was 'inexact' since the latter had taken *gandhaṃ* to mean 'book'. Dasgupta preferred to take it in the sense of 'smell' (III: 313n). But the reading printed by Smith is *ganthaṃ.* Rhys Davids and not Dasgupta was right. In *Saddanīti,* Aggavaṃsa refers not only to *vidtaṇḍasatthaṃ* but also to *vitaṇḍasatthasippaṃ,* 'the art of disputatio.' —Moggallāna says: *vitaṇḍasatthaṃ viññeyaṃ yaṃ taṃ lokāyataṃ iti* (ed. D.D. Shastri, v. 112ab,19).

[19] Nanayakkara in Malalasekera (ed.), III: 686.

[20] *'iti laukayatikāḥ', KS,* after 1.2.30 (Tarkaratna, 41). For the first appearance of Lokāyata/Lokāyatika in philosophical literature, see *TS,* Chapter 22 *passim* and *ṢDSam,* v. 80 (Suali, 301). The word, *cārvāka,* in this sense is first found in Kamalaśīla (on Śāntarakṣita, Ch. 22 *passim*) and *ṢDSam,* v. 85 (Suali, 307).

in the earlier sources, before the Common Era, Lokāyata has one and only one meaning: *disputatio.* Both in earlier Pali and Sanskrit usage, a *lokāyatika brāhmaṇa* is one who is fond of disputation, hence criticized as one engaged in sophistry or casuistry. This however, is not the *gauṇīvṛtti* (secondary meaning) as Rhys Davids suggested, but the primary one.[21]

Let us take an example from the *Rāmāyaṇa* (Ayodhyākāṇḍa). Rāma asks Bharata:

kaścinna lokāyatikān brāhmaṇāṃstāta sevase |
anarthakuśalā hyete bālā paṇḍitamāninaḥ ||
dharmaśāstreṣu mukhyeṣu vidyamāneṣu durbudhāḥ |
buddhim ānvīkṣikīṃ prāpya nirarthaṃ pravadanti te ||[22]

My dear son, don't serve any Lokāyatika brāhmins. They are experts in doing harm, are puerile and consider themselves to be learned. Even though there are principal religious law-books, these dimwits, having recourse to sophistical intelligence, talk rot. (Trans. mine)

The connection between *ānvīkṣikī buddhi* and *lokāyatika brāhmaṇa* is a definite pointer to the true and first meaning of *lokāyata.*[23]

How could the word become synonymous with Cārvāka materialism? We presume that disputatiousness and challenging the veracity of the sacred texts were common to the older Lokāyatika-s and the new Cārvāka-s. It is interesting to note that Medhātithi in his commentary on *Manu,* 4.30, glosses *haitukāḥ* as *nāstikāḥ,* and other commentators agree with this view. The verse is also quoted in the *Mitākṣarā* (on *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti,* I. 130) which explained the word *haituka* as "one who by argumentation, raises doubts about everything."[24]

Thus we may once and for all dispense with the first meaning of *lokāyata* provided in the *PTS Dictionary* (viz. common or popular philosophy, Nature lore) and take the word to mean, both in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit, a text-book of disputation:

vitaṇḍasatthaṃ/vitaṇḍā(vāda)śāstra.

[21] See Rhys Davids and Stede, *s.v. lokāyata.*

[22] Crit. ed., 94.32 (Vaidya, 537), 100.28 in the vulgate.

[23] This is perhaps the only instance in which *ānvīkṣikī* has been used as an adjective. See Schmidt, *s.v. ānvīkṣikī.*

[24] Jha (ed.), 342. Acarya (ed.), 44 (*yuktivalena sarvatra saṃśayakārī*). See also T.G. Sastri (1982), 105 (*Bālakrīḍā* commentary).

XVII
On Lokāyata *and* Lokāyatana *in Buddhist Sanskrit*

In what follows I propose to discuss the validity of the reading *lokāyata* (with or without inflections) and a doubtful word (I would call it a ghost word), *lokāyatana* occurring in the *Śārdūla.* (between 200 and 350 CE, included in the Buddhist Sanskrit work, the *Divyāvadāna*). The readings in the available MSS, Chinese and Tibetan translations, and hence in the three printed editions,[1] are not always the same. The meaning of the word too will depend on the reading adopted.

Let us look at the first two instances:

(1) *padako* (*padaśo*) *vaiyākaraṇo lokāyate yajñamantre mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇe niṣṇāto niskāṅkṣaḥ* (Vaidya, 318)

(2) *lokāyatayajñamantramahāpuruṣalakṣaneṣū pāragaḥ* (Vaidya, 319)

In (1), Cowell-Neil (C-N) read *lokāyatikayajñamantre* (619) and in (2), *lokāyatayajñatantre* (620). Mukhopadhyaya (Mukho.), in both cases, emended the reading to *lokāyata yajñamantre* and *lokāyata yajñamantra* (12, 13). He was apparently influenced by the second occurrence of *lokāyata* along with *yajñamantra* and *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa.* Although

[1] Edited by Cowell-Neil (1886), Mukhopadhyaya (1954), and Vaidya (1959).

the MSS consulted by him had the word *lokāyatana* in (2), he preferred to follow C-N, who had emended the reading, as they themselves confessed, *ex conjectura,* since their MSS had such mislections as *lokāyamayajña* and *laukāyayajña*-(620 n5). In the first instance, Mukho.'s MSS have *lokāyatika* and the Tibetan translation has *lokāyataśāstra;* so he chose to retain parity of expression by reading *lokāyata* and *yajñamantra* (not *tantra* as in C-N) in both (1) and (2).

Vaidya printed the text mostly in accordance with Mukho.'s, but in (1), he split up the compound, thereby making *lokāyata, yajnamantra* and *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa* three different branches of study. In (2), he retained Mukho.'s reading.

The next two instances show remarkable conformity:

(3) *athavā lokāyataṃ bhavatā bhāṣyapravacanaṃ pakṣādhyāyo vā nyāyo vā tvayādhitaḥ.* (Vaidya, 328; Mukho., 31; C-N, 630).

(4) *chandasi vā vyākaraṇe vā lokāyate vā... prajñāyate* (Vaidya, 330; Mukho., 37; C-N. 633).

Both (3) and (4) show that *lokāyata* is to be taken as a separate subject of study along with *vyākaraṇa, bhāṣyapravacana,* etc. One particular passage, however, poses a problem. In C-N, it runs as follows:

(5) *brāhmaṇaiḥ paurāṇaiḥ samyag dṛṣṭāni chandasi vyākaraṇe padamīmāṃsāyāṃ vā lokāyatane vā, anyāni ca gotrāṇi na caiṣām ūhāpohaḥ prajñāyate* (635).

Mukho. omitted *vā lokāyatane vā* as the Tibetan translator had done so (40 and n).Vaidya too followed Mukho. in this instance (331). Since, however, all available MSS contain these three words, such omission is unwarranted. We may emend the word, *lokāyatane,* to read *lokāyate,* as Mukho. did in (2).

From the above discussion it may be concluded that in all the five cases, *lokāyata* (or *lokāyate*) is used as substantive, whether occurring as an independent word or as a part of a compound. Dasgupta proposed to make an exception in case of (1). "It is true, however," he said, "that *Lokāyata* is not always used in the sense of a technical logical science but sometimes in its etymological sense (i.e. what is prevalent among the people, *lokeṣu āyato lokāyataḥ*) as in *Divyāvadāna,* p. 619..."[2] On the basis of (3), (4), and (5), however, we may say that both in (1) and (2) *lokāyata* is to be taken as a proper name denoting a branch of study, *yajñamantra* as another.

This leads us to the meaning of the word, *lokāyata,* particularly in Buddhist Sanskrit. Edgerton's Dictionary has no entry

[2] Dasgupta, III: 514 n3.

for *lokāyata,* presumably because he did not think that the word could have any special meaning other than what it had in standard Sanskrit,[3] viz. materialism (as Böhtlingk and Roth have it). Edgerton, however, records the word, *lokāyatana,* which he says, "=Skt. lokāyata" (465).[4] The only instance of its occurrence he mentions is, of course, the *Divyāvadāna,* 635.25. i.e. our (5), which is rejected by Mukho. and Vaidya but, in our opinion, should be retained in a suitably emended form. In any case, *lokāyata* does not mean materialism or the Cārvāka system of philosophy (also known as Bārhaspatya-mata or Lokāyata-mata) in Buddhist Sanskrit. It stands for, as Dasgupta says, "a technical logical science."

A comparison with Pali will prove the validity of this rendering. In all Pali commentaries, dictionaries, etc., *lokāyatam* is always glossed as *vitaṇḍasattham* or *vitaṇḍavādasattham,* the science of disputation.[5] This was the original meaning of the word. In *KA,* 1.2.10, too, it means the same.

Only later, but not much earlier than the fourth century CE, *lokāyata* came to mean materialism (as it is used in Vātsyāyana's *KS* (1.2.25-30). What was common to the older Lokāyatika-s and the new Cārvāka materialists was perhaps disputatiousness: nothing was sacred to them. It is interesting to note that Medhātithi, in his commentary on *Manu,* 4.30, glosses *haitukāḥ* as *nāstikāḥ* and quotes the following words, *"nāsti paralokāḥ, nāsti hutam",* which originally occur in *VDMP,* I. 108. 19ab and are attributed to Vena, a *lokāyatika* king.[6]

We should also remember that the word, *cārvāka,* does not occur in the Tipiṭaka even once.[7] The only materialist known in the Buddha's times is Ajita Kesakambala, who is called an *ucchedavādin,* not a *lokāyatika* or *cārvāka; lokāyatika* is reserved for the disputants, *vaitaṃḍika*-s. Cārvāka as the name of a materialist system-bulider (or follower of Bṛhaspati) is first encountered in the *TSP* of Kamalaśīla and

[3] Edgerton, I: xxi.

[4] It may be noted that Böhtlingk and Roth, Monier-Williams, and Edgerton —all considered *lokāyatana* a doubtful word, but included it in their dictionaries simply because Colebrooke had quoted it. See Colebrooke [(1837), I: 444], and Cowell's note (in Colebrooke (1873) I: 428 n1).

[5] Jayatilleke (1980), 45-57 offers a detailed survey of *lokāyata* in Sanskrit and Pali. He points out that Suzuki's rendering of *lokāyata* as 'materialism' in his translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is wrong.

[6] *'nāsti paralokaḥ, nāsti dattaṃ, nāsti hutam' ity eva sthitaprajñāḥ.* The source of this quotation, so far as I know, has not yet been identified by the learned editors of Medhātithi's commentary.

[7] Nanayakkara, in Malasekera (ed.), III: 686.

the *ṢDSam* of Haribhadra. Śāntarakṣita and Śaṅkarācārya, however, employ *lokāyata* and *laukāyatika*, not Cārvāka, to mean meterialism and a materialist respectively.

So, in the *Śārdūla.*, too, *lokāyata* has only one meaning: a text-book of disputation, *vitaṇḍāśāstra*. Patañjali must have meant the same when he said, by way of example, *varṇikā Bhāgurī lokāyatasya, vartikā Bhāgurī lokāyatasya*,[8] i.e. "*Bhāgurī* is the commentary on (a work of) *disputatio*".

[8] On *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 7.3. 45 (Kielhorn, III: 320-26). Cf. *nayate cārvī lokāyate* in *Kāśikāvṛtti* (on *Aṣṭā*. 1.3.36), *Nyāsa*, and *Padamañjarī* (Shastri and Shukla, I: 438-49).

XVIII
Lokāyata *and* Lokāyatana *in Sanskrit Dictionaries*

In what follows I propose to point out (a) an erroneous meaning of *lokāyata*, and (b) a redundant entry, *lokāyatana*, in the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* (abbreviated later as *S-W*) and to account for the mistakes.

(a) *Lokāyata*

S-W inter alia says: "In Pali (it) is said to mean an imaginary story, romance, cf. Burnouf in Lot(us), de la b(onne) 1(oi), 409 and *lokāyatika*." Under *lokāyatika* it refers to "perhaps another meaning of the word" (other than "a materialist") and cites Burnouf, ibid., 168 and 409.[1]

Burnouf in his French translation of the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra* (Ch. 13) writes, "[A Boddhisattva Mahāsattva] does not court the Lokāyatikas" (ne recherche pas les Lokāyatikas) and explains in a note:

> There is no reason to believe that the term indicates anything other than the sect among the Buddhists as among the Brāhmaṇas to be attached to the atheistic doctrines of the Cārvākas. Pali might suggest here another interpreta-

[1] "In Pali soll *lokāyata* eine erfundene Geschichte, Roman bedeuten", s.v. *lokāyata*. "Eine andere: Bed. wird vielleicht das Wort." s.v. *lokāyatika*.

> tion; as Lokāyata there signifies "fabulous story, romance", it will be permissible to suppose that the *Lokāyatikas* of our *Lotus* indicate the authors or the readers of similar works in which the passions and the affairs of the world form the principal subject.[2]

He refers to Moggallāna's *Abhidhānappadīpikā* as printed in Clough (1824) as his source.

T.W. Rhys Davids strongly objected to this interpretation:

> Burnouf... has a curious blunder in his note on the passage (p. 409). He says Lokāyata means in Pali 'fabulous history, romance'; and quotes as his authority, the passage... from the Abhidhana Padipika [*vitaṇḍā-satthaṃ viññeyyaṃ yaṃ taṃ lokāyataḥ*] in which Lokāyataṃ is simply explained as *vitaṇḍasatthaṃ*. This last expression cannot possibly mean anything of that sort. ([1899]169-70 n4)

Rhys Davids is right. *Abhidhānappadīpikā* simply states that "What is known as the science of disputation is the Lokāyatam." There is nothing to suggest *histoire fabuleuse* or *roman* here.

Munīnāñca matibhramaḥ. Burnouf did make a blunder, misled by Clough who, in his marginal gloss on *lokāyataḥ* (13, v. 8cd) writes "Fabulous story".[3] Such a meaning of *lokāyata* is not found anywhere else. *S-W* by literally translating the words of Burnouf has helped perpetuate the error.

But what is more striking is that Rhys Davids could not detect the source of this blunder. It is also rather curious that, while Böhtlingk and Roth rendered *histoire* as *Geshichte* (retaining thereby the ambiguity of the original), Rhys Davids took it to mean "history" though Burnouf surely employed the word to mean "story".

[2] "Il n'y a pas de raison de croire que ce terme désigne chez les Buddhistes autre chose que la secte comme chez les Brâhmanes pour rattacher à la doctrine atheiste des Tchârvâkas. La pali prurrait suggéter ici une autre interprétation: comme lokayâta y signifie «histoire fabuleuse, roman,» il serait permis de supposer que les *Lokāyatikas* de notre *Lotus* désignent les auteurs ou les lacteurs de pareils ouvrages, dans lasquels les passions et les affaires des monde forment le sujet principal." Burnouf, 409. Note to 168.

[3] *vitaṇḍasatthaṃ viññeyyaṃ yaṃ taṃ lokāyataṃ iti | keṭubhaṃ tu kriyākappavikappo kavinaṃ hito | ākhyāyikopaladdhatthā pabandhakappanā kathā | daṇḍanītyatthasattasmi buttanto tu pavatti ca |*, *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, Clough (1824), Section 2, vv. 8 cd-9 af, 13; Shastri (1981), pathamo saggakāṇdo, 6. Girabaggo, vv. 112-13, 19. Clough (13) took *keṭubhaṃ* to mean "Invention", *ākhyayikā*, "A tale", and *kathā* "A feigned story", and referred to *lokāyatam* as "Fabulous story". V. 113ab is taken from *Amarakoṣa*, vv. 321ab and 322ab.

In any case, the meaning recorded in *S-W* following Burnouf is totally unwarranted.

(b) *Lokāyatana*

S-W adopted this word following Colebrooke and added: "probably mistaken for *lokayata*."[4] Monier-Williams also enlists the word in the following way (apparently disapproving):

> *Lokayatana* (!), m.a. materialist, Col.

Colebrooke wrote as follows:

> In the second of these instances, SADANĀNDA'S scholiast, RĀMA TĪRTHA, names the *Locāyatanas*, a branch of the Chārvāca, as particularly intended. (1837, I: 404)[5]

The text of Rāmatīrtha's commentary on the *Vedāntasāra*, however, reads:

> lokāyatānām *cārvāka-viśeṣāṇāṃ matabhedān āha...* (187).

The word, *lokāyatānām*, is the inflected form of *lokāyatam* in the sixth declension, plural number. So *lokāyatana* was either a mislection in Colebrooke's MS or an instance of misreading on his part. However, the word, *lokāyatana*, has never been encountered in any Sanskrit text to mean "materialism" or "a materialist".

There is an entry of *lokāyatana* in Edgerton's Buddhist Sanskrit dictionary on the basis of a single occurrence of the word in the *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* (in *Divyāvadāna*). The entry and gloss run as follows:

> Lokāyatana (nt.?) = Skt. Lokāyata, the system so named: ^{0}-ne Divy 635.25; in BR cited from Colebrooke, Essays 1.404 as personal, meaning *a follower of the lokāyata* (the usual Skt. And HS lokāyata); it is cited from Ramatīrtha on Sadānanda; BR suggest that it is an error, and indeed a note to the 2n ed., 1.428, states that lokayataḥ is read 'in the printed edition.'

[4] "lokāyatana m. nach COLEBR. Sc. V.a. *lokāyatika* COLB. Misc. Ess.1. 404, wohl fehlerhaft für *lokayata*."

[5] In the second edition of Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays* (1873), E.B. Cowell added a cryptic note on *locāyatanas*. "In the printed ed. *Lokāyatāḥ*" (428 nl). Apparently this note failed to draw the attention of Monier-Williams (see above and also below).

Edgerton could consult only the Cowell-Neil *editio princeps* of the *Śārdula*. But a later edition (1954) based on new MSS as well as Chinese and Tibetan translations omits the words, *vā lokāyatane vā*, as they are not found in the Tibetan version (40 and n21).[6]

So, even in Buddhist Sanskrit, *lokāyatana* is a mere mislection.

Guiseppe Tucci, however, "quotes a passage from Buddhaghoso's *Śāratthapakāsinī* [Bangkok ed.] where the word *āyato* is taken in the sense of *āyatana* (basis), and *lokāyata* according to this interpretation means 'the basis of the foolish and profane people'." (Dasgupta, III: 514-15).[7] But the same text edited by Woodward adopts a different reading: *Lokāyataṃ, lokass'eva āyatam* (76); *āyatanaṃ* is given as a variant reading found in the Colombo ed. and a very late MS (copied in 1914). Buddhaghosa further writes:

> *Bāla-puthujjana-lokassa āyataṃ 'mahantam gambhīran' ti upadiṭṭhaṃ, parittaṃ chavaṃ ditthi-gatam.* (76).
>
> It is the *āyataḥ* (ground) of *hoi polloi*, (and though) put forth as something great and serious, it is a low, wretched (false) doctrine.

Apparently the word *āyataḥ* is used here as a noun though the PTS Pali-English dictionary provides no second meaning of *āyataṃ* as noun excepting "a bow".

Besides, Trenckner's *A Critical Pali Dictionary* has no entry of the compound *lokāyatana* (s.v. "*-ayatana*").

To sum up then: the word *lokāyatana* is found neither in Sanskrit nor in Pali. Hence it should be omitted from the dictionaries.

[6] Personally I am of opinion that Mukhopadhyaya could retain the word in the emended form *lokāyata* as he did in 13 where his MSS had *lokāyatana* (see 13 n19). Cowell-Neil too emended the reading here, as they said, *ex conject.* They had to deal with mislections as *lokayama-, laukaya-*, but not *lokāyatana* (see 620 fn). P.L. Vaidya in his edition of the *Divyāvadāna* (1959) reproduced Mukhopadhyaya's constituted text of *Śārdūla;* hence no significant emendation was made here. He too omits *vā lokāyatane vā* (331). See Ch. 17 above.

[7] Dasgupta refers to Tucci's *Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano,* 17. As the book is not available to me, I have to quote from Dasgupta.

XIX
ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet: *Who Said This?*

At the end of the first chapter of the *SDS,* S-M quotes a number of verses and ascribes them to Bṛhaspati. One of them runs as follows:

> *yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīved ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet |*
> *bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ* ||[1]
>
> While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt;
> When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again? (E.B. Cowell's translation)

To many this has become the epitome of the Cārvāka philosophy, which is thus reduced to hedonism par excellence —a doctrine that urges man to seek happiness at any cost and, at the same time, makes happiness a matter of sensuous gratification alone.

Where did S-M get this verse? No authority is cited in his work though some other verses or parts thereof can be traced back to earlier Purāṇas, plays and poems.[2] The authenticity of such passages is therefore doubtful. It is also

[1] *SDS* (BORI ed.), Ch. I, 14. v. 7, lines 125-26.
[2] See Ch. 6 above.

probable that S-M as well as his predecessors borrowed them from a common source —perhaps purely oral. That is why T.W. Rhys Davids suggested that S-M's description of the Lokāyata "is chiefly based on certain infidel doggerel verses which cannot possibly have formed a part of the Lokāyata studied by the Brahmins of old."[3]

There are, however, reasons to believe that at least in case of the verse cited above, S-M reproduced a distorted version of the original. Let us follow the successive alterations of this verse.

In the earlier part of the same chapter S-M himself quotes what he calls a *lokagāthā*:

yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ |
bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ ||[4]

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it ever again return? (E.B. Cowell's translation)

The main difference between the two verses lies in the second hemistich (no reference is made to Bṛhaspati as author either). Now, this verse occurs first in the *VDMP* almost exactly in the same form as the last and first lines of two consecutive verses with one variant —*śāntasya* in place of *dehasya*:

mugdhā evaṃ pratāryante dhūrtair dhana-jihīrṣayā |
yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyor agocaram ||
bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ ||
nāsti dattaṃ hutaṃ ceṣṭaṃ na devā ṛṣayo na ca ||[5]

The cunning ones thus cheat the deluded men, prompted by the desire to take away (their) riches. As long as life remains, live happily; nothing is beyond death. From where can be any return for that which has been reduced to ashes

[3] *Dialogues* (1899), 172. By 'doggerel verses' Rhys Davids apparently refers to the *ābhāṇaka*-s and *lokagāthā*-s quoted. The first word has been taken to mean "a saying, proverb" (Monier-Williams, 145, col 2) and the second, "a verse or song (handed down orally) among men" (ibid., 906, col 2) which is how Böhtlingk-Roth rendered it. (*"Ein in munds des volkes lebender Vers"*, VI: 582). There is no entry of *ābhāṇaka* in Böhtlingk-Roth, nor in Schmidt. None of these two words is recorded in *Śabdakalpadruma* either.

[4] *SDS*, 2, lines 17-18.

[5] *VDMP*, I. 108. 18-19, 70a (Translation mine).

and ceased to exist? There are no such things as given (in sacrifices), oblations, rites, nor gods nor sages.

This (Upa-) Purāṇa, composed some time between 400 and 500 CE,[6] seems to be the primary source from which all later authors have quoted or adapted the verse under discussion.

Kamalaśīla quoted one line —*bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya* etc.— in his *TSP*[7] but it was Jayantabhaṭṭa who first quoted the two consecutive lines from the *VDMP* as a verse-unit[8] and thus, we presume, became the immediate source of all subsequent authors. Somadeva Sūri in his *YTC* quoted the verse as it occurs in the *VDMP* with some variants in the first line only: *yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīvet nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ.*[9] Udayana in his *Pari.* quotes the first line only which has *nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ.*[10] Abhayadeva Sūri most probably refers to this very reading of the verse.[11] (I say 'most probably' because he quotes the first hemistich only. The editors of his work, I think rightly, refer to the *NM*).

In the twelfth century we find the first line rewritten by another Jain scholar, Hemacandra, as:

yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīvet tāvad vaiṣayikaiḥ sukhaiḥ

and the second line altogether altered:

na tāmyed dharma-kāryāya dharmādharma-phalaṃ kva tat.[12]

So long as one lives, let him live happily with the pleasures of the senses. He should not trouble himself by religious actions. Where is the fruit of dharma and non-dharma? (Helen M. Johnson's translation)

[6] Hazra (1958), I: 143.

[7] Baroda ed., 14; Varanasi ed., 17. Trans., 21. Neither of the editors could locate this quotation.

[8] Ch. 7. Ed. G. Sastri, II: 257; the Mysore edition has *dehasya* for *śāntasya* (which along with *jīvet* for *jīvam* is noted as a variant reading in the footnote. See II: 348). Jayanta did not refer to any source for this verse. He simply stated, 'As they say' / 'As the saying goes' (*yathāha*). The learned editors of this work have not been able to trace the source of this quotation.

[9] *YTC*, II: 253.

[10] *Pari* (on *NS*, 1.1.2), 113.

[11] *TBV*, 505 n6. Jayanta, too, in his work, once refers to the verse by quoting the first hemistich only (Ch. 4. Ed. G. Sastri, I: 388: *nanu ca yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīved iti tatropadiśyate...*)

[12] *TSPC*, I: 345, 12.

This is the first alteration made in the first line of the original verse.

Guṇaratna, a co-religionist of Hemacandra, cites the first line with a minor variation:

yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīvet tāvad vaiṣayikaṃ sukham

As long as a man lives, let him live happily; so long are the pleasures of the senses.

But in the second line he reverts to the original reading with one variation: *dehasya* for *śāntasya.*[13]

Śrīharṣa, on the other hand, preferred to rewrite the verse in the following way:

kaḥ śamaḥ kriyatāṃ prājñāḥ priyāprītau pariśramaḥ |
bhasmībhūtasya bhūtasya punarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ ||[14]

Ye arrant fools, of what use is quietude? Try to gratify your mistresses. Will a creature, once he is reduced to ashes, ever return? (K.K. Handiqui's translation)

It is interesting to note that Mādhava-Sarasvatī, in spite of S-M and Guṇaratna and Śrīharṣa, goes back to the Purāṇic reading as quoted by Jayantabhaṭṭa but replaces *śāntasya* with *dehasya.*[15] Similarly an undated commentary on Somadeva Sūri's *Nītivākyāmṛta* called *Mugdhabodhinī* and Advayavajra's commentary on Sarahapāda's *Dohākoṣa* quote the verse which reads *nāsti mṛtyor agocaraḥ* and *tāvat mṛtyor agocaraḥ* respectively.[16]

On the basis of available evidence we may conclude that the verse in question was first distorted by the Jains (who were very much anti-Lokāyata) and then by the Brāhmiṇical opponents of the Cārvāka. What was meant to be a simple denial of the concept of after-life was transformed into a preaching of heedless hedonism as well. S-M got this verse from some unknown source or rewrote the second hemistich himself, apparently forgetting that he had quoted another version of the same only a few pages earlier.

Second, if the *VDMP* is the source of this verse, it is also to be noted that this is not an authentic version coming

[13] *TRD,* 202.
[14] *NC,* 17.69, 646.
[15] *SDK,* 108.
[16] *MB,* 14; *Dohā.,* 86.

from the Cārvāka-s themselves. The story of king Vena in the *VDMP* is hostile to materialism and, even in its original form, the verse is imputed to the irreligious king by the author/s of the Purāṇa.

XX
jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā *or* jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ?

At the end of the first chapter of the *SDS*, S-M quotes a number of verses and ascribes them to Bṛhaspati. One of them runs as follows:

> *agnihotraṃ trayovedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam* |
> *buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīvikā dhātunirmitā* (sic) ||[1]

J. Muir, the first English translator of this passage from the *SDS*, renders it thus:

> The agnihotra sacrifice, the three Vedas, the mendicant's triple staff, and the practice of smearing oneself with ashes, are only a means of livelihood ordained by the Creator for men who have neither understanding nor energy.[2]

The verse seems to strike an odd note. It is well known that Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of the Lokāyata doctrine, denied the existence of God, after-life, etc. Why should he speak of the Creator, *dhātṛ*?

[1] *SDS* (BORI ed.), Ch. 1, 13, v. 2, lines 112-13. In the *editio princeps* the last word was *dhātṛnirmitā*.

[2] Muir (1861), 352. The anonymous German translation (*ZDMG*, 1860) has *'von den Vätern angeordnet'* (ordained by the Father) for *dhātṛnirmitā* (525).

Cowell indeed felt that there was something wrong here. He therefore translated *dhātṛnirmitā* as "made by Nature".[3] In a note he added, "I take Dhātṛi as God, or nature, speaking by common parlance. Dr Hall (Catalogue, p. 162) would seem to take Dhātṛi as the name of an author. —'Dhātṛi may sometimes stand for Bṛihaspati'."[4]

There is no evidence elsewhere or in the lexicons that Bṛhaspati was also called Dhātṛ. In any case, even accepting that would be of no avail in the given context. How could Bṛhaspati or a mere author (as Hall would have it) make or ordain the livelihood of the ascetics?

Max Müller modified the last line of Cowell's translation of this verse as follows:

> They are the mode of life made by the creator for those who are devoid of sense and manliness.

In a note he pointed out: "Dhātṛi, creator, can here be used ironically only, instead of Svabhāva or nature."[5]

The reading of the verse seems to be suspect.

Fortunately enough, S-M himself quotes another reading of the verse in the earlier part of the same chapter.

> *agnihotraṃ trayovedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam |*
> *buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ ||*[6]

The fourth *pāda* here is quite different. Cowell translates the last line as: "Bṛihaspati says, these are but means of livehood for those who have no manliness nor sense."

The difference lies only in the last *pāda*, which, however, makes all the difference in meaning. Evidently the reading just quoted is more appropriate. Why then did S-M alter it when he cited the verse for the second time? The question will lead us to the source of the verse itself.

[3] *JASB* (1862), 381. Cowell's translation also appeared in Appendix C to Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays* [second edition, edited by Cowell (1873)] and in *The Pundit* (1874) before the publication of Cowell-Gough (1882).

[4] *JASB* (1862), 381 n. The note was omitted in Cowell-Gough (1882). By 'Catalogue' Cowell refers to Hall (1859) who said, "A complete list of the numerous authors and treatises cited or referred to in the *Sarva-darśana-sangraha* will, therefore, have value in affording a notion as what philosophical and cognate works were held, five hundred years ago, to be authoritative, or, at least, representative" (161-62). He then cites the names of Bṛihaspati and Dhātṛi as authorities in relation to Chārvāka-darśana.

[5] Max Müller (1971), 101 and n2.

[6] *SDS*, 5, lines 50-51.

Śālikanātha was apparently the first to quote this verse.[7] It has *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ*. Kṛṣṇamiśra cited this verse in his allegorical play, *PC* (2.26). The last *pāda* here too is *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ*.[8]

In the *GrBh* commentary on Jayantabhaṭṭa's *NM*, Cakradhara quotes the same reading with one variation in the second *pāda* – *bhasmamuṇḍanam* (ashes and shaving of the head) for *bhasmaguṇṭhanam*.[9]

Śrīharṣa, however, decided to rewrite the verse in his *NC* (17.39) in the following way:

> *agnihotraṃ trayītantraṃ tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmapuṇḍrakam |*
> *prajñāpauruṣaniḥsvānāṃ jīvo jalpati jīvikā ||*[10]

> Bṛhaspati [= Jīva] says, "Oblation in the fire, morning and evening, the system of rules built up by the three Vedas, the carrying of three sticks tied into one, and the bearing of browmarks of ashes are the means of livelihood of those who are devoid of wisdom and manhood." (K.K. Handiqui's translation)

Nārāyaṇa, in his commentary (*NPr*) on this verse, quotes the verse as it occurs in the *RVP* and *PC* but retains *bhasmapuṇḍrakam* in the second *pāda*.

Nīlakaṇṭha goes back to the original version but writes *trayīdharmāḥ* (ordinance according to the three Vedas) in the first *pāda*.[11]

Sadānanda Kāśmīraka, a contemporary of Nīlakaṇṭha, in his *ABS* provides yet another reading:

> *agnihotraṃ pītañca tripuṇḍraṃ bhasmadhāraṇam |*
> *prajñāpauruṣahīnānāṃ jīvo jalpati jīvikām ||*[12]

> The Agnihotra, wearing ochre robes, bearing of three browmarks of ashes are the means of livelihood of those who are destitute of wisdom and manhood, says Bṛhaspati.

The second line is taken almost *verbatim* from Śrīharṣa's version (only in the third *pāda* it has *hīnānām* and in the fourth, *jīvikām*). The first line is largely rewritten.

[7] *RVP*, 285.

[8] *PC*, 44.

[9] *GrBh*, I: 228.

[10] *NC*, 635.

[11] On *Mbh*, Śāntiparvan, 218.25 (vulgate ed.), 211.24 (critical ed.).

[12] *ABS*, Ch. 2 (*'dvitīya mudgaraprahāraḥ'*), 100. Translation mine.

Two philosophical digests of uncertain date, the *SMS* and *SSS*, quote the second line as it is found in *PC* without a single variant.[13]

In an anonymous commentary on Somadeva Sūri's *Nītivākyāmṛta*, the same verse is quoted in a corrupt form:

agnihotraṃ trayovedaḥ prabṛjyā [prabrajyā] nagnamuṇḍatā |
buddhipauruṣa hīnānāṃ jīvite 'do [?] mataṃ guruḥ [guroḥ] ||[14]

Following the occurrence of the verse (twelve in eleven sources) chronologically, can we come to any conclusion regarding its true reading? The variants in the first line are minor and of little consequence. The crux lies in the last *pāda*: should it be *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ* or *jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā*? The third alternative —*jīvo jalpati jīvikā(m)*— may be safely ignored. It was Śrīharṣa's fabrication and none but Sadānanda Kāśmīraka adopted it. All other readings have *jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ*. This seems to be the correct reading.

Why did S-M substitute it by *jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā*? The reason is apparently as follows. While quoting the verse for the first time, S-M himself calls in an *ābhāṇaka*, a popular saying.[15] Śālikanātha might not have been the author of the verse. He too perhaps got it from a purely oral source. Most of those who have quoted this verse (including S-M) retain the original reading of the last *pāda*. When S-M quotes the verse for the second time (along with ten others), he introduces them with the remark: "And all this has been also said by Bṛhaspati." the verse in question comes as the second one. So, instead of naming Bṛhaspati twice in so close a succession, S-M omits his name and thereby alters the last *pāda*. This saves the metre but kills the sense. Dhātṛ is introduced for nothing in an uncompromisingly atheistic system of philosophy and unnecessarily creates some confusion.

It should be remembered that this is not the only instance of S-M tampering the reading of what was known as Bārhaspatya sayings. He had done the same thing with another verse (*yāvaj jīvam*, etc.) by providing two readings: the first, original; the second, his own.[16]

[13] *SSS*, 6; *SMS*, 15.
[14] *MB*, 76, v. 33 on *sūtra* 32.
[15] *SDS*, 5, line 49.
[16] For a detailed discussion of the variants of this verse, see Ch. 19 above. D.R. Shastri and Namai have included both *yāvaj jīvam*, etc. and *agnihotram*, etc. in their reconstruction of the lost *Bārhaspatyasūtra* as aphorism

So it may be concluded that the reading of the verse in question as found in the *RVP, PC, GrBh* and in the earlier part of *SDS*, Chapter I is the original one, other readings are variations or distortions.

Nos. 40 and 45, and B7 and B3 respectively. Shastri adopted the second reading for B3. Leaving aside, for the present, the question whether such popular sayings can be taken as authentic *sūtra*-s, we may note that the first readings in both cases would be more appropriate.

XXI
mṛtānāmapi jantūnām...

A verse in the *editio princeps* of the *SDS*, Ch. 1 runs as follows:

mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṃ śrāddhaṃ cet tṛptikāraṇam |
gacchatāmiha jantūnāṃ vyarthaṃ pātheyakalpanam ||[1]

If the *śrāddha* produces gratification to beings who are dead. Then here too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.[2]

Īśwarachandra Vidyāsāgara, the first editor of the *SDS*, could procure only five MSS for collation. Apparently all the five contained the same reading. Two large Sanskrit dictionaries, the *Śabdakalpadruma* and the *Vācaspatyam*, quote this reading along with other verses from the *SDS*.[3] Subsequent editions (reprints) of the *SDS* published by Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati (1871), Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara (1889) and Maheśacandra Pāl (1894) adopted the same reading.[4]

[1] *SDS* (BI ed.), 6.

[2] *SDS* (Parimal ed.), 12. The translation first appeared in *JAS(B)*, 1862, 381. For the meaning of *śrāddha*. see Appendix A.

[3] S.v. *Cārvāka*.

[4] It may be mentioned in this connection that Karl H. Potter wrongly attributes the *editio princeps* to Tarkavācaspati (T) and gives the year of publication as 1851 (809.17.1, 510). T's edition appeared first in 1871. A copy

Hari Nārāyaṇa Āpṭe brought out a new edition of the *SDS* in 1906. It supplied the last chapter not found in the MSS available to Īśwarachandra Vidyāsāgara. However, as regards the verse under discussion (v. 4 of the last section), Āpṭe's edition does not differ in any respect from the *editio princeps.*[5]

It is in Vāsudeva Shāstrī Abhyaṅkar's edition of the *SDS* (1924) that two additional lines are first found. The second line of the earlier reading (4 *cd*) becomes the first line of the next verse (5 *ab*) and two new lines, 4 *cd* and 5 *cd* are added. The two verses now read as follows:

mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṃ śrāddhaṃ cet tṛptikāraṇam |
nirvāṇasya pradīpasya snehaḥ saṃvardhayecchikhām ||
gacchatāmiha jantūnāṃ vyarthaṃ pātheyakalpanam |
gehasthakṛtaśrāddhena pathi tṛptiravāritā ||[6]

If the *śrāddha* produces gratification even to the dead beings,
oil would then increase the flame of an extinguished lamp.
It is futile to provide for the travellers when they start. Their gratification on the way would be boundless by the offering of *śrāddha* at home. (Trans. mine)

The addition of two new lines (4 *cd* and 5 *cd*) makes more cogent reading and much better sense. In place of nine verses of two lines each and a verse having three lines (twenty-one lines in all), we now have ten verses of two lines each and a verse having three lines (twenty-three lines in all).

Unfortunately Abhyaṅkar does not specify from which new MS or MSS he got these two additional lines. In his short exposition he refers to a couple of verses from the *VPu* (3.18.25-26). The second one is a variant of *SDS,* Ch. 1, lines 114-15 (=v. 3 in the last set of verses). However, Abhyaṅkar failed to notice that the first additional line, viz. *nirvāṇasya pradīpasya,* etc. (line 117 in his ed. = 4 *cd*) also occurs in *PC,* 2.21.[7] In fact the reading given in the *SDS* tallies with that of the *PC.* Most probably S-M got this verse from the *PC,* as he might have got vv. 2 and 3 from other sources.[8]

of this edition is available in the Government Sanskrit College Library, Kolkata. Similarly the name of Maheśacandra Pāl has been misprinted in Potter as C.M.Pal (809.17.19, 510).

[5] *SDS* (Ānandāśrama ed.), 5.

[6] *SDS* (BORI ed.), 13-14, lines 116-19.

[7] The speech is attributed to Cārvāka. Cf. *PC,* 2.20 = *VPu,* 3.18.26 = *SDS,* Ch. 1, last section, v. 3.

[8] For details see Ch. 6 above.

Fortunately, the verse (*PC,* 2.21) also occurs in the works of two Jain savants, Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa. In Hemacandra's auto-commentary on his *YŚ,* the verse runs as follows:

mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṃ yadi tṛptirbhavediha |
nirvāṇasya pradīpasya snehaḥ saṃvardhayecchikhām ||[9]

This varies a little from the reading found in the *PC* and *SDS* (*yadi tṛptirbhavediha,* 'if it causes gratification here' in place of *śrāddha cet tṛptikāraṇam* in *b*), but otherwise the readings are all alike.

Malliṣeṇa quotes this verse in his commentary on Hemacandra's *AYVD.* The reading cited by him is different from Hemacandra's but it is much closer to that of the *PC.* There is only one minor variant in *c: tannirvāṇapradīpasya* for *nirvāṇasya pradīpasya.*[10]

In spite of these variations, it cannot be claimed for certain that Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa got the verse from two different sources. Most probably they were quoting from memory which may account for the differences in their readings.

There is another point to be noted. Kṛṣṇamiśra attributed this verse to Cārvāka who makes a brief appearance in his allegorical play. Kṛṣṇamiśra has nothing but contempt for his views. Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa, on the other hand, quote the verse under discussion with approval and use it as a stick to beat the Mīmāṃsakas with. Both of them were adherents of the doctrine of non-violence (*ahiṃsā*) while the Mīmāṃsakas, as staunch Vedists, accepted and recommended slaughter of animals in *śrāddha* and other rituals. There is nothing to prove that Kṛṣṇamiśra was the author of this verse. It is more probable that the verse was already current as an *ābhāṇaka* or *lokagāthā* (popular saying), a floating verse circulating orally. S-M might very well have taken the verse from the *PC* and believed that it had its origin in the Cārvāka tradition. But the question is: did Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa, too, think that the verse "is clearly in the style of Cārvāka comments"?[11] Would they use a verse attributable to the Cārvāka-s in their polemics against the arch-Vedists? Or,

[9] On *YŚ,* 2.47, f. 98b.

[10] *SVM,* 69 on *AYVD,* v. 11.

[11] F.W. Thomas, 69 n36. He must have had some edition of *SDS* prior to the BORI ed. Hence his comment: "The first line is given [in *SDS*] as such, the second line differs" (ibid.). But, as we have shown above, the difference in reading is merely due to the absence of 4 *cd.*

did they know that the verse had emanated from Jain circles and it could be employed with immunity?

The verse makes fun of offering oblations to the departed soul in the *śrāddha* ceremony. The Cārvāka-s did not believe in the existence of the soul without the body. So the banter against the *śrāddha* ceremony is quite fitting. But that is not the only point. *Śrāddha* also involves slaughter of animals as food for the ancestors. As Manu prescribes:

dvau māsau matsya-māṃsena trin māsān hāriṇena |
aurabhreṇātha caturaḥ śākunenātha pañca vai || (3.268)

Two months with fish-flesh, three months with that of deer,
Four months with that of sheep, five months with that of birds.
(Trans. F.W. Thomas)

Both Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa quote this verse in the same sections in which they quote the *mṛtānāmapi jantūnām*, etc.[12]

Similarly, in order to deprecate *hiṃsā* in the performance of Vedic rituals, Malliṣeṇa quotes a verse that is also found in the *PPu*:

yūpaṃ chitvā paśuṃ hatvā kṛtvā rudhirakardamam |
yadyeva gamyate svarge narake kene gamyate ||[13]

If having cut a sacrificial post, having slain animals, and made a puddle of blood,
Thus one gets to heaven, whereby does one go to hell?[14]
(Trans. F.W. Thomas)

Māṭhara, too, quotes this verse (with some variants) in his commentary on the *SK*,[15] although neither he nor

[12] On *YŚ*, 2.43, f 98b; *SVM*, 62 on *AYVD*, v. 11.

[13] *SVM*, 65 on *AYVD*, v. 11. See *PPu*, Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, 13.323 (there are some minor variants).

[14] Trans. F.W. Thomas, 66.

[15] Māṭhara on *SK*, v. 2, 111. The verse as quoted reads: *vṛkṣaṃśchitvā paśuṃ hatvā kṛtvā rudhirakarddamam | yajñaiśced gamyate svarge narakaḥ kena gamyate* ||. Editors and translators of the *MVṛ* and *SVM* have not identified the source of this verse. Māṭhara vaguely refers to *anyacca* (another) while Malliṣeṇa attributes the verse to the followers of a great sage (*tathā ca paṭhanti pāramarṣāḥ*). There was no love lost between Hemacandra (or, for the matter of that, Malliṣeṇa) and the Cārvāka-s. So the "great *ṛṣi*" can never refer to a Cārvāka. It is also to be noted that Hemacandra devotes no fewer than thirteen verses in his *YS* (2.37-49) to denounce *hiṃsā* enjoined in the Vedas and Smṛtis and denounces Manu and other lawmakers as the worst of the *nāstika*-s (*nāstikebhyo 'pi nāstikaḥ*, 2.37).

Malliṣeṇa mentions the source. In the *PPu*, too, the verse is not attributed to the Cārvāka. The basic theme of the section in which this verse occurs is the condemnation of Vedic sacrifices that require violence.[16]

It is probable that S-M merely compiled the last eleven verses from disparate sources. He did not compose any of these verses (although he made some alterations in the readings)[17] and attributed all the verses to Bṛhaspati.[18] S-M concentrates on the practice of slaughtering animals in vv. 3-6, 9 and 11*ef*; vv. 1 and 7-8 deny the existence of the incorporeal soul (and consequently the futility of *śrāddha*), and vv. 9-11 ridicule the text of the Vedas, as well as Vedic sacrifices, and blame the Brahmins for inventing obscene rituals.

The first three verses can be traced back to the *PC*, *VPu*, *NC* and other texts. The context of vv. 4-6 can be related to similar sources, such as Jābāli's speech in the *Rām.*, Ayodhyākāṇḍa and *VPu*; v. 7 is taken from the *VDMP* while vv. 10-11 could have been taken from some Buddhist and/or Jain sources.[19] S-M does not always quote verbatim and his choice of the last eleven verses is rather eclectic. It is impossible to accept his declaration that Bṛhaspati is the author of all these verses. It is more probable that the verse, *mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṃ*, etc., was taken from a Jain source although Kṛṣṇamiśra attributed it to Cārvāka. Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa most probably knew the verse to be of Jain origin and unhesitatingly used it against the Vedic ritualists in general.

APPENDIX A

The word, *śrāddha*, is generally taken to mean funeral ceremony. But Monier-Williams has rightly observed:

[...] Śrāddha is not a funeral ceremony [*antyeshṭi*] but a supplement to such a ceremony: it is an act of reverential homage to a deceased person performed by relatives, and is moreover supposed to supply the dead with strengthening nutriment after the performance of the previous funeral ceremonies has endowed them to ethereal bodies; indeed until those *antyeshṭi* or 'funeral rites' have been performed,

[16] See Appendix B.

[17] See Chs. 19 and 20 above.

[18] *tadetatsarvaṃ bṛhaspatināpyuktam. SDS* (BORI ed.), 13, line 109.

[19] For details see Ch. 6 above. Jābāli, however, does not object to *hiṃsā*. He is content to point out the futility of offering food to the dead.

and until the succeeding first *śrāddha* has been celebrated the deceased relative is a preta or restless, wandering ghost and has no real body [only a *liṅgaśarīra,* q.v.], it is not until the first śrāddha has taken place that he attains a position among the Pitṛis or Divine Fathers in their blissful abode called Pitṛi-loka, and the śr. is most desirable and efficacious when performed by a son. (*A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. śrāddha.*)

Appendix B

The episode in *PPu,* Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, Ch. 13, first tells how Bṛhaspati (disguised as Śukra) misled the demons (*dānava*-s) who wished to learn the way to liberation. Bṛhaspati advised them to renounce all *yajña* and *śrāddha* (v. 316), and remain celibate (vv. 327-33). He also spoke vehemently against *hiṃsā* (319-26).

In another section of the same chapter Māyāmoha (as produced by Keśava) advises the demons further. He first assumes the guise of a Jain ascetic (*yogī digambara muṇḍo varhipatradhara,* v. 346) and then of a Buddhist monk (*raktāmbaradhṛk,* v. 360). In both forms Māyāmoha denounces the evil religion of slaughtering animals, etc. (*paśughātādiduṣṭadharma,* v. 361). The demons then began to indulge in reviling the Vedas, gods, *yajña* and Brahmins.

This is an amplified version of a tale found in the *VPu.* For a detailed study, see Hazra (1963), 343-45. Hazra, however, doubts the authenticity of the episode in *VPu* 3.18. (1940), 25. See also his "Introduction" to H.H. Wilson's translation of *VPu,* (k) - (l).

For a survey of the heretical doctrines in the Purāṇa-s, see Dandekar, 737-53.

XXII
Cārvāka/Lokāyata Philosophy: Perso-Arabic Sources

The whole literature of the Cārvāka system is lost. Scholars have ransacked all Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit works to glean whatever little that can be salvaged. However, the Arabic and Persian sources have not been tapped yet. Here I propose to discuss three such works.

I

The first source is, of course, *India* by al-Bīrūnī (1031). The passage runs as follows:

> [...] the book *Laukâyata [Lokāyata],* composed by Bṛihaspati, treating of the subjects that in all investigations we must exclusively rely upon the appreciations of the senses; the book *Agastyamata,* composed by Agastya, treating of the subject that in all investigations we must use the appreciation of the senses as well as tradition [...][1]

Bīrūnī apparently had no access to the first work he refers to. That is why he could mention only one aspect of this system, viz. sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the only valid means

[1] *Alberuni's India,* I: 132. For the Arabic Text, see *Fi Tahqiq mā li'l-Hind.*

of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). From earlier sources we know that the Laukāyatika-s denied everything that the theists believed in: God, the infallibility of the Vedas, the efficacy of the observance of religious duties either for this world or for the next, etc. The Buddhists and Jains too had no faith in God and the Vedas but they believed in after-life or the other-world (though, unlike the Jains, the Buddhists did not accept the idea of the imperishable soul). The Laukāyatika-s had gone several steps ahead: they were rooted in this world and had nothing to do with anything beyond the senses. Bīrūnī does not mention the most characteristic features of this school.

The reference to a work called *Agastyamata* (the doctrine of Agastya) is highly intriguing. Like the text of Bṛhaspati, this book, too, is lost. But it seems to refer to a modified view of the materialist school. What Bīrūnī exactly meant by *al-khabar* (translated as 'tradition') is not clear. Surely it cannot refer to the Sanskrit word *aitihya* (generally rendered into English as 'tradition') which was accepted as a valid means of knowledge by the Paurāṇika-s, i.e., those who accepted the books of legends (*purāṇa-s*) as authoritative.[2] We are told that they believed in eight means of knowledge, not just two (as Bīrūnī says). On the other hand, if *al-khabar* stands for 'common knowledge' which need not be verified by sense-perception anymore, we may conjecture that Bīrūnī was speaking of Purandara who declared that the Cārvāka-s accepted inference in so far as it related to mundane matters verifiable by sense-perception.[3]

Sachau in his notes on *India* speculated: "Is it (*sc.* the doctrine of Agastya) identical with that of the Jainas?" He referred to Colebrooke's view in this regard.[4]

Colebrooke indeed said, "But the Jainas are distinguished from the rest by their admission of no opinion, as they themselves affirm, which are not founded on perception, or on proof drawn from testimony."[5]

The position of the Jains vis-à-vis the valid means of knowledge, however, has not been uniform. It was Umasvāti (c.400 CE) who first referred to five *jñāna-s*: *mati* (sensory and non-sensory perception) and *śruta* (scriptural writing), belonging to the indirect kind, and *avadhi, manaḥparyāya* and *kevala,* three types of extra-sensory perceptions, belonging to the direct kind. Akalaṅka (c. 720-780) spoke first of three, then of six *pramāṇa-s*: *pratyakṣa, smṛti, pratyabhijñā, tarka, anumāna* and *āgama* (perception, memory, recognition, knowledge of invariable concomitance, inference and verbal testimony). Hemacandra and Vādidevasūri (both of the eleventh century) divided these six into two categories: direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the rest into indirect (*parokṣa*).[6] S-M, on the other hand, quotes the view of a Jain philosopher, Jinadatta, who spoke of perception and inference as the two valid means of knowledge admitted by *syādvāda* (the Jain philosophy).[7]

In any case, the doctrine of Agastya seems to be quite distinct from that of the Jains.

II

The second source is al-Shahrastānī's *Ārā'ahl al-Hind.* Unlike Bīrūnī, Shahrastānī (d. 549 AH/ 1153 CE) did not know Sanskrit, and what he writes about Indian philosophy is rather vague. He speaks of two schools of Brāhmaṇas: naturalist and dualist.[8] By 'naturalism' he might have meant *svabhāvavāda* which, though an older doctrine, had, by the tenth century (if not earlier), become identified with Lokāyata,[9] or he might have referred to Sāṃkhya. Since he does not expressly state which doctrine he had in mind, we cannot be sure whether he means Lokāyata or not.

[2] *NS,* 2.2, 1-2. The relevant verses referring to the views of different schools, including the Paurāṇika-s, are quoted in *SMS,* 14 and elsewhere (e.g. *Mān.* and *Tārkikarakṣā*).

We read of as many as eight valid means of knowledge accepted by different schools: *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *śabda* (verbal testimony), *upamāna* (analogy), *arthāpatti* (postulation), *abhāva* (absence), *sambhava* (inclusion) and *aitihya* (traditional hearsay). The Paurāṇika-s accepted all eight as valid.

[3] *TSP* on *TS,* vv. 1479-81.

[4] Sachau, 300 (note on 132). He, however, frankly confesses, "His (*sc.* Agastya's) doctrine is not known to me."

[5] Colebrooke (1807, 1873), II: 173.

[6] See Sanghvi (1961), 50-54 and Dixit (1971), 7, 22, 146.

[7] *SDS* (BORI ed.), 87, v. 4ab. Cowell, in his edition of Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays* (1873) also notes this view, but instead of mentioning Jinadatta, he refers to Mādhava (173 n2).

[8] See Bruce B. Lawrence (1976). For a survey of Shahrastānī's views, see M.S. Khan (1984), 199-208. The Arabic text has been edited by Md. Syed Kilani, Beirut, 1395 AH/1975 CE (second ed.).

[9] So far as I know, Bhaṭṭotpala (or Utpala Bhaṭṭa) was the first to identify *svabhāvavāda* with Lokāyata in his *SVi* on *BṛS,* 1.7.

III

The third source, and the most important one, is Abu'l Faḍl-i-Allāmi's *Āʿin-i Ākbarī*. Again, unlike Bīrūnī, Abul Faḍl (1551-1602) did not know Sanskrit but he had gathered around him the best available scholars of his time and prepared a digest of all the major systems of Indian philosophy. The two chapters (IV-V) can vie with any digest compiled before or after him.[10]

Historians of Indian philosophy, however, have paid little attention to this important Persian source. The exposition of some of the systems is more ample, though some others (like Cārvāka and Buddhist) are treated rather cursorily.[11] It is definitely a pointer to the fact that his informants knew little about the non-Vedic schools. Interestingly enough, the Jain philosophy is represented in greater detail than others.

Let us now look at the section on the Nāstika:

> *Charvaka*, after whom this school is named, was an unenlightened Brahmin. Its followers are called by Brahmins, *Nāstikas* or Nihilists. They recognise no existence apart from the four elements, nor any source of perception save through the five organs of sense. They do not believe in a God nor in immaterial substances, and affirm faculty of thought to result from the equilibrium of the aggregate elements. Paradise they regard as a state in which man lives as he chooses, free from the control of another, and hell the state in which he lives subject to another's rule. The whole end of man, they say, is comprised in four things: the amassing of wealth, women, fame and good deeds. They admit only such sciences as tend to the promotion of external order, that is, knowledge of just administration and benevolent government. They are somewhat analogous to the sophists in their views and have written many works in reproach of others, which rather serve as lasting memorials of their own ignorance.[12]

[10] K. Miśra writes of no fewer than twenty-three digests of philosophy (*darśana-saṃgraha*-s) right from the eighth century CE in his preface to *ṢDSam* (Varanasi ed.), xvii-xxi.

[11] A look at the space provided for the different philosophical systems in the English translation (*Āʿin-i Akbari*, Vol III, trans. Jarrett) will bear this out: Nyāya (Ch. IV: 143-66), Vaiśeṣika (166-67), Mīmāṃsā (167-72), Vedānta (172-79), Sāṃkhya (179-87), Pātañjala (187-98), Jaina (Ch. V, 199-222), Bauddha (233-27) and Cārvāka (227-28).

[12] For the Persian text, see *Āʿin-i Akbari* (1297 AH/1880 CE), 89. The English translation is quoted from Jarrett, 227-28.

Some comments are in order:

(a) Although the informants of Abu'l Faḍl speak of 'many works' written by the Cārvāka-s (instead of only one mentioned by Bīrūnī), they do not seem to have read even one of them. This is understandable, for no authoritative text or commentary of the Cārvāka school was available in the sixteenth century (or, for that matter, after the twelfth). Whatever little was known to them seems to have been transmitted orally from preceptors to disciples. Hence their account cannot be expected to be accurate in all respects.

(b) The informants must have been extremely pious and God-fearing. Their attitude is best reflected in the way Cārvāka is introduced in the very first sentence.

(c) 'The whole end of man' mentioned in the passage obviously refers to what is known as *puruṣārtha* in the Brahminical tradition, and the enumeration of the four constituent parts or elements is meant to suggest the four *varga*-s (departments) of life: *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (pleasure), *mokṣa* (release) and *dharma* (religious merit). This is not the right order in which they are represented by the Brahminical authors. Originally only three such *varga*-s were formulated, *mokṣa* came to be added later. *Dharma* comes first, followed by *artha* and *kāma; mokṣa* is the *summum bonum.* All pious men and women are required to pay attention to all three, but there were differences of opinion as to the priority of *artha* and *dharma.* Kauṭilya, for example, admits all three to be the end of life, but to him *artha* comes first. Without wealth, there can be no pleasure or religious merit.[13] Vātsyāyana, the author of *Kāmasūtra* (fourth century CE), upholds *dharma* above all (second comes *artha* and last, *kāma*) but prefers to treat all the three *varga*-s as equally important; no *varga* is to be left out of life.[14] The writers of Dharmaśāstra, on the other hand, place *dharma* over everything else.[15]

(d) We should also note that, in this context, *kāma* does not mean *zan* (woman) as Abu'l Faḍl writes: it means pleasure as such.[16] Only in a narrow sense it means sexual enjoyment.

[13] *KA,* 1.7.3-7.

[14] *KS,* 1.2, see the English trans., 36-43. Vātsyāyana himself defines *kāma* as "the desire for the enjoyment of objects through the five senses —of hearing, touch, sight, and smell under the guidance of the mind which is connected with the soul. The object of this desire is pleasure." (1.2.11).

[15] For a survey of the relationship between *artha* and *kāma*, see Kane, II: 1:8-9.

[16] See *kāma* in Monier-Williams (1899).

(e) Similarly, *nik-nāmī* and *niku-kārī* are poor equivalents for *dharma* and *mokṣa*. Abu'l Faḍl, it appears, misunderstood his informants. The Cārvāka-s, uncompromising materialists as they were, had nothing to do with religious merit or release (from the cycle of rebirth). Nor is there any definite evidence that they used to think in such Brahminical terms as *puruṣārtha* and *varga*-s of life. Some of their opponents have said that they recognized both wealth and pleasure as the end of life, but some speak of pleasure alone as their creed.[17] In any case, the Cārvāka-s, like their fellow-*nāstika*-s, the Buddhists and Jains, were under no obligation to operate under such Brahminical schemes as these.

(f) 'The sciences [tending] to the promotion of external order,' etc. obviously refer to Arthaśāstra, the science of polity. The connection between Lokāyata and Arthaśāstra has been suggested by some other writers too, both medieval and modern.[18] However, it is not proven that the Lokāyata philosophy was closely allied to the princes or even to court circles. Unfortunately, we possess only one Arthaśāstra text —that by Kauṭilya. He does mention Lokāyata as a constituent of Ānvīkṣikī (logical philosophy) but the word, *lokāyatam*, there may very well mean the art of argumentation or disputation, as in Pali.[19] Moreover, the *KA* is anything but unorthodox; it accepts the Vedic lore as the subject of learning (*vidyā*) to be mastered by a prince.[20] The Cārvāka-s, on the other hand, openly defied the authority of the Vedas and

[17] *PC*, Act 2 and *SDS*, 2, speak of both *artha* and *kāma* as the two *varga*-s accepted by the Lokāyatika-s whereas Nīlakaṇṭha (commentary on the *Gītā*, 16.11) and Sadānanda Kāśmīraka (*ABS*, 99) mention *kāma* alone as their *puruṣārtha*. Warder (1971) does not consider this difference to be of any importance. Referring to S-M's view (which is earlier) he says, "Perhaps this is from a different Lokāyata source giving a slightly different view. Otherwise we must understand that wealth is necessary as a means to pleasure" (39). But this very difference in representation points to the fact that none of the opponents of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata knew for certain what the latter had actually said. They were simply trying to place the doctrine within the framework of Brahminical thought regarding the end of life. It is hardly conceivable that such diehard atheists and deniers of after-life, etc. would think in these terms.

[18] See. for example, *SDS*, 2, Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216; Warder (1971), 39.

[19] See Ch. 16 above.

[20] *KA*, 1.2.8. Kauṭilya staunchly upholds the social and religious order (*varṇa* and *āśrama*) promulgated by the Brahminical orthodoxy and fosters all kinds of superstitions. See 1.19.31, 3.18.7, 3.20.22, 4.10.13, 5.2.5, 37-45, etc. See also Kangle, III: 150-60.

all religious practices.[21] Such a connection is therefore ill warranted.

(g) The reference to *sufistā'ī* is rather interesting. The word, *lokāyata*, as I have said before, originally meant disputation, often it would appear, for disputation's sake. Commentators on Pali canonical works also explain the word in this way (*vitaṇḍasattham*). Only much later it came to mean 'materialist philosophy'. In fact, the word, *cārvāka*, as a synonym is found even later.[22] Abu'l Faḍl uses this word, not *lokāyata*, to designate 'materialism'. But the two meanings —*disputatio* and materialism— have already got mixed up.[23] The Cārvāka-s are therefore, represented as argumentative and denying every tenet of their opponents, particularly the concept of after-life and the infallibility of the Vedas.

To sum up, we may say that though the account of the Cārvāka philosophy as given in the *Āʿin-i Ākbarī* does not provide any reliable piece of information (other than confirming one view attested in other sources, viz., consciousness is the product of four-fold matter, i.e. earth, air, fire and water), it is negatively important inasmuch as it shows that this system had definitely become a 'lost philosophy'[24] by the sixteenth century and even the best pundits of north India had little idea of its tenets.

Postscript

No available source so far consulted or referred to by the scholars of ancient Indian philosophy mentions (as Abu'l

[21] See *SDS*, vv. 10-11, 14-15.

[22] Cārvāka the *rākṣasa* (demon) in the *Mbh* is not projected as a materialist; he worshipped Brahmā and earned a boon from him. He is burnt alive by the Brahmins for the sin of reviling the latter (Śāntiparvan, 39.22. 48 in the crit. ed.). The name, Cārvāka, however, became a synonym for Lokāyata in course of time. It is first encountered in the works of Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra although Śāntarakṣita and Śaṅkarācārya still used the word, *lokāyata*, only. It appears that the Lokāyatika-s too called themselves Cārvāka-s (see *TSP*, II: 528). For the technical and popular senses of materialism, see the *OED*, *s.v.*

[23] *Śabda-kalpa-drumaḥ*, the famous Sanskrit lexicon compiled by the pundits of Radhakanta Deva (1822-52, Supplement, 1859), records two different meanings of *lokāyatam*, viz. *tarkabhedaḥ* (a kind of logic) and *cārvāka-śāstram* (the doctrinal work of the Cārvāka).

[24] Randle used this term in relation to *svabhāvavāda*, etc.: "Some of these 'lost philosophies' (so to speak) were probably fathered on the *Lokāyata* or *Cārvāka* school and some of them are possibly to be found in the doctrines reviewed in [*NS* 4.1].", 16 n3.

Faḍl does) that the Cārvāka-s conceived of paradise and hell as the earthly conditions of freedom and bondage respectively. Such a reference, however, is found in a small, obscure and undated philosophical digest, *Sarva-darśana-śiromaṇi* written by Śrī-Kāṃci-Rāmānujācārya II (different from the author of *Śrī-bhāṣya* and other works, as the editor mentions on 19n). The passage runs as follows:

> Dependence (on another's will) is bondage, self-dependence is freedom, passing away of the body is super-freedom (*paratantratā bandhaḥ svatantratā muktiḥ, dehanivṛttiḥ parāmuktiḥ*, 2).

XXIII
What is Meant by nāstika *in the* Nyāyasūtra *Commentary*?

Vātsyāyana in his commentary *(Bhāṣya)* on the *NS* employs the word, *nāstika* and its derivatives, *nāstikatva*, and *nāstikya*, thrice (on *NS*, 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 3.2.61, IIIb60 in Ruben). The meaning of *nāstika* (lit. negativist) in the last two instances is conventional and readily comprehensible. But it is not so evident in the case of the first. I propose to deal with this problem in detail and consider the views of other explicators of the *NS*.

Let us begin with *NS*, 1.1.2. In course of explaining what is meant by false knowledge *(mithyājñāna)*, Vātsyāyana enumerates how evils produced under the influence of attraction and repulsion lead to moral lapses: "Driven by the evils and through the agency of the body one commits violence, theft and incest. Through words (one is led to) plotting against others, covetousness and *nāstikya*."[1] Vātsyāyana adds that motivations like these are sinful, resulting in *adharma*, lack of merit.

Apparently *nāstikya* is here associated with irreligiosity. The *Manu* very succinctly explains *nāstika* as 'a defiler of the Veda',

[1] All references to the *NS* and its commentaries are to the texts edited by Anantalal Thakur and the English translation by Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya (with some minor modifications).

nāstiko vedanindakaḥ (2.11).[2] Defiling the Veda is one of the worst sins in the eye of Brahminical orthodoxy. By including *nāstikya* in the enumeration of vices, Vātsyāyana records his unflinching devotion to the Veda as well as his own orthodoxy.

It is, however, well known that the term, *nāstika,* is also employed by the Buddhists and Jains to designate those who, instead of denying the validity of the Veda, used to deny the existence of the other-world or after-life (*paraloka*) and hence the concept of virtue and vice. See, e.g., Vāmana and Jayāditya on *Aṣṭ,* 4.4.60 and Hemacandra in his auto-commentary on *AC,* 3.526.[3] We may note in passing how difference in religious views leads to divergent interpretations of the same word. Since the Buddhists and Jains had nothing to do with the Veda and hence had no concern in upholding it as a sacred text, they had to put forward their own meaning of *nāstikya* in order to brand the common enemy of all religions, namely, the materialists (grammar is not as objective a science as some people believe it to be).

In whichever sense we take *nāstikya* in the *NSBh* on *NS,* 1.1.2, there is no room for doubt regarding the moral disapproval that goes with the word.

The *NSBh* on *NS,* 3.2.61 (*bhūtebhyo mūrtyupādānavat tadupādānam,* "The production of the body is just like the production of certain composite objects out of material elements") opens with the following statement, *atra nāstika āha,* "To this (conclusion) the *nāstika* says". The *sūtra* purports to refute the view that the body is produced due to connection with the results of actions previously performed (*pūrvakṛta-phalānuvandhāt tad utpattiḥ,* 3.2.60, IIIb59 in Ruben). Eleven *sūtra*-s (3.2.62-72, IIIb 61-71 in Ruben) are devoted to this issue. Denial of anything beyond the four elements (viz., earth, air, fire and water) is the basic stand of the Indian materialists.[4] There is a Cārvāka aphorism which affirms that the body is merely a combination of four elements (*tatsamudāye śarīrendriya-viṣayasaṃjñāḥ*).[5] *NS,* 3.2.61 reiterates this view.

Nāstika in this instance obviously refers to the materialist. The Buddhists and the Jains also call the materialist *nāstika* or *ṇāhiyavādī,*[6] because he does not believe in rebirth and the notion that the meritorious and sinful acts of previous birth would influence the course of future life. Denial of rebirth and hence of after-life (*paraloka*) is another characteristic position of the Indian materialists. A Cārvāka aphorism runs as follows: *paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ,* "There is no other world because of the absence of any other-worldly being" (i.e. the transmigrating self).[7] Hence *nāstika* in the context of *NS,* 3.2.61 means the materialist.

The *NSBh* on *NS,* 1.1.2 and 3.2.61 may then very well be taken to refer to the same doctrine.

So far so good. However, *nāstika* in the *NSBh* on *NS,* 1.1.1 does not and cannot mean the same. Let us look at the context. Speaking of the importance of corroborative evidence (*dṛṣṭānta*), Vātsyāyana writes:

> It (*dṛṣṭānta*) being there, inference and testimony are possible; without it these are not possible. It is also the basis

[2] Not all commentators and translators of the *Manu,* however, take *nāstika* and *vedanindaka* as synonymous. G. Bühler, for instance, translated the verse (2.11) as follows: "Every twice-born man, who, relying on the Institutes of dialectics, treats with contempt those two sources (of the laws [Veda and Dharmaśāstra]) must be cast out by the virtuous, as an atheist and scorner of the Vedas" (31). Dasgupta, on the other hand, proposes to take *vedanindaka* as 'the definition of *nāstika*'(3: 518-19). See also n3 below.

[3] *asti matirasya āstikaḥ. nāsti matirasya nāstikaḥ... na ca matisattāmatre pratyaya iṣyate, kiṃ tarhi paraloka'stīti yasya matirasti sa āstikaḥ. tadviparīto nāstikaḥ. Kāśikā,* 396; *nāsti puṇyaṃ pāpam iti matirasya nāstikaḥ. AC* auto-commentary, 334. Commenting on the word, *nāstika,* in Hemacandra's *AYVD,* v. 20, as explained by Malliṣeṇasūri, F.W. Thomas writes: "The negative term *nāstika* sometimes denotes those who reject the Veda and its *dharma,* in which case it includes the Buddhists: more generally it is those who deny moral responsibility and future life: which seems to be the sense here, as the Buddhists and the Jains themselves, escape" (126 n3).

Not only the Buddhists and the Jains but some Brahminical writers too follow this meaning. Medhātithi (on *Manu,* 8.22) calls the *nāstika*-s *paralokāpavādin*-s, but his gloss on *nāstika* in *Manu,* 4.163, runs as follows: *vedapramāṇākānām arthānāṃ mithyātvādhyavasāyaḥ,* "the view that the Vedic doctrines are not true".

[4] There was also another (and presumably earlier) school of materialists in India, which spoke of a fifth element (*ākāśa,* space) in addition to the four, as attested by the *Mbh,* Śāntiparvan, 267.4; *SKS,* 1.1.7-8, etc. See Ch. 2 above. The Cārvāka-s seem to have appeared after the redaction of the *NS.* But the history of materialism in India goes back to a much earlier period, even earlier than the Buddha. Cf. Ajita Kesakambala's views found in the *SPhS* (*DN*). See Ch. 3 above. Unfortunately no materialist text of the earlier period has survived; the *Cārvākasūtra* (now lost) too is available only in fragments. But there are enough fragments to evince the continuity of the old materialist tradition. Hence I have referred to the Cārvāka aphorisms to represent the materialist view.

[5] Cārvāka fragment, I.3. For sources see Ch. 6 above.

[6] See Āryaśūra, *JM,* 23.57, 151; Haribhadra, *SKa,*164.

[7] Cārvāka fragment, IV. 2. See Ch. 6.

of the application of *nyāya* (*nyāya-pravṛtti*). By (showing) the contradiction of the *dṛṣṭānta* the position of the opponent can be declared as refuted. By the substantiation of the *dṛṣṭānta,* one's own position is well established. If the *nāstika* admits a corroborative instance, he has to surrender his *nāstikatva.* If he does not admit any, how can he silence his opponents? (5)

Who is this *nāstika*? Surely he cannot be the irreligious person caring neither for the Vedas nor for after-life (as in the *NSBh* on *NS,* 1.1.2). Nor can *nāstika* here mean the materialist philosopher (as in the *NSBh* on *NS,* 3.2.61). A materialist is only too keen on perceptible evidence. A Cārvāka aphorism asserts: *pratyakṣam* (*ekam*) *eva pramāṇam,* "Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge".[8] And *dṛṣṭānta,* as Vātsyāyana explains, "is an object of perception (*pratyakṣa-viṣayo 'rthaḥ*), an object about which the notions (*darśanam*) of the layman (i.e. one who learns) as well as of the expert (i.e. one who expounds) are not in conflict (i.e. are unanimous)." (5). (*NSBh* on *NS* 1.1.1. See also *NS,* 1.1.25).

Why should then a materialist deny the existence of corroborative instance, as Vātsyāyana's *nāstika* is supposed to do? In this case, *nāstika* then must mean someone else. Jha, however, translated *nāstika* and its derivatives in all the three instances uniformly as 'Atheism' and 'Atheist' (177, 365, 1404); Gangopadhyaya prefers 'sceptic', 'scepticism', 'heterodoxy' and 'Nāstika' (5, 9, 268 respectively).

The sub-commentators of the *NS* do not bother to explain what Vātsyāyana here means by *nāstika.* Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīsā in his comments on *NS,* 4.2.18,[9] proposes to equate this *nāstika* to the *ānupalambhika,* who is the exponent of the view that 'all is non-existent' (*athedānīm ānupalambhikaḥ sarvaṃ nāstīti manyamāna āha*). Vācaspati, however, identifies this *ānupalambhika* with the *śūnyavādin.* Tarkavāgīśa, on the other hand, proposes to take him as an *asatkhyātivādin,* which a Buddhist *śūnyavādin* is not.[10] *Śūnyavāda,* as expounded by Nāgārjuna, refuses to commit whether the world is existent (*sat*) or non-existent (*asat*) or anything else. The doctrine

[8] Cārvāka fragment, III.1. See Ch. 6.

[9] Tarkavāgīśa, V:109. See also 1: 42 (on *NS,* 1.1.1). Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya offer a summarized version of Tarkavāgīśa's Elucidation (*ṭippanī*) in English.

[10] Tarkavāgīśa, IV:233 (on *NS,* 4.1.37) and V:212-14. In *NP* (32) Tarkavāgīśa calls the doctrine of the *ānupalambhika 'sarvvanāstitvavāda',* the doctrine of the non-existence of all objects. See also n11 below.

of the *ānupalambhika,* according to Tarkavāgīśa, is therefore quite distinct from the Madhyamaka view. It may be called *sarvvābhāvavāda* (Elucidation of *NS,* 4.2.18).[11]

In the absence of any other opinion offered by the sub-commentators of the *NS* it is well nigh impossible to identify the *ānupalambhika* for certain. However, one thing is evident. The context is epistemological and metaphysical, not ethical or religious.

Vātsyāyana thus uses the term *nāstika* in two different, and even contradictory, senses: (a) an absolute idealist who denies the very existence of all things, and (b) a materialist who accepts nothing that is not perceptible and, therefore, he is considered irreligious.

[11] Tarkavāgīśa, V:108-09. He apparently has *NS,* 4.1.37 (IVa34 in Ruben) in mind: *sarvamabhāvo bhāveṣvitaretarābhāvasiddheḥ,* "All is non-existent (*abhāva – asat*), because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved."

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